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A COMPARISON OF SEXUAL AND NON-SEXUAL ASSAULT PROSECUTION

Susan Caringella-NacDonald, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 1983
In 1974 the state of Michigan enacted what has come to be referred to as model rape legislation.

A salient objective of the

Criminal Sexual Conduct (CSC) Code in this state was to facilitate
the comparable rather than unique handling of sexual assaults in the
criminal justice system.

The primary purpose of this study was to

discern whether or not this objective of equitable case treatment was
realized through implementation.

The focus of this research was

therefore directed towards the discovery of differences in sexual and
non-sexual assault case prosecutions.

Specific aspects of legal

change involving corroboration requirements, consent and resistance
standards, and issues of victim precipitation and credibility, were
scrutinized as they related to the intents underlying enactment of
the esc code.
A second objective of this investigation was to apply theoretical perspectives on the origin and operation of the criminal law to
the enacted and enforced statute alteration.

Previous work in this

field has neglected not only the assessment of chang:e effected by
legal modifications, but also has been lacking in the application of
theory to empirical research, and additionally in the examination of
the comparative viability and/or implications of various theories for
legal change.
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Data were collected for a two year period on the charging and
plea bargaining decisions rendered by prosecutors in these
of assaults in one Michigan jurisdiction.

t~-10

types

Prosecutors' discretionary

decisions were focused on as they have a critical impact upon case
treatment and outcome, yet rarely have been studied.

Sexual and non-

sexual assault cases were compared in terms of univariate, bivariate,
and multivariate analytic techniques.

A number of differences were

found to exist between these assault offenses along the dimensions of
case characteristics, types of decisions made, and factors influencing these discretionary decisions.

The host of research findings

were interpreted given the six theoretical perspectives described.
Consensus and plural conflict theories were of limited utility
for interpretation purposes.

Hhile the labeling orientation provided

the basis for some insight, it too was found wanting.

Instrumental

Marxian theory facilitated explanation of some research results, but
also fell short of full applicability.

Structural Marxian theory was

of greater value in the interpretation of the variety of findings
encountered in this endeavor, but, too .was found problematic in
several respects.

It was dialectic Marxian theory that was most pro-

ductively applied to the seemingly inconsistent results indicating
both success and failure in terms of the implementation of alleged
intents underlying the esc code.
The tenets of dialectic Marxian theory were drawn on to conclude that enactment of even model sexual assault legislation, while
representing a progressive step in this area, necessarily falls short
in ef:(ecting true gains for rape victims.

The root causes of this
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phenomenon in our society must first be addressed and then interwoven
with legal solutions designed to alleviate problems concomitant with
sexual assault and its victims.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND STATEJ1ENT OF THE PROBLEH

Introduction

The crime of rape has been included as a Part I Index offense in
the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) since 1930, but not until
approximately the last decade has attention been directed towards the
problema tics associated w:i th this phenomenon.

Numerous factors can

be related to the growing awareness surrounding the vast array of
issues attending sexual assault.
In 1954 the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. the Board of Education gave official recognition to the plight of minorities in
American society.

The Civil Rights Movement, which ensued and gained

momentum throughout the 1960s, generated a critical attitude in regards to the lack of implementation of fundamental American values
such as equality and justice for all in society.
The Homen's Movement, inspired in part by the developments in
the Civil Rights areas, directed specific attention to the minority
status of women and the failure of American society to accept women
as full participating members within the social structure.

As the

consciousness regarding the plight of women in society grew, so too
did· the more specific concern with rape and its victims.
The feminist movement has been instrumental in pointing out that
indignation over rape, when existent, has historically been predicated upon the violation of another man 1 s property (Brownmiller,
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1975a; Ilean & deBruyn-Kops, 1982; LeGrand, 1973; National Institute
of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ), 1973; Schwendingers,
1983; ~'ood, 1973).

The treatment

of

women as property finds its

parallel in the institution of slavery and attributions of inferiority
to Blacks.
The atmosphere during the 1960.s, engendered by such phenomena as
the Civil Rights Movement, anti-war protests, and campus rebellions,
facilitated the critical examination of the vieWs, roles, and treatment of women in society.

The problems with the views and treatment

of rape victims were similarly beginning to be assessed.
There are several considerations in addition to women's movements which. contribute to the explanation of the increase in concern
about rape.

Urban violence and riots during the 1960s stimulated

fear and drew emphatic attention to the incidence of crime in general.
The Commission on Law Enforcerr.ent and Administration of Justice
(1967) and the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of
Violence (1969) were both established during this time frame to
evaluate and make recommendations with regard to crime.

Nation-wide

concern about crime included concern about rape.
The alarm over crime in general

~nd

over rape in particular were

also both fueled in the mid to late 1960s when the National Ovinion
Research Corporation (NORC) released figures on the amount of crime
not reported to the police (Ennis, 1966) and thus not a part of national statistics.

:NORC (1966) estimated that for every one rape

reported to police, three to four rapes actually occurred.

The un-

der-reporting, and hence underestimation, of crime in the United
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States, including rape, was further substantiated by the first victimization survey undertaken by the government in the following year
(President' s· Commission on Law· Enforcement and the Administration of
Justice, 1967).
Subsequent victimization surveys: conducted by the U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Statistics report fairly consistent results through the 1970s: (50% of all rapes were estimated to be
unreported},

Several other sources (Brownmiller, 1975b; Curtis,

1976) estimate the percentage of unreported rapes to be as high as
90% or more.
It is important to note that rape was declared to be the most
notoriously under-reported offense in this country Oy the FBI itself ·
(FBI, 1975: 15).

Therefore, the concern about rape, which was begin-

ning to materialize around the early 1970s, can be viewed as partially the result of increased knowledge about the sheer incidence
of this offense.

Feminist and women's groups had begun to draw

attention to rape, and these new research findings served to
strengthen th'; cause.

The Speak Out On

Rap~,

sponsored by the New

York radical feminists in 1971, WAR (Women Against Rape) groups, and
Rape Crisis Centers emerging around this time illustrate the consolidation of concern among women which was developing in the 1970s.
The publication of Patterns in forcible rape in 1971 (Amir) also
contriLuted to the heightened attention being paid to this offense.
Amir's study of 646 rape cases in Philadelphia has been cited as a
'' ... landmark behavioral science study of the crime of rape" (NILECJ,
1978:2).

Amir's work stimulated much. academic interest and drew yet
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further attention to the topic of rape.

Moreover, Amir 1 s work

prompted much criticism and subsequently furthered research and
theorizing on the subject.
Susan Brownmiller 1 s classic treatise, Against our t11ill, publicized rape as a social and ideological issue in 1975 (a).

Brownmiller

substantiated her articulation on the sexism concomitant with rape
offenses, attitudes, and trea~ent through an historical analysis.
This work accomplished much by way of sensitizing the public to the
problem of rape.
The increases in forcible rape as documented in the UCR during
the 1960s and 1970s constitute another element which elevated concern.
Between 1968 and 1973, forcible rapes increased 65%, while murder,
assault, and robbery (the other three violent/personal Index crimes)
gretv- by 45% (FBI, 1973:6, 11, 15).

Between 1975 and 1979 reported

cases of forcible rape had increased another 35% (FBI, 1980: 14),
Forcible rapes increased a full 1001; over the decade of the 1970s.
In 1980 the FBI stated that '' •.• forcible rapes showed the highest
increase among all Crime Index offenses during the past decade.

The

trend has shown no sign of mitigating" (1980:326).
I t might be pointed out that whether the increase in the number

of rapes is due in part to increased reporting or to an actual increase in. its incidence over time is not of concern at this juncture.
Moreover, it is virtually impossible to make such a determination.
The relevant contention here is that increases, and estimates of the
proportion of unreported rapes, have all contributed to the heightened attention being paid to sexual assault.
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There are innumeraOle iss.ues whid'l can be expounded upon as they
relate to the heightened sensitivity and concern surrounding the
crime of rape.

The rape literature and research take a number of

different directions in dealing with_ the topic and relevant issues.
Perhaps the most salient problem concerns the victimization of rape
victims by the criminal justice system.

Historically grounded be-

liefs and attitudes and antiquated statutes defining rape as carnal
knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will are interwoven in
the fabric of present day inequitable rape case treatment.
titles such as Twice traumatized:
(Bohmer & Blumberg, 1975), Rape:
& Burgess, 1975), Rape:

Q.

Recent

The rape victim and the court
The victim goes on trial (Holmstrom

The. victim as defendant (Landau, 1974),

If you rape a woman and steal her T.V., what can they get you for

in New York?

A.

Stealing her T.V. (Lear, 1972), Rape and rape laws:

Sexism in society and the law (l.eGrand. 1973), Rape victim:

A victim

of society and the law (Mathiasen. 1974), Existentialism and corrob. oration of sex crimes in New· York:

A new attempt to limit "If some-

one didn't see it. i t didn't happen" (Pitler, 1973), and~
rape:

Institutionalized sexism in the CJS (Robin. 1977) all indicate

that the criminal justice system is anything but a minor concern

vis-~-vis the crime of rape and its victims.
Because the victims of rape suffer at the hands of the rapist
and the law, change has been demanded.

Carnal knowledge statutes

have been attacked for their discriminatory and unjust requirements
and for perpetuating inequitable sexist practices and attitudes.
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(l3enDor 1 1976; Bohmer & Blumberg, 1975; Brownmiller, 1975a.: Griffin,
1972; Harris, 1976; Holmstrom & Burgess, 1975; LeGrand, 1972;
Luginbill, 1975; Sebba, .1973; Shapo, 1975; l.Jashburn, 1978; Younger,
1971),

Alteration of legis·lative codes has thus become a focal point

for those concerned about rape in the nation.

To state that reform

is long overdue is most charitable, particularly given that present
day statutes contain concepts and principles articulated in law as
early as 1900 B.C. (in the Code of Hammurabi),
Over less than the span of a full decade, virtually every state
in this nation has altered its rape legislation (Field & Bienen,
1980:153).

In some states the changes are quite minor, while in

others the changes have been sweeping and radical.

The massive legis-

lative alteration in this country is in no small measure a response
to women 1 s groups calling for change.
Perhaps the most critical component behind reform is the call
for rape to be viewed and treated as a violent, assaultive crime,
like any other (BenDor, 1976; Brownmiller, 1975a; Gager & Schur,
1976; Klemmack & Klemmack, 1976).

The inequitable treatment of rape

has historically been tied to statutory standards, such as corroboration and resistance requirements, which are unique to the crime
of rape.

The removal of such. obstacles has been a major thrust of

reform legislation.

The underlying logic is that if rape is seen

and treated as a violent rath.er than sexual act, victims will undergo
less difterential and discriminatory treatment.

If rape were treated

comparably to other violent assaults, less scrutiny would be
attending victim demeanor, consent, precipitation, credibility, and
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the like,

The desired end result concerns the fair and just handling

of the crime and contingently the reduction of double victimization
and trauma.

Statement of the Problem

Given the tremendous amount of legal change over recent years,
it is somewhat surprising that virtually no studies have been conducted assessing the enforcement of new rape codes.

Whether or not

the objectives inspiring new rape statutes are realized is wholly
contingent upon the implementation process.

The question of whether

or not enactment of new laws represents a sufficient measure to
accomplish problem resolution, i.e., comparable rather than unique
rape case treatment, must be evaluated via examination of the administration of such new laws.

Yet, such efforts do not appear to be

forthcoming.
The purpose of this research is to assess specifically this
issue.

The objectives embodied in a model sexual assault code are

investigated in light of the implementation of the law.

The ulti-

mate objective of fair rape case treatment intends equity in terms of
the types of requirements, standards, practices, and overall handling of sexual and non-sexual assault crimes.

The problem of the

differential treatment of these forms of criminal offenses has been
addressed through statutory char:.ges.

Mod'el· sexual assault laws, such

as the code examined in this research, directly mirror the intent of
equitable rape case treatment through the elimination of antiquated
standards such as those pertaining to corroboration, resistance,
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and victim character/reputation,

This research examines whether or

not this overriding objective has been met through implementation by
investigating the (dis)similarity in the handling of sexual and nonsexual assaults.

If the goal of having rape viewed and treated as a

violent crime is realized through the enactment and implementation of
new laws, few (if any) differences between this offense and other
personal, violent offenses should be discovered.
Applying theoretical perspectives in criminology pertaining to
the origin and enforcement of criminal law to legal change in rape
provides insight into alternative types of implications of both the
change in rape law and into the relative neglect in attention being
paid to the actual implementation process attending such enactments.
While theoretical applications can facilitate predictions and. anticipate consequences of statute change in rape, interpretations in the
literature at present suffer from three major problems.

First, the

few authors in the field who do apply criminological theory to the
topic of rape have yet to assess or interpret new legislation with
such perspectives (Brownmiller, 1975a; Curtis, 1976; Schvendingers,
1974).

The second point is that there exist only a very few studies

on the effect of sexual assault laws after their passage, and none on
the comparability of sexual and non-sexual assault case treatment
under new legislation.

A third problem is that empirical assessments

rarely accompany theoretically oriented works.

In short, comparative

testing of the applicability of differing theoretical approaches on
the subject of change in rape law are non-existent-.
of this type of assessment lies in the insights,

The importance

explanations~

and
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understanding facilitated by applying theory to everyday practice in
the effort to discern whether or not, and why, enactment of new laws
does or does not achieve stated goals.
The type of enforcement of any· law is contingent upon discretionary decisions rendered by criminal justice officials.

It is

discretion then, and the factors underlying discretionary decisions
rendered, that must be scrutinized in order to determine whether or
not rape is treated in a consistent manner with_ other personal violent assaults in the implementation of enacted change.
Focus on discretion in the criminal justice system has generally
centered around the trichotomous classification of police., courts,
and corrections.

The problem here is that this discretion " ••. fails

to take into account the most powerful figure in the administration
of justice" (Cole, 1975:227).

Prosecutors have not only been said to

be the most powerful agents of the law (Blumberg, 1979; Cole, 1975;
Miller, 1969}, but also those who operate with the greatest discretionary latitude (Blumberg, 1979; Chambliss & Seidman, 1971; Cole,
1975; Davis, 1976; Jacoby, 1977; Newman, 1966).

It is the prosecutor

who decides who to charge, what/how many charges to levy, whether or
not to plea bargain, nolle cases, and so forth.

The prosecutor is an

independently acting official to whom scant attention is paid in the
theoretical and research literature (Cole, 1975; Grosman, 1979;
Neubauer, 1974).

This oversight must be remedied, especially in

light of the preceding discussion regarding the importance of discretionary criminal justice decision-making in reaction to the
implementation process.

If prosecutors represent the most powerful
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10
figures in the criminal justice system, there is good reason to as-

sume that they will shape, if not determine, the type of implementation of new legislative enactments, i.e., whether or not the goal of

comparable versus discriminatory rape case treatment will be realized.
The factors that prosecutors consider in making determinations in
different types of cases about who will be charged, what charge(s)
will be leveled, and whether or not, and to what extent cases will be

plea bargained, are critical to understand if assessment is to be
made about the equity and fairness in rape case treatment and out-

The objective of this research is to contribute to the under-

standing of the implementation process attending new and model rape
legislation as it exists in Michigan.

The "bottom line" question

concerns whether or not the salient objective of victim advocate
groups, such as the women's rape task forces, of comparability in
sexual and non-sexual assault case treatment has been realized through
the implementation of enacted legal change.

Additionally, this re-

search seeks to contribute to the growing body of theoretical and
research literature in criminology by not only examining prosecution,
but additionally, assessing the implications of differing theoretical
perspectives on the origin and operation of the criminal law through
empirical application.

These yarious theoretical models with varying

assumptions and tenets, provide for different types of interpretations of altered rape codes and their implementation.
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CHAPTER II

TP.EORETIGAL AND RESEARCH LITERATURE

Perspectives on the Law and Its Enforcement
Theoretically, the most significant orientations toward the
origins of law and the enforcement of the law are consensus, pluralistic, labeling, and conflict perspectives.

The latter type of

orientation can be further subdivided into instrumental, structural,
and dialectic Marxian theory.

These major alternative models of law

and the criminal justice process provide the theoretical framework
within which this research operates.

These divergent perspectives

serve to guide the questions asked as well as the interpretation of
research results.
It is important to note at the outset that these types of theory
do not always distinguish between the origin of law and operation of
the criminal justice process, i.e •• some perspectives assume continuity between source and enforcement, while others address these
issues separately.

It is not the intent of this research to test or

assess these alternative models as they pertain to the origin of the
law, but rathe:.: t::: draw on such perspectives as they facilitate un-

derstanding the operation dimensicr". involving the criminal justice
system.

The objective is to draw on these differing theoretical

models to shed light on the new sexual assault law and its enforcement.

11
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12
Value .Consensus

Consensus theory assumes, as the name would imply, that laws
arise out of shared values by societal members.

Laws thus reflect

the commonly held beliefs, norms, and collective will of the people.
Sutherland and Cressey's (1974) discussion of the origin of law includes two somewhat different consensus views.

They state that laws

can be viewed as the crystallization of mores and alternatively as
the result of the rational process of a unified society (1974:1Q-ll).
The difference between the two lies in th3t the former sees customary
beliefs getting translated into laws because of habit and pattern,
while the latter takes· the cognitive, planning, rational aspect of
law making into account.

This latter view is consistent with Weber's

(1922) position on the tendency for increasing rationalization of the
state and law to accompany the progressive industrialization of
society.

Both, however, assume that the values which become embodied

in law are agreed upon by the society as a whole.
This consensus view draws heavily on functionalism.

Chambliss

clearly demonstrates this connection when he cites Durkheim who
states that

11 • • •

the only common characteristic of crimes is that they

consist.,, in acts universally disapproved of by members of each
society'' (Chambliss • 1976 :4).

This same art.icle elaborates on the

role of the state and criminal justice system given this "functional
paradigm."

Not only do laws arise out of value consensus, but the

criminal justice system, as an arm of the state, executes these laws
in a neutral fashion made possible by the shared values and interests.
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13
The functionalist contention is that the legal system is designed and
functions to protect fundamental social values (Hall, 1974; Durk.heim,

1893).

Plural Conflict
The pluralistic orientation is frequently referred to as plural
conflict theory.

Both the pluralism and the conflict stem from the

recognition of the existence of differing groups with different
values and interests within any social structure.

Plural conflict

perspectives thus reject the notion of an homogeneous society so cri-

tical to consensus theory.

The point of convergence between the two,

however, lies in that both see the state and legal system as acting
in an objective fashion.

Plural conflict asserts that the state acts

as an impartial mediator between diverse groups, each vying for state
power to protect and promote its values and interests.

The law is

believed to represent the compromise between such differential values
and interests (McCaghy, 1976; Quinney, 1970; Turk, 1966, 1969, 1977).
Authors working within this perspective have taken somewhat
different directions.

Austin Turk's (1969) discussion of authority-

subject relationships falls within a plur· ..:. i.stic orientation.

The

crux of Turk's argument is essentially that there is a continUal socialization process whereby societal members learn "norms of deference" and "domination" in preparation for the range of authoritysubject roles they will occupy.

Conflict is engendered by a number

of different factors, e.g., "differences in perceptions, beliefs, and
aspirations" (Turk, 1977:215) between these two primary groups.
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14
Cultural and social differences between authorities and subjects
lead not only to conflict, but also to the criminalization of behav-

iors or persons who fail to abide by the norms, specifically, those
who fail to comply with the norms of deference.

According to this

view, authorities maintain control and stability not through coercive
power but through submission to these universal norms,

As subjects

and authorities struggle. modifications are effected, and stability
in these relationships results temporarily.

Necessarily, as learning

of norms is continual, so too are struggles and adjustments.
Richard Quinney's early work (1970) was also pluralistic in nature.

He posited six different "institutional orders" (1970:38) in

society.

These six different political, economic, religious, kinship,

educational, and public groups may come into conflict owing to differential values and interests.

Quinney considers differential

powe:t among such groups, yet still keeps within the pluralist notion
that balance and equity are the result of state action (Quinney,
1970:41-42; Taylor, Walton, & Young, 1973:259).
Chambliss and Seidman (1971) develop their pluralistic conception along

some~vhat

more radical lines.

They posit that different

groups with different interests vie for state power, but argue that
groups are not equal in power and hence in ability to have their
interests embodied in law.

Moreover, they assert that the state does

not necessarily act in a neutral, unbiased manner (Chambliss & Seidman, 1971),

Sheldon (1982:58-59) categorizes this type of perspec-

tive as an interest group/conflict model.
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While variants on the plural conflict tenets exist, the thrust

of pluralism can be evidenced in each of the prominent works men-

tioned above.

This similarity becomes even more apparent upon

comparison with consensus theory and the subsequent perspectives
discussed below.

The Labeling Perspective
A third type of approach to the study of the origin and adminis-

tration of criminal law can be found with the labeling perspective.
Th.is orientation addresses itself to the question of how collective
definitions of deviance and criminality emerge and are applied.

Additionally, this perspective focuses in on the consequences of such
designations (Davis & Stivers, 1975; Schur, 1979; Traub

&

Little,

1975).
The labeling orientation does not systematically expound on the.

role. of the. state, except to recognize that power plays an important
role in the definitional process (Becker, 1973; Currie, 1968; PluJamer, 1979; Schur, 1980 -

~n

power).

In this sense it is similar to

the previously cited work of Chambliss and Seidman (1971).
This orientation is similar to the pluralistic conflict perspective in another way as well.

Becker's (1963) discussion of "moral

entrepreneurs'' in relation to the tax act of 1937, Dickson's (1968)
of the tax act in terms of organizational self interests, Gusfield 1 s
(1963, 1967) of symbolic crusades in regards to prohibition, and
Duster's (1970) and Lindesmith's (1965) of bureaucracies are all indicative of the assumption that different groups with different
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interests and power struggle for advantage in the legal definition

process.

These types of studi.es have much_ in common with the plu-

ralism of, for example, the early work of Quinney, but to reiterate,
they do not assess the relative or absolute objectivity or equity
owing to the role of the state.
That which this perspective sets out to do renders it relevant
to a discussion of the origin and administration of the law because

of its objective of examining the emergence and application of deviant and criminal "labels.."

This perspective, however, does not fit

neatly into a classification of orientations on the origin and operation of the law based upon considerations of the nature of society
and the work of the state for several reasons.

First, the labeling

perspective has been critiqued for focusing on the consequences of
labeling at the expense of examining exactly these dimensions of
emergence and application of laws and labels (Davis, 1980; Thio,
1973).

Second, this orientation does not specifically delineate its

conception of society in terms of social grouping and consensus.
Additionally, while this perspective makes reference to the importance of power in the definitional and administrative processes, it
has been critiqued for assuming rather than analyzing a dichotomous
power structure (Turk, 1977:210).

Because of these conside-rations,

the labeling perspective can be conceived of as falling into pluralistic theory as shmm above, or into a more Marxian type of orientation as discussed below.

Regardless of these problems, the advantage

of this orientation is that it calls attention to the collective
process involved in designations and attributions of deviance, crime,
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and stigma, and to what laws get enforced against whom, and with what
COtlSequences.

Instrumental Marxian Theory
Marxian conflict theory represents a drastic departure from the
previously discussed orientations.

lnstrwneutal Marxian conflict

theory is a more deterministic or strict application of Marx's work
to the criminological field than structural Marxian theory which assumes broader latitude in 'the interpretation of his writings.
The more conventional instrumental theory can be described most
succinctly by first identifying several of the most critical tenets
of Marxian theory.

Marx stated, for example, that the 11Eistory of

all hitherto society is the history of class struggle" (Marx,
1848:13).

Societies are characterized by conflict emanating from the

struggle over scarce resources.

This struggle leads to stratifica-

tion and the development of classes.

Social and economic class is

determined by ownership over the uans of economic production.

In

capitalistic soc.ieties, such as the United States, there are two
distinct classes, the bourgeois and the proletariat.

The bourgeois,

or ruling elite class, own and control the economic means of production, i.e., a disproportionate share of societal resources.

The

proletariat, or the masses, work for wage labor for those who own,
control, and rule.
'l'b.e economy, referred to as the infrastructure, is believed by
instrumentalists to d(.!.termine the rest of societ£11 arrangements, such
as those relating to tb.e government and legal apparatus, and those
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relating to civil society such as the family, educational, and
religious systems.

A significant assertion with instrumental Harxian

theory is that the dominant ruling class utilizes the infrastructure

to control the superstructure in order to perpetuate its advantage
and position.

The bourgeois dominate, subjugate, and oppress the

masses in order to maintain and enhance their disproportionate resources, power, and control.
Perhaps the most critical tool involved in this system is ideol-

ogy.

Marx stated that the ideas of the ruling class are always the

ruling ideas and that the dominant economic or material force would
be the dominant intellectual force (Marx, 1848).

Ideology can be

conceived of as beliefs or belief systems employed by the ruling
class to justify, legitimate, and hence perpetuate the inequitable
status quo.
Instrumental theory in criminology is predicated upon these assumptions.

The most relevant application of Marx to the criminologi-

cal field involves a consideration of the role of the state.

The

state, as the embodiment of political power, is manipulated at ;-li.ll,
ergo, it is an instrument of the capitalist class.

The state is used

not only to maintain the monopoly over material resources and promote
accumulation, but further to protect and facilitate the monopoly over
non-material resources, i.e., over power and ideology for legitimation purposes.

It is precisely these dynamics of resource, power,

vested interest, and conflict which give rise, through the state
apparatus, to the criminal law and its enforcement (as well as to
law-violating behavior itself).
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According to ins:trumentalists. acts which are defined as criminal as well as those who w:Ul be processed as criminal are. wbclly
contingent on ruling class interests.
state that

11

Chambliss and Manko££ (.19761

Acts are defined as criminal because it is in the inter-

est of the ruling class to so define them. 11 0"976:7} •.

Along· these

lines, Quinney states that the capitalist class alone is seen to have
the resources, control of the state., and power to translate its
values and interests into law.

Laws, therefore, protect the inequi-

table material and non-material resource distribution, and perpetuate
the superordinate position of the bourgeois through the exploitation
and subjugation of the proletariat (Balkan, :Berger & Schmidt, 1980;

Chambliss, 1976; Kolka, 1963; .Miliband, _1970; Quinney. 1977; Reiman,
1979).
Th.e enforcement or administration of such laws is explained in

a comparable fashion.

Th.e laws are designed and therefore applied so

as to protect the vested interests of the bourgeois.

The result is

discriminatory enactment as well as enforcement (Braithwaite, 1981;
BulloCik, 1961; Clelland & Carter, 1980; Hepburn, 1973; Lizotte, 1978;
Peterson & Friday, 1975; Pope, 1978; Thornberry, 1973; Wolfgang &
Reidel, 1973).

It is the masses, particularly the lowest echelons of

the poor and minority group members, who are targeted in both
processes.

It is not only that the acts defined as criminal are

prilllarily those COIIIDiitted by the

proletariat~

but also that those

processed through the state apparatuS" of the criminal justice system
are disproportionately those commi.tted by the disadvantaged segment
of the population.
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The ruling class is seen to benefit from this in a number of
different ways.

This legal structure serves the upper class by func-

tioning to divert attention away from the wrongs, harms, and crimes
committed by those in power (Chambliss, 1976; Greenberg, 1981; Reiman,
1979).

Because of the types of laws enacted as well as enforced, the

focus, fear, and state resources are all directed at conventional
street crime.

A stable and visible class of "criminals" is socially

constructed (Quinney, 1970; Reiman, 1979) which channels attention,
concern, and the use of state power towards the lower class, rather
than towards acts engendering even greater harm in terms of lives
lost, injuries, and material and social coso,ts incurred.

In other

words, the focus, fear, and punishment is aimed at -crime "in the
street" at the expense of the recognition, definition, and processing
of crime "in the suites" (Newfield, 1980).

Simultaneously, attention

is drawn away from the more general and profound "crime" of the
ruling class, i.e., exploitation, subjugation, and oppression.

In a

similar vein, hostility in both classes comes to be directed at only
those defined as criminals, viz., the lower class.

As Marx noted,

this acts as a divisive force amongst the proletariat, thus thwarting
the development of class consciousness and liberation.
The capitalist class directly manipulates ideology through its
control over the state.

The state is a significant instnnnem:. uti-

lized to formulate and disseminate ideology.

The manner in which

laws arise and are implemented benefits the ruling class by generating false consciousness (Carsen, 1974; Chambliss, 1976; Hepburn,
1977; Michalowski & Bohlander, 1976; Reiman, 1979).

The
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proletariat are "duped 11 into believing that the legal system operates
out of shared or consensual interests, that the laws are designed for

the equal protection of all, and in short, that there exists a criminal justice system, state, and society.

All of this serves yet another purpose for those who rule.

The

"social reality of crime" (Quinney, 1970) created by enactment and
enforcement systems facilitates greater dependence on the state and
legitimizes the continual, if not increasing, use of coercive

pews~

to control "problem populations" (Spitzer, 1975) and to quell threats
and opposition (Chambliss, 1976; Greenberg, 1981; Michalowski &

Bohlander, 1976; Quinney, 1980).
The net result of law creation and implementatiori in a capitalist society is a perpetuation of the status quo.

Forceful domination

by those who own the means of economic production is accomplished in
a fashion and by a system believed by the masses to be fair, equitable, and just.

Structural Marxian ·Theory
Because the instrumental Marxian view appears overly deterministic, structural conflict theorists have addressed themselves to this
issue.

Structuralists in the criminology field differ in their

reading and application of Marxian theory from the instrumentalists
i.n several respects.
The first difference lies in that structural conflict theory
rejects the notion that the state is an instrument of the ruling
elite.

Structuralists view the state as developing its own relative
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autonomy, independence, and even interests and contradictions
(Althusser, 1977; Bierne, 1979; Bierne & Quinney, 1982; Greenberg,

1982; Harring, 1981; Picciotto, 1982; Poulantzas, 1982; Quinney,
1980).

Because of this, the state cannot be manipulated at will by

the capitalists.

Greenberg best ca;:;tures the meaning of this when he

states that the state protects the rules and relations of capitalism,
rather than the will or interest of capitalists (1981:192)
Along these same lines, structuralists argue that the economic
infrastructure shapes rather than determines the superstructure of
society (Greenberg, 1981).

In this vein Poulantzas asserts not only

the relative "separation" of the state from the dominant class, but
also of the economic from the political (1982:313).

This broader

interpretation of Marx intends that the infrastructure sets the parameters within which classes will function, but does not decisively
delimit all superstructure arrangements (Greenbe::g, 1981; Poulantzas,
1982)

such as the character of the state and lower class conscious-

ness, and divisions and alliances among classes (Greenberg, 1981).
A third point of divergence

bet~v-een

instrumental and structural

!fu.rxian theorists is that structural arguments do not involve perceptions of the bourgeois as an homogeneous ruling elite.

Structural

conflict theorists allow for internal dissensions and conflict
within as well as between class members.

Structuralists recognize

that there may well exist different factions within the ruling class
(Bierne, 1979; Greenberg, 1981).
The law itself is viewed in somewhat different light by structuralists.

As the state is viewed to protect capitalism rather than
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capitalists, the

la~,r

too is seen to be rooted in and an expression of

class relations rather than determined strictly by capitalists and

their interests (Balbus, 1977; Bierne, 1979; Chambliss, 1979; Green-

berg, 1981; McCormick, 1979).

This means that laws may be influenced

by the masses and in appearance ostensibly serve their interests.
Laws do exist, in modern day capitalistic societies such as the
United States, which appear to be inimical or irrelevant to the ruling class, or appear to arise out of consensus and shared interest.

Instrumentalists have a more difficult time explaining such phenomena
than do structural conflict theorists.

Instrumental Marxian theo-

rists' response to these types of critiques is generally that the
laws are either not enforced (carsen, 1974; Chaml;Jliss, 1974; Hepburn,
1977) or that they serve the interests of generating false consc:i.ousness (Carsen, 1974; Hepburn, 1977; Kolka, 1963).
While structural conflict theory is amenable to such interpretations, a critical further insight predicated on structural tenets
can be offered.

Very simply, the law, in order to appear fair, must

at times be fair (Bierne, 1979; Greenberg, 1981; Humphries & Greenberg, 1980; Thompson, 1975).

The appearance of fairness and shared

interests is integrally tied to the st:ability of the social system,
The system must be perceived as legitimate in order to have the
stability requisite to reproduce class relations and the capitalistic
system.

Bierne states that the state must, in fact, n., .routinely

pursue policies which are at variance with the interests or wishes of
certain factions of capital" (1979 :379),

The long term interests of

those with power are served by permitting concessions which placate,
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and thus facilitate false consciousness.

Structural Marxian theory,

therefOre, emphasizes the legitimation or "consent" function of the
state rather than the "repressive or coercive," as stressed by instrumentalists (Greenberg, 1982; Hunt, 1982; Picciotto, 1972).

Hunt,

speaking of structuralism and its debt to Gramsci, notes that
".,.class relations are sustained and reproduced in such a way that
relationships of domination and exploitation persist without general
or frequent recourse to state coercion" {1982:86).
that

11 • • •

Poulantzas states

the ~can never ex;ercise its function of domination, in

the long run, by repression alone; this must always be accompanied by
ideological domination." (cf. Ritzer, 1983:140- emphasis in the original).
These differentiating aspects of structural conflict theory can
be viewed as a progressive modification of the instrumental scheme.
The basic congruity as well as difference between the two remains in
the interpretation and application of Marx's works.
Dialectic Marxian Theory
Hegel, who first theorized on the dialectic, posited in an
ideational sense that first there is the thesis, an original idea,
which generates challenge or contradiction.

From this challenge,

referred to as the aD.tithesis, emerges a synthesis which combines the
best of the thesis and ·antithesis.

Drawing on this, Marx talked of

the dialectic in historical material terms.

He inverted Hegel by

declaring that ideas are epiphenomena resulting from dialectic materialism.

In other words, Marx posited that ideas are products
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of the economic infrastructure and that contradictions in the infra-

structure engender new social formations.

The dialectic model is similar to the structural in its recognition of conflicts within class, the overriding, yet not determinative importance of the material basis of the social structure, and
the state as somewhat independent of the dominant class in its
capacity as a resolution apparatus for conflicts stemming from con-

tradictions inherent in the capitalist structure.

The present day

dialectic departs from structuralism by recognizing and attempting
to resolve the l.reaknesses found in both the instrumental and struc-

tural Marxist approaches.
The salient weaknesses of instrumentalism have been elaborated
through the discussion of structural :Marxian theory.

To reiterate,

instrumental Marxian theory has been heavily critiqued for its
economic determinism, assumption of a monolithic ruling class, and
instrumental view of the state as a repressive organ of the bourgeois
(Balbus, 1977; Bierne, 1979; Greenberg, 1981; Humphries
1981; Klochars, 1979; O'Connor, 1973).
most recently been critically examined.

&

Greenberg,

Structural accounts too have
Greenberg himself notes that

structural Harxism is found waating by "minimizing" the discrii!'i.natory, repressive aspect of law and its enforcement (1982:193) through
its focus on relative autonomy and the "consensual," legitimizing
functions of the state.

Grau (1982) along with Greenberg notes that

structural Harxian theory additionally neglects to engage in systematic historical analysis of class struggle leading to the "content
of legal reforms" (Grau, 1982:199) rendering it amenable to the very
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critiques it seeks to avoid, i.e., being overly determinate (Hunt,

1982:87-88; Picciotto, 1982).
The dialectic model calls for the remedying of such problems in
these two forms· of Marxian analysis by attempting to integrate them
(Grau, 1982:207).

This alternative focuses on the dynamic process

involved in the enactment and implementation of law through the state.

It calls for the his·torical analysis of class struggle and the role

that power differentials play in legal enactments.
politics of the law and the state,

~as

It assesses the

relatively autonomous

entities (Grau, 1982) and simultaneously addresses the dichotomy of

"coercion" or repression as emphasized by instrumentalists and "consent" or legitimation as emphasized by structuralists (Hunt, 1982:87).
This model can be seen as dialectic in essentially
lights.

t~vo

different

First the model itself endeavors a "synthesis" of instru-

mental and structural orientations to bypass theoretical stalemates
and to further understanding.

The new theoretical direction arises

out of the differing aspects characteristic of instrumental and
structural approaches.

The second form of the dialectic is found in

the specific tvorks of these authors.
Chambliss (1979) expounds his "dialectic paradigm" as one which
", •• sees law creation as a process aimed at the resolution of contra. dictions, conflicts, and dilemmas which are inherent in the structure
of a particular historical period (1979:7).

He intimates that the

thesis, so to speak, as represented in the social form of capitalism
and its inherent contradictions, leads to antithetical challenges
which result in "resolutions."

These resolutions do not nece.ss.arily
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represent the synthesis in a truly Hegelian/Marxian sense.

Chambliss

states that resolutions do not address the basic contradictions in
the social order, but rather the "conflicts and dilemmas" stemming
from the contradictions which confront this established order
(1979: 17).

He goes on to contend, therefore, that resolutions under-

score donuant contradictions, which lead to new conflicts, dilemmas,

and resolutions (1979 : 7).

Change thus must be viewed in a dynamic

yet cyclical, rather than progressive fashion, given this view which
posits that resolutions arise out of contradiction.

Along these

lines, Chambliss concludes:
The more general point is that the creation of the law
reflects a dialectic process, a process through which
people struggle and in so doing create the tv-orld in which
they live. The history of law in capitalist countries
indicates that in the long span of time, the capitalists
fare considerably better in the struggle for having their
interests and views represented in the law than do the
working classes; but the shape and content of the law is
nonetheless a reflection of the struggle and not simply
a mirror image of the shortrun interests and ideologies
of the "ruling class" or of "the people" (1979 :24).
Grau (1982) expounds on a critical dimension of the dialectic in
his critique of structural Marxian accounts.

Hhile Grau agrees with

the notion of relative state autonomy, he chastizes the structural
theorists for failing to make a distinction between the state and the
law (1982: 198).

The law too,

h~

argues, is autonomous relative to

the state as it represents the culmination of class struggle.

The

contradictions of the state and its functions of accumulation, legitimation, and repression (O'Connor, 1973) are manifest in law.

The

type of resolution to the contradictions and conflicts as seen in law

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

28
is, significantly·, tied to the distribution of power among classes

(1982:207).

Therefore, he intimates that resolutions way or may not

represent true gains Cor a true synthesis as discus-sed in above terms)
contingent upon power differentials.

In reference to this he docu-

ments historical cases. to show: that laws not only serve state fuJ;Jctions, but also afrustrate them" (1982:207).
Grau r s work can be viewed dialectically in that it is the nature
of the political economic structure and its contradictions which
engender power differentials and challenge, and these may ultimately

alter the nature of social relationships or the political-economy
itself.

Few gains or compromise for the dominated class are seen to

be a common outcome of such chall.enges and struggles.

Yet Grau

teases that real gains or change are tenable if th_e challenging force
has an underlying power base (which itself originates in capitalist
contradictions).

As Grau concludes,

11

If it is true that the capital-

ist st''3.te and the law are structurally limited, the content of
policies and actions can vary, and that the variation can be thearetically and politically significant" (1982:207),

Similarly,

Bierne and Quinney point out that " ... significant inroads may be
confirmed and implemented through. law" (1982 :6).

Theoretical Perspectives in Sum
As preViously mentioned, consensus, plural conflict, labeling,

instrumental, structural, and dialectic Marxian perspectives are all
models that relate to the origin and operation of the law,

The

consensus and pluralistic orientations assume that the state is

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

29

neutral and acts in the public interest in the creation of laws and
by inference, due to the assumption of social consensus, in their

administration.

The labeling perspective allows for the role of

power as an influence in these processes, yet does not specifically
assess the role of the state, objectivity, and so on.

The first two

Marxian perspectives contend that the creation and enforcement processes both are controlled and work (in the long run} to further
ruling class interests.

The third variant of Marxian conflict theory

allows for the possibility of change owing to contradictions inherent
in the political economy.
This type of sunnnary suggests that the perspectives discussGd
vary in the degree to which they differentiate and address the two
separate issues of legal enactment and enforcement.

Some of these

perspectives more thoroughly address the issue of the source of law
and then generalize to its operation, e.g., consensus and plural
conflict perspectives.

The Marxian perspectives pay more direct at-

tention to both the origin and enforcement aspects of law.

The at-

tempt of this research is to specifically analyze the relative
viability of these perspectives as they relate to this latter
enforcement or implementation phase of the criminal justice process.

The Law on Rape
"Rape is no doubt as old as human existence, as evidenced by the
recorded history of a brief six millennia" (t.)'arner, 1980:1).

Vthile

the act of rape " .. ,dates back to earliest times, for centuries there
were no laws against it" (Dean & deBruyn-Kops, 1982:18).

Along these
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same lines the "conspicuous" absence of "Thou shalt not rape" from
the Ten Commandments has been noted (Brownmiller, 1975b:9).

Histori-

cally, rape was a legitimate form of "bride capture;" as Brownmiller
explains:
The earliest form of permanent, protective conjugal
relationship, the accommodation called mating that we now
know as marriage, appears to have been institutionalized
by the male 1 s forcible abd~ction and rape of the female.
No quaint formality, bride capture, as it came to be
known, was a very real struggle:

A male took title to

a female, staked a claim to her body, as it were, by
an act of violence. Forcible seizure was a perfectly
acceptable way - to men - of acquiring women, and it
existed in England as late as the fifteenth century

(1975b,7).
The first laws against rape, dating back several thousand years,
set the tone for literally centuries upon centuries of subsequent
legislation, attitude, and enforcement practices.

In point of fact,

the appearance of real, substantive change in law was not forthcoming
until this past decade.
Some of the earliest laws against forcible "abduction" can be
found in early civilizations dating back to almost 2,000 B.C.
la\-15 blamed and punished both men and Homen when rape occurred.

These
The

code of Hammurabi in Babylon, for instance, stipulated that married
women who were raped were to be punished along with their attacker
(by being bound and thrown into the river) for committing adultery
(Brownmiller, 1975b:9).

The Hebrews stoned married rape victims and

virgins to death along with their atl·ac:kers for the same reason, i.e.,
consent was assumed as the women cot.:ld have cried out for help and
avoided the attack i f i t were truly unwanted (Brownmiller, 1975b:l0).
Dean and deBruyn-Kops note that "The Assyrians went one step further.
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If a man raped a virgin, her father was entitled to take the wife

of the ravisher" (1982:19, citing Saggs, 1962:13).
Laws and attitudes which blame and punish victims have carried
through the times and pages of history.

For example, the first laws

in this country corporally punished both rapist and victim (Dean
deBruyn-Kops, 1982:21}.

&

The long standing carnal knowledge statutes

enacted in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: and still existent

in numerous states today continue to punish

r~pe

victims, but in a

less direct fashion, i.e., through attributions of blame, responsibility, precipitation, and the like which culminate in victimization
and trauma for the rape victim.

Such statutes generally define rape

as carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will.

This

form of rape law securely affixes the focus on victim rather than
assailant behavior, and has operated to victimize the rape victim in
the past as well as the present through the criminal adjudication
process.

It was not until the 1970s that change finally began to

Calls fo't" Reform
The feminist movement which. emerged during the 1960s is largely
responsible for the changes in rape statutes across this nation.
Feminists, inspired in no small part by civil rights activists, defined women as a minority and drew critical attention to the lack of
implementation of fundamental American values such as equity and
justice for all memDers of society.

As the consciousness regarding
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the plight of women and minorities in society grew, so too did the
more specific concern wi_th rape and itEr victims.

The feminist movement has b.een instrumental in pointing out that
laws against and indignation over rape, when existent, have histori-

cally been predicated upon the violation of another man's property
(Brownmiller, 1975a; Dean

&

deBruyn-Kops, 1982; LeGrand, 1973; NILECJ,

1978; Schwendingers, 1983; Wood, 1973}.

The laws, both in terms of

origin and enforcement, have been criti_ques by feminists as discriminatorlly protecting only certain classes .of rape victims, i.e., the
"legitimate" property of wives and virginal daughters rather than. all

women (Weis & Burges, 1978).
Feminists have additionally levied scathing criticism against
rape laws across the country for placing such extensive and unique
burdens on any rape victim so that the victim, rather than the assailant, is on trial CBohmer

&

BlumDerg, 1975; Browntrt:Uler, 1975a;

Harris, 1976; Holmstrom &-Burgess, 1975; Landau, 1974; LeGrand, 1973;
Luginbill, 1975; Washburn, 1973).
Feminists and other victim advocate groups began to form over
the past decade in the decided effort to change sexist laws and practices

~vith

regard to rape.

The. Speak Out On Rape sponsored by the

New York radical feminists in 1971, WAR (Women Against Rape), and
Task Forces on Rape throughout the country were all influential in
calling national attention to the problem concomitant with rape
/

vis a vis the legal and social structure.

They further played no
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small role in altering the carnal knowledge statutes which contributed to victim trau:roa and differential treatment of rape.
The difficulty in prosecuting rape cases and corollary trauma
imposed on rape victims are integrally tied to the structure of the
law as it has existed in this country since

codification~

The be-

liefs, misconceptions, and justifications for rape as "carnal knowledge forcibly and against her will" are, as previously noted, more
antiquated than the statutes and case law interpretations themselves.
The specific critiques, and consequently changes sought, by such
groups as Women's Task Forces concern the issues of corroboration,
resistance and consent standards, and character evidence.

The fol-

lowing takes each of these issues sequentially and discusses the
bases upon which historical requirements and practices are justified,
and then goes on to critique each of these dimensions from a victim
advocate point of view.
Corroboration
Corroboration requirements are one type of obstacle to the successful pcosecution of rape cases.

'itlhile the requirement varies from

one state to the. next, its existence in any form. places !.mique
strains on rape victims in the adjudication process.
states do not have
a~

a~~

Although many

corroboration requirement, i t exists in

facto manner in most jurisdictions (Hibey, 1973: 169; Shapo,

1975:1530; Yale Note, 1972:1383).
Corroboration requirements impose the general rule that convictions cannot be sustained in rape cases on the sole basis of the
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victim's statements.

The general categories of corroborative evi-

dence sought concern the identity of the accused, penetration, and

lack of consent (Hibey, 19:73; Luginbill, 1975; Sebba, 1974; Hashburn,
1975).

The specific types of verification required from independent

sources range from:
1) Medical evidence and testimony, 2) Evidence of breaking
and entering the prosecutrix' apartment, 3) Condition of
clothing, 4) Bruises and scratches, 5) Emotional condition of prosecutrix, 6) Opportunity of accused, 7) Conduct
of accused at time of arrest, 8) Presence of semen or blood
on clothing of accused or victim, 9) Promptness of complaints to friends and police, and 10) Lack of motive to
falsify (Allison vs. U, S., 1969 :448 n. 8),
The first rationale for refusing to convict on the basis of victim testimony is embedded in the belief articulated by Chief Justice
Hale approximately 400 years ago and echoed in courtrooms in the form
of jury instructions to this day.

He stated:

It is true that rape is a most detestable crime, and it
ought severely and impartially to be punished ~Jith death,
but it must be remembered, that it is an accusation
easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be
defended against by the party accused, tho never so
innocent (Lord Hale, 1680:635).
The belief that women frequently falsely "cry" rape provides a
second justification or underlying belief which has given rise to the
existence and persistence of the corroboration requirement.

A fur-

ther co!IUllonly held notion is that with such a heinous offense, the
proclivity is for juries to sympathize with victims and thereby
operate with a presumption of guilt towards rape offenders.

The cor-

roboration requirement is thus justified on the basis of protecting
innocent men from guilty verdicts and punishment (Luginbill, 1975;
Sebba, 1974; Shape, 1975; Washburn, 1975).
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Feminists, as well as academicians and leg.:o-1 researchers, have
attacked corroboration requirements and the basis for them on a number of different levels.

The- demand for corroborative evidence is

said to represent an unjustifiable. requirement in rape case prosecu-

tions.

To determine that a rape did not occur because no one wit-

nessed the attack (Pitler, 1973} is ludicrous.

To dismiss a case or

decide that no rape occurred because the only available evidence is

comprised of victim and defendant testimony is inequitable and unjust.
Victims of no other crime are so suspicioned.

The prose; ·1tion is not

required to provide additional evidence verifying victim statements

in order to proceed with prosecution and sustain convictions in other
types of criminal cases.

The bases upon which the corroboration re-

quirement rests are equally unfair.

The result of a corroboration

requirement in rape prosecutions is thus the differential and unequal
treatment of rape victims.

Low conviction rates constitute an addi-

tional and serious deleterious effect of this requirement (Ludwig,
1970).
A point of departure for the argument against the corroboration
requirement concerns the availability of corroborative evidence.
has been pointed out that "The nature of the crime is

s~ch

witnesses are seldom available" (Stapleman v. State, 1948).

It

that eyeFor

example, rapes do not frequently occur with eyewitnesses present and
do occur disproportionately in private residences rather than public
places (Amir, 1971; MacDonald, 1975) where corroborative evidence
will be difficult, if not impossible, to -come across to verify the
victim• s accounts (Yale Note., 1972: 1368-69).

Similarly, evidence
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additional to the victim's testimony to corroborate force and penetration also may not exist.

Some women decide not to resist for fear

of injury and thus have no bruises, cuts, or other wounds to substantiate or prove that a "real" rape occurred.

Lack of resistance

cannot rightfully or logically be equated with the absence of force
and rape.

Evidence of penetration may also be lacking due to a num-

ber of factors, e.g. • no emission, douching, semen undiscovered after
time has elapsed between the attack and the medical exam, and lack of
disease and/or pregnancy (Yale Note, 1972:1371).

I t is important to

further bear in mind that even overt indicators of resistance '' ... are

not at all probative of penetration.

And conclusive evidence of

penetration has no probative value on issues of consent" (Washburn,
1975: 292).
The justifications and beliefs upon which corroborative rules
and practices are predicated are erroneous and/or misguided as well.
The belief that frequent false accusations are corollary to rape
complaints has been discussed by many (Columbia Law Review Note,
1967; Lear, 1972; Ludwig, 1970; Younger, 1971),

Motives attributed

to false reports range from shame, guilt, and bitterness, to hatred,
vengeance, and shielding the origin of pregnancy (Herzog, 1931; MacDonald, 1971; Ploscowe, 1951; Williams, 1962).
Although false reports do, in fact, occur with sexual &s8a:.11ts
as with other criminal offenses, they happen in only 15% of the cases
(FBI, 1975).

Thus, figures alone should detract credence from the

myth that rape is commonly (intending more frequently than not) a
falsely reported crime.

The evidence for this belief being false
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goes yet further.

The Pennsylvania Law Review reported that 38%

of the cases categorized as unfounded (no rape) by police in Philadelphia involved weapons, and 40% of the unfounded rapes involved
victims who struggled and screamed (University of Pennsylvania Law
Review, 1968:227-332).

Moreover, in New York City the percentage of

cases classified as unfounded dropped to 2% when female rather than
male police officers were assigned to rape cases (Brownmiller,

1975a:43S).

·McCahill, et. al. (1979:103-122) and Peters et, al.

(1976:92-98) discuss similar findings.
In addition to this and to the fact that rape represents the

most notoriously underreported offense in the nation to begin with
(FBI, 1975: 15), it has also been stated that of the minority of rapes
which are reported (5% and lower) (Brovmmiller, i975a; Curtis, 1974;
Haines, 1948; Kanin, 1975) the number of false reports" ... will almost
certainly be so small that modern techniques of criminal investigation and traditional legal rules, other than corroboration requirements, will effectively protect innocent defendants" (Yale Note,
1972: 1972).
The second justification for corroboration requirements involving the emotionally sympathetic rredilections of jurors and
judges toward complainants alleging rape provides no more basis for
thP. rule chan ciid the myth of frequent false accusations.

The mis-

guided nature of this presupposition is readily apparent when one
examines empirical data.

It is a fact that rape is a charge ,.;rhere

the difficulty lies in sustaining convictions, rather than a charge
difficult to defend oneself against.

Attrition in rape cases is
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alarmingly high ..

Most rapes are not reported (FBI, 1975; U.S.

Department of Justice, 1979}, of those reported approximately 15%
are declared to be unfounded (_FBI, 1975}; of thos-e reported and
"founded" 48% are cleared by police (FBI, 1980: 178) _; of those cleared
anywhere between 27 and 72% are not prosecuted (Caringella-NacDonald,
1984:forthcoming); of those prosecuted 46% of the charged rapists are
acquitted (FBI, 1975:24}.

Yet law and practices are designed to deal

with "sympathetic" criminal justice actors - the very people who,
with or without corroborative evidence, are anything but eager to
convict the accused in rape cases (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966}.
The third justification (_for corroboration requirements) that
rape is a crime difficult to defend oneself against is also inaccurate, given these data.

In other words, how difficult can it be to

defend oneself against rape charges if most rapes are never charged,
many not prosecuted, approximately one-half not convicted, in short,
i f all but a minute handful of offenders go free?

Figure 1 diagrams

·:his progressive loss of cases, i.e., the difficulty of sustaining
convictions, as opposed to charges, of rape.
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All Rapes

50-90% Unreported
15% Unfounded

52% Not Cleared
27-72% Not Prosecuted

Figure 1.

Rape '' .•. is an accusation easily to be made ••. and harder
to be defended against by the party accused, tho never so
innocent" (Lord Hale, 1680: 635)?

In an attempt to protect innocent men by invoking corroboration

rules, the veracity or truthfulness of rape victims is questioned.
Yet the honesty of complainants' testimony/statements in other criminal offenses is not subject to such skepticism.

If trials, judges,

and juries are believed to be capable of discerning the truth in all
other criminal matters so as to effectively protect the innocent, why
must additional burdens be leveled in rape cases?

Judges have ex-

actly the same power in rape and other criminal trials to " •.. set
aside or direct a verdict based on insufficient evidence" (Younger,
1971:276),

Thus, the criminal justice system has safeguards built
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into all criminal proceedings for all defendants, not all of the accused excluding rape defendants.

Consent and Resistance
A second difficulty in rape legislation revolves around the issue

of consent.

If it can be established that the victim consensually

participated in the sexual act(s} alleged, it is deemed that the

crime of rape did not occur.
a charge of rape.

In other words, consent is a defense to

It must, therefore, b.e demonstrated in criminal

prosecutions that the sexual act(s) were " ... against her will."
The issue of consent is interwoven with resistance standards.
The resistance standards existing are utilized to demonstrate the
presence of force, i.e., lack of consent (Sasko & Sesek, 1975;474).
They frequently require that victims resist to the "utmost" throughout the entire sexual attack.

Submission, even under for·c:e or the

threat thereof, at any point in the duration of the sexual assault
can be construed as consent.
The belief that "rape is a charge which is easily made but difficult to disprove" (Eisenberg, 1976:58) and similarly, that women
often falsely accuse men of rape are again relevant to the explanation of consent and resistance issues.

Perkins reports a comment

from Starr vs. State (1931) which highlights the relationship between
the beliefs, justifications, consent and resistance standards:
Obviously a man should not be. c:onvic ted of this very
grave felony where a woman merely puts up a little
resistance for the sake of 11 appearance" so to speak,
taking care not to resist too much. The law goes beyond this. The absence of consent is necessary for this
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crime. And even where the resistance is genuine and
vigorous in the beginning, if the physical contact
arouses the passion of the woman to the extent that
she willingly yields herself to the sexual act before
penetration has been accomplished - or if she yields
before this time for any other reason - it is not rape
(Perkins, 1969: 161-162).
Victim advocates, particularly feminists, have raised a variety
of issues relating to consent as it has existed and slowly evolved in
statute, case law, and attitudes over many years.

While consent in

rape ro:<.y be a legitimate defense .in some instances, the criminal jus-

tice system has slanted its focus to such an extent that all r.ape
victims are required to prove their "innocence" or lack of consent
and desire, rather than focusing on the criminal behavior of the
accused.

The issue of consent subsumes the question of resistance,

past sexual history of the victim, and evidence of character.
The ' 1 . , .against her will" phrase in convent.ional rape statutes
is designed to deal with consent issues.

But as Harris (1976) notes,

the lack of consent and "against her will" are not strictly synonymous.

They carry rather different connotations.

She states that

"While the first implies only that the victim should withhold active
approval or expressed non-consent, the second connotates active resistance" (Harris, 1976:618-19).
The consent standards in rape adjudication represent a further
dimension upon which differential treatment of rape cases has been
justified.

Again, victims of other assaults and criminal offenses

are not asked to

demonsr~_-ate

that they did not consent to being vic-

timized, yet it is believed that rape is unique enough to justify a
rigid and differential standard.

It is in this vein that Harris
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states that the " ••. argument for separating a theory of consent in
rape from consent in other areas of law was based on prejudicial as-

sumptions than on purposes unique to the crime of rape" (1976:632).
Resistance on the part of rape victims has traditionally been
required as an element of the offense and used as an indicator of
non-consent, but lack of resistance does not, in fact, imp:!.y consent.
Submission under force and/or the threat thereof

~be

equated

with consensual participation in the sexual act(s) constituting the

crime.

However, lack of resistance, i.e., submission, has tradition-

ally been a basis for dismissing allegations and determining that no
cr;Lme occurred.

Washburn argues that:

It is difficult to see why a woman should be required to
physically resist when a verbal refusal can be just as
effective, The wo.-nan should not be punished because the
man believes the myth that when a woman says "no," she
really means "yes," And the woman ~ definitely punished
by the requirement of resistance (1975:284 - emphasis in
the original),
Not only have conventional statutes required that victims resist,
but further that they resist

11

to the utmost," from the inception to

the close of the sexual assault (Cobb & Schauer, 1977).

The nebu-

lous nature of this phrase has often been interpreted in such a
strict manner that even when resistance has been documented, defendants have been acquitted due to "insufficient" resistance on the part
of the rape victim.

The following court interpretations of the

resistance requirement are indicative of the stringent standards
imposed:
The court found no indication of the "terrific resistance
which (a) determined woman should make", Thus requiring
as fulfillment of "against her will" not simply the general
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absence of mental consent but rather "the most vehement
exercise of every physical means or faculty within the
woman's power to resist the penetration of her person •••

to persist until the offense is consummated." The court
buttressed this high standard with statements of medical
writers that a woman could pose unsuperable obstacles
(hands, limbs, and pelvic muscles) against sexual attack
(Shape, 1975:505, citing Brown v. State).
It is not sufficient that the carnal act be violently
accomplished, or that it be without her consent ••• In such
cases, although the woman never said 'yes,' nay, more
although she constantly said 'no' and kept up a decent
show of resistance to the last, i t may still be that she
more than half consented to the ravishment (Mares v.
Terri tory) .

It should be obvious from these common types of Statements that
unique burdens are placed upon rape victims who decide to proceed
with charges owing to legalistic requirements, practices, and the
attitudes regarding false accusations and so forth.
these requirements and at;titudes unjust, they are
founded and unrealistic.

Not only are

~facie

ill-

Moreover, as previously discussed, many

women are physically overp0wered and incapable of resisting their
attackers, while others become paralyzed by fear.

Furthermore, re-

sistance may have the propensity to increase assailant anger and
determination, and hence incur greater victim injury.
Victim precipitation is a notion which bears mentioning as it
relates to resistance and consent issues.

This concept essentially

involves blaming the rape victim for provoking or asking for the
criminal act of sexual assault.
tion of resistance.

This is integrally tied to the no-

The myths regarding victim precipitation vis-a-

vis resistance can be found in common misconceptions and beliefs such
as "an unwilling woman cannot be raped," or "a victim could avoid
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rape if she really wanted to," or "no victim can be raped unless she
somehow wanted to be."

Such a belief is related to the notion of

consent, i.e., the victim asked for/consensually participated in the
sexual act(s), and therefore no rape/crime took place.

In no other

crime are victims seen to be deserving of or asking for an attack
based on such

~

hoc reasoning (Michigan Women's Task Force on

Rape, 1974), i.e., viewed as simply attractive before a sexual attack and provocative afterwards, seen as asking for an attack because
of vulnerable circumstances, and so on.
The resistance requirement, along with the related issues of
consent and precipitation, have had the effect of affixing excessive
and categoric focus on rape victims, while simultaneously detracting
attention and scrutiny away from the criminal activities perpetrated
by the accused.

Character Evidence
Character evidence is additionally admissable in rape trials.
The past sexual conduct and reputation of the victim has traditionally been publicly scrutinized in the courtroom in the attempt to
discern whether or not consent was existant at the time of the alleged rape.

It is believed that if women have consented to sex in

the past, the probability h

high that they consented with the

defendant in the present instance, and hence no rape could have occurred.

The rationale for admitting character evidence also extends

to the more broad or general issue of victim creditiliby.

Past

sexual history and reputation evidence are introduced additionally
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to "impeach the credibility of the victim in her capacity as wit-

ness" (Washburn, 1975 :293),
Whether introduced to establish the defense of consent or simply
to impune the rape victim, the justifications provided for the admis-

sability of such evidence are similar to those previously noted in
terms of corroboration, consent and resistance, e.g., the ease and
frequency of false accusation in relation to the difficulty of

defending oneself against such charges.

One further basis for ad-

mitting character evidence stems from the sixth amendment right to
confront one's accusers in cross-examination (Sasko &. Sesek,
1975:485).

In this light, Herman states " ... the defendant is en-

titled to participate in the fact-determining process by offering
evidence to cast doubt on the prosecution's case" (1977: 17).

The

argument here is that "the defendant should be afforded every opportunity to present evidence relevant to his innocence" (Sasko & Sesek,
1975:485) in light, once again, of the. difficulty of defending
charges, and so forth.
Prying into sexual activities of victims is a second legalistically permitted tactic which is conducted under the guise or with the
"objective" of establishing non-consent, i.e., lack of force, or
proof of consent as a defense to criminal culpability.

This princi-

ple was first articulated in 1888 (Sasko & Sesek, 1975:478).

The

assumption is that if victims consented in past sexual encounters
they are prone or more likely to have consented in the case under
review, thus rendering the charges to be a matter of false accusation.
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In this way, chaste women are protected (more often) by rape laws
than are any other women.
Even where consent is not being argued, information regarding

moral terpitude and reputation may still be admissible to impeach
victim credibility (Luginbill, 1975; Washburn, 1975).

The underlying

assumption remains the same - consent in the past indicates likely

consent in the case at hand.
Utilization or reliance on character evidence as an indicator of

present consent is more than highly suspect; it is unjust and rests
on assumptions that are outright fallacious.

Consent in past sexual

relations has nothing to do with the forceful and violent crime of

rape.

Deciding or agreeing to engage in sexual activity in the past

has little bearing apon present crime circumstances.

For example,

sharing one 1 s money or property with a friend at one point in time
is ~ considered as evidence that one decided to "share" one's
money or property with robbers or burglars.

Yet, such is the case

with rape (}l'.d.chigan Women's Task Force on Rape, 1974).
Character/reputation evidence is generally allowed in court only
in homicide cases to show that the victim was the aggressor (McCormick, 1972; Washburn, 1975; Wigmore, 1940).

It is disallowed, even

if potentially relevant, if " ... its probative value is substantially
outtJeighed by the danger of unfai-r prejudice, confusion of the issue,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence" (Washburn,
1975:303).

Hew then can evidence of such a biasing nature as past

sexual activity of victims be permitted in the courtroom?

The
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rationale offered concerns the consent defense and rights of the
accused.

Several quotes serve to highlight the issues surrounding the
admissability of character evidence.

Luginbill comments that " ... the

focus often dramatically shifts to the character of the prosecutrix,

almost as if she were the one whose guilt or innocence was to be
determined" (1975:674),

Washburn, in discussing the constitutional-

ity of character evidence states that "The Constitution does not
require that the defendant be allowed to subvert the fact finding
process by appealing to the baser motives of juries" (1975 :306).

LeGrand's discussion of the consent standard nicely s'iJlliiilarizes character evidence issues in relation to consent and credibility.

She

notes that "Thus, legally, a man's previous sexual attacks, even if
criminal, are of no relevance to his credibility, but once a woman
has had sexual relations with one man, a legal presumption exists
that she has consented to sexual relations with all men"

(1973:874-75).
Rape as a Violent Assault
Statute, case law interpretations, practices, and attitudes have
rendered the crime of rape so unique in our legal system that it is
rape victims who are put on trial to demonstrate their innocence
after being sexually attacked.

The victimization of the rape victim

by the criminal justice system has its roots deeply embedded in history.

To claim that reform is long overdue is charitable.
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The underlying and essential thrust of the women's movemeTit

vis-~-vis lobbying for changes in rape legislation has been targeted
at the objective of redefining rape as a violent rather than purely a

sexual crime.

Dealing with rape as a sexual crime tied to passion

drives and motives has slanted the criminal justice system 1 s treat-

ment of this offense (BenDor, 1976; Brownmiller, 1975b; Gager &
Schurr, 1976; Klerranack

&

Klemmack, 1976; LeGrand, 1973; Sasko & Sesek,

1975; Shape, 1975) to such a degree that the system exists in a state

of "tilt," i.e., to a point where the system/machinery ceases to
function for its stated purpose (viz. equity, fairness, and justice).
It is argued that recognizing the violent nature of this offense,

rather than viewing it as a purely sexual

crime~

will render criminal

justice processing less discriminatory and unjust.

The relevant as-

swnption· here is that if rape is seen as a violent crime, it can then
be handled in a manner comparable to other types of assaults.

The

goal of consistency in regards to sexual and non-sexual assault is
predicated on the belief that comparability will preclude considerations, requirements, and. differential standards such as those of
corroboration, resistance, character ev'ldence, and consent.

Enacted Change and the Hichigan Crim1nal St:xual Conduct Statute
Numerous states have altered their rape legislation in
to the types of problems discussed herein.

rest~onse

The decade of the 1970s

witnessed an incredible amount of legislative activity, particuL::.rly
given the centuries of what amounts in practice essentially to
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inaction.

Between 1976 and 1978, 36 states changed their rape stat-

utes (NILECJ, 1978: l}.

While virtually every state in this country

has altered its rape legislation wi.thin the last full decade (Field &
Bienen, 1980:153) some states have enacted only minor amendments, for
example Illinois and Kansas, while others sueh as Michigan and California have radically altered their rape laws.

Michigan was one of the first states to enact sweeping changes

in rape legislation in 1974.

The Criminal Sexual Conduct Code (CSC)

in Michigan, UOI-7 implemented, is referred to as model legislation

(BenDer, 1976; Dean & deBruyn-Kops, 1982; Field & Bienen, 1980;
Marsh et. al., 1982; NILECJ, 1978}.

Because Y.ichigan law represents

the existing exemplar in rape statutes, because it is most comprehensive in nature, and because it is the specific statute being scrutinized, it is focused upon in this section.

Michigan's law will

be employed as a vehicle for discussing the various dimensions of
change throughout the nation.
Corroboration requirements have become more relaxed and even
abolished due to reform legislation.

While some authors state that

most states adhere to common law standards which did not require corroboration, it has simultaneously been noted that the requirement has
existed in

a~

facto fashion in most jurisdictions (BenDer, 1976;

Dean & deBruyn-Kops, 1982; Field & Bienen, 1980; Marsh e::, al., 1982;
NILECJ, 1978).

Michigan's case is illustrative of the meaning in-

tended by such statements.

Hichigan never formally stipulated a

corroboration requirement, but

the~

facto situation which histori-

cally existed was one where few defendants were ever convicted
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without some corroborative evidence (Michigan Women's Task Force on

Rape, 1974; Cobb & Schauer, 1977).
specified the lack of a
tempt to eliminate its

~ ~
~facto

The enacted change in Hichigan

corroboration requirement in the atexistence.

The CSC Code now speci-

fically stipulates that "The testimony of a victim need not be

corroborated in prosection" (P.A. 266, 1974:520(h)).
States such as New Mexico (1975) and Florida (1977) followed
Michigan's lead by repealing their corroboration rules, while others
such as New· York (1974) and Georgia (1978) settled on a compromise

strategy, requiring some types of corroboration for some offenses,
e.g., only· in statutory rape cases.

Attempts to alter the consent standard as manifested in statutes
and in case law interpretations have also been made,

Reform efforts

have directed their attention to the preclusion of sexist practices
which grew and solidified through consent standards.

Hichigan (19/4)

and New Jersey (1979) for example, have avoided the vord consent and
delineated objective circumstances such as the existence of weapons,
victim injury, or authority relations between victims and offenders
which, if present, automatically constitute sexual assault, i.e., the
lack of consent (Field & Bienen, 1980: 160).
Addressing the problem of ccasent has also been accomplished
through the abolition of resistance requirements.

Michigan's

esc

Code does not require victim resistance in order to sustain convictions, but instead permits that it is sufficient to prove that force
and/or the threat thereof existed at the time of the sexual assault.
This shifts the focus from the victim's behavior (as in resistance)
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to the offender.

Minnesota (1975) and Ohio (1974) have enacted

similar legislation.

Moreover, even where the resistance standards

have been retained, "resistance to the utmost" has been deemed
"obsolete and outdated 11 (Bailey & Rothblatt, 1973:278).

Utmost re-

sistance has been replaced by a more lenient (yet still inequitable)

practice (Shape, 1975:478).

The prosecution nm<1 must demonstrate

only "good faith resistance, measured in relation to the total cir-

cumstances of the alleged attack" (LeGrand, 1973:620).
The admissibility of character or reputation evidence as an

indicator of consent has been perhaps the most significantly affected
dimension of traditional rape statutes.

Forty states have enacted

some provision for limiting victims' past sexual history in the
courtroom (Field & Bienen, 1980:171).

The degree of protection

afforded rape victims by the esc Code revision in Michigan has, unfortunately, been unmatched in other states.

l1ichigan 1 s Code states

that:
Sec. 520(j). (1) Evidence of specific instances of
the victim's sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the
victim's sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the
victim's sexual conduct shall not be admitted under
sections 520(b} to 520(g) unless and only to the extent
that the judge finds that the following proposed evidence
is material to a fact at issue in the case and that its
inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh
its probative value:
(a)

Evidence of the victim's past sexual
conduct with the actor.

(b)

Evidence of specific instances of
sexual activity showing the source
or origin of semen, pregnancy, or
disease.
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(2) I f the defendant proposes to offer evidence descrihed
in subsection (1) (a) or (b), the defendant within 10
days after the arraignment on the information shall file
a written motion and offer of proof. The court may order
an in-camera hearing to determine whether the proposed
evidence is admissible under subsection (1). If neH
information is discovered during the course of the trial
that may make the evidence described in subsection (1) (a)
or (b) admissible, the judge may order an in-camera
hearing to determine whether the proposed -;,;-idence is
admissible under subsection (l).
(P .A., 266, 1974:3-4,
520(j)).

While numerous reforms in statutes have addressed the issue of

character evidence, Field and Bienen state that "Most states, however,
have enacted rules which simply require a pre-trial hearing on relevance before evidence regarding the victim's sex conduct with persons
other than the defendant can be admitted" (1980:171).
lli.chigan and other state statutes contain several additional
provisions designed to improve the protection of sexual assault victims.

Only 29 states presently use the term rape somewhere in their

statutes as numerous states have endeavored the redefinition of this
offense (Field & :Bienen, 1980:154).

Definitional revisions in

approximately one-half of the states have been constructed to cover
not only a wider range of victims, but further a wide range of behaviors.

For example, many states have gone to sex-neutral terminal-

ogy, so that the law extends to cover male victims of sexual assault.
In a similar attempt to protect larger classes of victims, many
states have begun to include provisions for the inclusion of spouses
as rape victims.

Revisions designed to include a. consideration of

a greater range of behaviors now cover " ... oral and anal conduct,
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vaginal or anal penetration with an object, and other kinds of sexual
abuse'' (Dean & deBruyn-Kops, 1982:20).

Moreover, 22 states have redefined rape in terms of a series of
graduated offenses (Field & Bienen, 1980:154).

The degree structure

for different types of sexual assaults and the corresponding di£ferential penalties have been enacted with the intent of rendering
the treatment of this offense more comparable with other violent

assaults and crimes (Shapo, 1975:1522).

The degrees are generally

differentiated on the basis of the severity of the crime as determ:i.ned by such factors as victim injury, presence of weapon, aiders

and abettors, age of victim, and so forth.

These factors represent

some of the objective criteria which are stipulated so that sexual
assault is handled in a more equitable manner throughout the criminal
justice system.
Many states have additionally increased the amount of punishment
ass'ocieted

~rith

sexual assault offenses (Sasko & Sesek, 1975).

This

type of reform is aimed at correcting the problem of light sentences
being handed down to convicted offenders.

States such as Michigan

have even enacted additional proposals which preclude special "good
time" allowances for early parole for those convicted of criminal
sexual conduct.
A further alteration involved in reform legislation forbids the
identity or name of the victim to be publicized.

For example, the

Michigan Code states:
Upon the request of the counsel or the victim or actor
in a prosecution ... the magistrate before whom any person
is brought on a charge of having comoitted an offense •• ,
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shall order that the names of the victim and actor and
details of the alleged offense be suppressed until such
time as the actor is arraigned on the informatic:a, t:he
charge fs dism.h:;::.e;d, or the case is otherWise concluded,
whichever occurs first. (P,A. 266, 1974:4, 520(k)).

It is more than apparent that our legislators have been active
in attempting resolutions aimed at the issues and problematics associated with archaic statutes, case law, and practices.

The enacted

legislative alterations in general appear most positive from a victim
advocate point of view.

The final and absolutely critical question

then concerns the effect of all of this change given the implementa-

tion process.

As stated by The Michigan Women's Task Force on Rape:

While we must have done something right to so upset the
traditionalists, I would nevertheless caution the enthusiasts against the belief that an untested law can be a
model lctw. Its carefully chosen words may say what many
of us want a fair law to say. But we do not yet know if
in practice it will help to right what is so desperately
wrong. More than a legal reform, the Michigan law is an
experiment in which we hope to learn how a major revision
in the criminal code can deter, control, publicize, and
equalize the treatment of a very destructive set of acts
against human beings (BenDer, 1976: 150-151).
Alternative Interpretations of New Rape. Law
The theoretical perspectives on the legal system described in
the first section of this chapter can now be drawn upon in the effort
to explain the origin of rape laws across the country in general and
the new Michigan law in specific.

The application of these perspec-

tives to the enforcement/implementation dimension of the legal system
is of particular importance given the research objective.

Thus, each

perspective needs to be assessed in terms of both the legislative
change and its enforcement.
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Value Consensus

In assessing the three types of statements made about the origin
and operation of law with consenstJs theory, it becomes apparent that
certain tenets or types of consensus theory are more relevant than
others.

Sutherland and Cressey's (1974) first point regarding the

"crystallization of mores" is most difficult to apply to the new rape
legislation.

Protection of all classes of sexual assault victims,

comparability of treatment with other crimes, etc., cannot be characterized as custom or habit in this country,

The point that Suther-

land and Cressey make in this light is that laws arise out of the
process of translating custom or habit into legal codes.

Since the

new law attempts to alter prevailing definitions and customs, it is
not amenable to interpretation with this variant of consensus theory.
Sutherland and Cressey additionally posit that laws may emerge
out of the "rational process of a unified society."

This orientation

can be employed to explain the new rape law and to anticipate its
administration.

The recognition of and calling attention to discrim-

inatOry handling of rape vs. other crimes can be seen as part of a
rational process.

This perspective would explain that once the

discrepancy between stated end consensual societal goals, such as
justice, equality, and fairness before the law, and actual case
treatment were brought to_ light, laws were changed to bring about
consistency.

Thus the society can still be seen as unified and the

new law explained as an attempt to implement consensual values which
were being unwittingly distorted under a previous condition due to
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the shared but different value of protecting the rights of the accused.

Given the assumption of value consensus attributed to society

and the legal system with. this rational process view, it would be
assumed that continuity would exist between the shared values leading
to legislative alteration and the implementation of the new law
reflecting these values.
The third variant of value consensus relates to functional

theory.

This type of orientation would lead to an interpretation

similar to that above in terms of the new rape law and its enforcement.

The historically standing carnal knowledge statute would be

seen to represent the collective conscience, and the new law as an
attempt to better align such consensus with practice.

This is to say

that the interpretation, given functional consensus theory, would be
that both violent and property crimes offend the collective conscience.

When .feminists brought to light that differential treatment

of rape for the protection of the accused resulted in injustice, it
became apparent that this was consistent with neither the consensual
values of right and wrong, nor with societal goals of justice.

The

laws would be seen to change in the effort to have the legal system
better reflect and meet the shared societal values and goals.
This type of explanation, however, begs the question of the
impetus for feminist groups who challenge the prevailing value consensus (consensus being the need for differential standards and
treatment of rape because of concern about the rights of the accused).
The fact that a unified challenge to the "collective conscience" was
levied by feminists is difficult to account for given consensus
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orientations such as functionalism.

One could draw on Durkheim 1 s

discussion of deviance in an attempt to explain this- phenomenon, yet

this too falls short.

Durkheim asserted that deviants, such as the

feminists who did not accept the prevailing consensus, serve certain
functions for the social structure.

One of the functions he men-

tioned, which can be viewed as applicable in this case, is that of
innovation (1895).

The feminists can be seen to be innovators

bringing about a change in the collective conscience, with such
change ultimately serving as the basis for continued solidarity and
integration of societal members.

The problem with this type of ex-

planation is that functionalism is not able to account for the origin
of the deviance or collective challenge, owing to the fact that this
contradicts t:he strength of the collective conscience.

Moreover.

Durkheim' s discussion of innovators pertains to a more individualistie level.
While value consensus approaches facilitate certain insights,
they do fall short of fully explaining the creation of the new rape
laws.

The enforcement aspect of the legal system must be inferred

from the same value predicates leading to the law.

The implemented

law would therefore be anticipated to resolve noted inconsistencies,
and reflect the consensual intentions and values of justice and
equity.

Plural Conflict Theory
Pluralistic conflict theory would posit a different type of
interpretation of the new law.

This perspective, which posits that
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there are different groups with different interests in society, would
view women as one such group.

Women, such as feminists, vied for

state power to protect their set of interests, i.e., being better

protected from rape and from the traurr.:a imposed through the criminal
justice system.

This is consistent with the view that all groups

have the right to access the political arena to have their interests

protected.

In this pluralist view, the state would be seen as acting

in a fair and objective fashion by 'Neighing the interest:s and demands
of this group against those of other groups and ultimately, then,
conceding to enact a more fair law.
Iti. applying Turk's pluralistic conceptualization i t might be

stated that the feminist group (by lobbying for change) followed appropriate channels by recognizing the legitimate authority of the
state.

Change would De seen to be necessary as the norms of domina-

tion and deference required modification.

The struggle of '.)'omen

which manifested itself in the challenge to authority to protect the
interests of women is accommodated by Turk's pluralistic position.
The adjustment in law can be taken as an adjustment in these norms
between authorities and subjects.

The legal resolution to the chal-

lenge and conflict would be viewed co result in the temporary stability of the social order.
The pluralism of Chambliss and Seidman (1971) and of Quinney
(1970) render somewhat different insights.

The work of authors such

as these leads to speculations about why a less powerful group, such
as women, were able to have their interests reflected in law.

The

response to this query is not terribly difficult to discover.

~'omen
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represent a numerical majority (albeit slight) in this country and
women can vote.

Therefore, the "less powerful" or subordinate group

does, in fact, wield some power because of their numbers and the
political power of the vote.

These factors would be interpreted as

influential dimensions in the successful enactment of new rape legis-

lation.
Again, the varieties of the general perspective lead to somewhat
different interpretations.

The essential thread weaving these per-

spectives together is that they assert that different groups with
different interests (and power) compete for implementation of inter-

ests in law.

The lmv and its operation are assumed to operate in an

impartial fashion, protecting the general public welfare.

While the

form of operation of the law must be inferred from these premises, it
can be stated that the implementation process would be anticipated to
mirror the enactment process.

In other words, the law and its

enforcement would reflect a fair, protective compromise of interests
in a Turk scheme, and an inequality in power relationships along the
lines of more radical pluralistic theorists.

It is obvious that

since women are a subordinate group in this society in most every way
save numerically, a contradicr:ion is inherent in this latter view.
This form of plural conflict theory is therefore hard pressed to
fully c"'rplain the emergence and enforc·ement of a law serving the
interests of a group less powerful in most all ways.
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The Labeling Perspective

As similarities were pointed out in the general discussion be-

tween the labeling orientation and plural conflict theory, it can be

expected that the. application of this perspective to the new rape
laws will also manifest some congruity.

The labeling perSpective

asserts that definitions of crime arise out of power bases.

The en-

forcement process is also <>.mployed to reflect power relationships.
The interpretation of new rapt'! statutes must, therefore, once again

take into consideration the numerical superiority of women and the
power they hold as a group primarily Decause of their vote.

Tile

problem of inattention to differential degrees of poWer 'Nhich besets

the pluralistic conceptiOns is of equal relevance here.
A significant

contr:Lbut~on

of this orientation, however, in re-

lation to the women's movement and rape legislation, lies in the
consideration of the nature of labels.

A critical element of reform

legislation has been to redefine rape so that it is conceived of and
treated as other violent assaults.

It is precisely the social recon-

struction of the reality of rape as a form of assault that reform
efforts have attempted to address.

Viewing rape as a violent assault

in law is believed to be one significant means of resplving the problems tied to historical legislation and practice.
definitions thus comprises a target of reform.

The nature of rape

If criminal justice

officials begin to develop and share conceptions of rape as a violent
crime. as the new law would envision, less differential treatment
(e.g., attributions of consent, blame., etc.} would be anticipated.
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The labeling orientation calls attention to these definiti.onal and
attributional processes and the likely consequences for individuals
of such designations.

Labeling would therefore view the new law as a

means to accomplish the re-labeling of the crime of rape and its victims~

and because of these new constructions of reality, view the new

law as a possible measure to reduce differential treatment and hence

victim trauma.
Because lab9ling recognizes the role of power but does not analyze power structures and relationships (Turk, 1977) it is difficult

to utilize this orientation to lead to anticipations about the discrepancy between enactment and implementation.

Whether the enacted

redefinition of rape as sexual assault, sexual battery, criminal
sexual conduct, or deviate sexual conduct accomplishes the obj active
of treating this offense comparably (to other assaults) is a question
better answered by the Marxian perspectives.

Instrumental Marxian Theory
The instrumental Marxian conflict approach would assume that not
only is it that those in pcwer determine what laws will be enacted,
but also that this is the class who will control the law's implementation.

This view would contend that the new rape

laws~

while

appearing to be equitable and just, actually serve the interests of
the ruling class hy perpetuating the inequitable status quo.
It is instructive to note at this juncture that Marxian analysis
specifically deals with. the dichotomous distinction of the ,upper
class and the masses. as theM two classes are related to the modes of
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economic production.

While t>lomen as. a social group cannot all right-

fully be strictly classified as lower class, the tools of a Harxist

approach., es.pecially pertaining to the dicflotomy of the superordinate
or powerful vs. the subordinate or powerless, can be utilized to

interpret the origin and enforcement of new rape statutes that affect

both men and women.
It is anticipated, given instrumental Mandan theory, that power

interests can be facilitated, even by passing legislation supposedly

inimical to such interests, for a number of reasons.
departure for this argument is that laws may Oe

The point of

ena~ted

t.,rhich appear

and purport to serve interests other than those of the power elite;

however such legislation on th.e books remains just there, rather than
being enforced (Carsen, 1974; Chambliss, 1974; Hepburn, 1977; Kolka,
1963).

In the case of altered rape legislation it might be antici-

pated that while new laws exist, enforcement through the judicial arm
of the state maintains the. historical practices of protecting man's
property, and this only when the property is legitimate, i.e., there
is very little in the new law which. can preclude discriminatory
enforcement.

The instrumental perspective allows for and even pre-

dicts that the implementation process can/l.rill totally negate the
intent of the law as envisioned by those so instrumental to its
enactment.

In point of fact, the protection of property, i.e., wives

and daughters, is not at all inconsistent with even model legislation.
In Michigan, for example, the crime is automatically more severe
(carries a greater penalty) if the victim is under the age of 13.
Men still cannot legally rape their property/tvives in this same state.
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The law endeavors to reduce victim trauma and attributed culpability,
but if discriminatory enforcement endures, as would be predicted by

this approach, then it is primarily still only upper class women who
are protected.

The seemingly inimi..cal law may be seen to serve the

dominant class in another fashion.

The interpretation IDight be of-

fered that the patriarch is spared the stigmatization of disloyalty
where victim culpability and consent become less visible and frequent

issues.
From the instrumental Marxist view a further response to the

apparently inimical law is that such laws are advantageous to the
ruling class by furthering false consciousness (Carsen, 1974; Hepburn,
1977).

The false consciousness is facilitated by virtue of the fact

that, for instance, new "fair" rape laws can and have been enacted,
while no real substantive changes are actually forthcoming by those
in power.

The public is then duped into believing that the democrat-

ic and just system is viable and operating while the ruling class
retiiins control of the enactment process.

In reality the new rape

laws represent a ploy by the upper class to achieve just such an end
result.

Put differently, the ruling class perpetuates false con-

sciousness in order to maintain the status quo by passing a law and
simultaneously being cognizant that the la:w will not be enforced any
differently than the old law.

By introducing legislation into the

state apparatus which endeavors to redefine the crime of rape as a
violent assault, feminists and other victim advocates are placated,
and an open challenge and threat is quelled.

The point instrumental

theory brings to light is that legislation alone is an insufficient
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measure - for the class that is ruled - but more than sufficient for
those that rule since the ultimate test of reality is determined by

enforcement.
Additional reasons exist which explain why the new rape laws
serve principally the ruling class.

The nationwide focus on rape, as

well as the attempt to have it viewed as a violent assaultive crime
that needs to be controlled, also serve those with power.
focus on "violent" or "street" crime is heightened.

First, the

This serves to

divert attention and concern, and even definitional efforts, away
from upper class offenses, such as corporate crime and the pervasive
domination and oppression of the lower class (Hepburn, 1977; Reiman,
1979; Reiman & Headlee, 1981}.

Additionally, the rapist himself is

still stereo typically conceived of as a lower class black man who
needs to be controlled and punished.

This lends greater legitimacy

to the state as a repressive branch of government (Hepburn, 1977;
l'Iichalowski & Bohlander, 1976}.
The state gains legitimacy, not only in this respect, but in yet
another fashion.

It is the law which groups such as women address

themselves to in the effort to abate the problems of rape.

It is,

therefore, the state, an arm of the ruling elite, which is believed
to have the ability to resolve conflicts for the people.

The inher-

ent contradiction of using the state by and for th'3 people has already been discussed.

The additional point to be made here is that

because, in part, of false consciousness, or the inability of the
proletariat to know their true collective class interests, a major
symptom rather than cause of the problem is being addressed.
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Specifically, the call for reform has been to change rape laws
rather than to alter the class strue.ture which leads to domination
and exploitation of women, and thus to rape itself.
The attempt to broaden the definition of rape by making it sex

neutral and encompassing a wider range of acts represents a final
component of new legislat:ifn which can act to serve ruling class
interests.

By broadening the scope of those who can fall within the

arms of the law, the state and hence: the upper class are able to control "problem populationsn and/or quell threats from lower class

members with greater ease.
In sum, instrumental Marxian theory points out that the bourgeois will benefit from t):le new rape legislation in this country,

while the legislation itself appears to serve interests other than
those of this class.

While application of this perspective yields

some very significant insights, it too falls short in explaining the
emergence of a group who challenged prevailing ideology, law, and
practice.

The instrumental approach has been critiqued for dictating

that the economic infrastructure determines the superstructure, including class consciousness.

Therefore, a change in the infrastruc-

ture must necessarily precede a change in ideology .£!. counter
ideology development.

To the degree that the instrumental approach

subscribes to the 1'equirement that a change in the material conditions is necessary fot" a change in consciousness, it cannot
satisfactorily explain the rise and challenge of feminists in regards
to rape.

The issue of implementation is an empirical question to be

addressed later.
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Structural Marxian Theory

While the structural and instrumental approaches have much in
common, the structural conflict approach can be -drawn upon to--explain
that which the instrumental fails to do.

Because structuralists

recognize that the infrastructure shapes rather than determines the
superstructure and t.hat the superstructure develops relative autonomy,
the perspective can more easily account for the emergence of a challenging ideological stance by feminists.

The structural argument

allows for consciousness changing independently from changes in the
material realm of life.

Therefore, structural conflict theory can

take into account the altered consciousness of_ women as. an impetus
for changes in rape legislation across the nation.
Because of the recognition of the relative autonomy of superstructures, such as the state apparatus, structural theory like
instrumental theory allows for a discrepancy between enactment and
implementation of

legi~1lation.

The new rape laws passed by legisla-

tors in this country I)Ver the past decade may take on quite a
different character when put into effect by polic:;:, prosecutors,
defense attorneys, judges, and juries.

While instrumental theory

takes on a somewhat conspiratorial flavor, structural perspectives,
while acknowledging such potentialities, suggest they may not always
hold true.

It is in this vein that Bierne (1979:379) states that in

order for laws to appear fair, they must, at times, he fair.

The

implementation of the new rape statutes might then actually reflect
the objectives sought by groups who called for such change.

This is
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not to sugges:t that the consensus or pluralist_models: are accurate
since, however, it IDUSt be remembered that this "fairness" is to...ha
vi.e.wed in light of accomplishing the legi.tiJDatiou function of the

state.

From the structuralist perspecti.ve, the upper class, _in order

to perpetuate their rule, endeavors to lllinimize resistance by per-

suading the populace that consensus exists, that the system is fair,
just, and serves the interests of alL

Thus, some legislative and

enforcement change is permi.tted to preserve the r:apitalists' long
term advantaged position.
Structuralista- elaborate this position by stating that the
individualization of rights, such. as those accruing to the rape vi.ctim,

11 , • •

does net create but frapents class solidarity" (Picciotto,

1982: 175).

Grau asserts that:

••• soci.al movements equate changing the law with transforming society. Collective needs asserted by these
movements get articulat~d in terms of individual rights;
••• Laws are changed, and i f changed, challenged.
Interpreted by the courts, the changed laws acquire
meanings other than those held by those who sought the
changes. Turned solely to legal ends, the social
movement is diffused (1982:206, citing Klare, 1977).
Again, generating and perpetuating false consciousness via placation,

legitimation, and rationalization are seen by structural Marxian
theorists to be an ideological means of domination.

Tb.ei new rape

laws can. be seen to fit squarely w.tthin such a scheme.

Dialeetie Marxian "Theory
As the dialectic approach. departs from structuralism., so too

d.o the insight;.s it can provide.

The dialectic theorists cr:itique
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structural Marxists for their ambiguity and "unwarranted generalizations" (Bierne & Quinney, 1982:4) brought about by the lack of his-

torical specificity.

The argument is that "each case must be

examined empirically and on its own merits, and understood in the
proper historical context" (Bierne & Quinney, 1982: 11).

Without

historical analysis, or conversely with "unwarranted generalization,"
the theory obscures certain issues and answers, e.g., Wy the very

first rape laws favored male
social formations.

11

property rights" in pre-capitalist

Thompson (1978) argues· that the ahistorical

universal type of theorizing engageC in by structuralists renders the
theory incapable of accounting for the dynamic process of contradiction, struggle, and change so critical to a Marxian analysis.
The contribution of dialectic theory can be seen along these
lines.

This position facilitates the examination of new rape stat-

utes in specific historical context, where change arises out of
contradictions and class struggle.

Ihe implementation of such change

can effect several diffa:cent outcomes.

The repressive function of

the state and law as discussed in terns of instrumental Harxian theery is recognized as a potential outcome in the dialectic approach.
The generation of new false consciousness as emphasized by structural
theorists is also possible.

A third possibility lies in the

dialec~

tic view that contradictions and conflicts can usher in real change;
not just change in appearance (as the instrumentalists suggest) or
inconsequential and sporadic change to maintain the overall ideology
and thus the social system (as implied by the structuralists).
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Chambliss t (1979) dialectic model insinuates that real gains are
possible.

Applying his perspective to the new rape legislation one

could conclude that the new laws represent an adjustment or
tion" from which the challenging group may benefit.

11

resolu-

Chambliss'

argument suggests, however, that regardless of limited gain for the

subordinate class, in the long run the law

~.;ill

still work to favqr

the dominant class and its interests (1979:24).
Grau's discussion goes one step further.

He leads one to specu-

late that real gains may be made not only because of the need for
legitimation as structuralists would have it, but additionally be-

cause of the contradictions W"hlch have led to power accruing to women
as a group in present day society.

Women have increasingly gained

both economic and political power because of, for example, the
interm.ittant need for them in the work force and economy, because of
increased political participation in voting, lobbying, campaigning,
holding political positions, and because of their ability to develop
alliances within and between class divisions.

This yields a more

powerful base of operations relevant to struggle and conflict between
the super- and subordinate groups.

The new rape laws women 1 s groups

were able to get enacted across this country in the past decade can
be seen to represent true gains of an under class in the population.
As Bierne and Quinney state, "true inroads can in fact be gained

through law" (1982:6).
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Discretion and the Enforcement of Laws
The source of legislative change, as manifested in

new rape

codes in this countrY, has been ir1terpreted according to each of the
theoretical perspectiveS" above presented.

General anticipatory ex-

planations regarding the implementation dimension of such statute
change have also been made, given

ea~h.

of these approaches.

The

imporcance of the enforce111ent aspect of the law cannot be overstated,

yet, as can be evidenced in the prev.l.ous section, several of the theoretical orientations either neglect or merely asswne the generaliza-

bility of tenets to this critical component of law,

It is the actual

implementation and operation of the law which determines specific

case treatment and outcome and is, therefore, a sign:i.ficant factor in
assessing the theoretical applicability of any perspective.

The

discretion which permeates the enforcement system in the country
renders implementation at..!!:!!!. as important as the enactment element
of the legal system.

Discretion allows all criminal justice enforce-

ment agencies a wide range of choices in the interpretation and
implementation of any given legislative enactment.

Discretion,

therefore, should be scrutinized as it pertains to the anticipated
style of law enforcement, given each of the theories.

This comprises

the empirical questian to be assessed.
With consensus theory. discretion would have to be explained as

operating in a fashion reflective of the shared sense of morality and
values.

Therefore, non-discriminatory, fair, and just enforcement
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would be expected, given the societal value consensus, the objectives
of the state, and

sanct~oning

mechanisms.

Consideration of plural conflict theory leads to a similar type
of interpretation, since this perspective also views the state as

neutral, fair, and objective.

The difference is that as pluralistic

theory sees the law as reflecting a mediated compromise of competing
interests, it would see discretionary decisions in the enforcement
process as also reflecting these same competing interests.
Labeling and Marxist accounts depart from such expectations.
Th.ese approaches generally- intimate that discretion in the enforcement system yields discriminatory treatment.
enforcement of laws, made poss.ible by

Discrimination in the

discretion~

is in very general

terms interpreted by these three orientations as protecting the
interests of those in power.
The structural approach posits one
which merits reiteration.

additiona~-

consideration

Structuralists argue that in order for the

law to appear fair, it must at: times be fair (Bierne, 1979; Greenberg,
1981).

In order to serve upper class interests, therefore, discre-

tion can be seen to facilitate both discrimination and fairness in
the enforcement process, both of which continue to serve status quo
interests.

The problem here is that structural arguments do not

specify which laws it is that will be enacted and enforced to appear
fair, and which to actually be fair.
Dialectic Marxian theory makes a contribution here by calling
attention to power differentials involved in conflicts and their
resolution.

If the challenging group has power (arising out of
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contradictions. inherent in the social structure) the change/reso-

lution may engender true fairness and eqJJity through implementation.
Prosecution

When enforcement or the operation of the law is scrutinized,
conceptualization and focus· have generally been on the three components of police, courts, and corrections.

Even casual perusal of

criminal justice text titles attests to this fact, yet this theoretical and research focus fails to take into account perhaps the most
important figure in the administration of justice - the prosecutor

(Blumberg, 1979; Cole, 1975; Miller, 1969; Southern California Law
Review, 1969).

It is the prosecutor alone who "activates the judi-

cial machinery" (Karlen & Schultz, 1972:113),

Prosecutors decide not

only who will be processed through the criminal justice apparatus,
but also the number and severity of charges to be levied against the
accused, and whether or not, and to what extent, cases will be plea
bargained.
Coexistent with the tremendous amount of power which prosecutors
hold is an incredibly vast discretionary latitude in the office.
There are very few structured checks or controls over the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion (Davis, 1976:65-67).

Moreover, the few

controls that do exist are by and large ineffective (Blu:nberg, 1979;
Davis, 1976).

This means that the figure in the criminal justice

system that wields the most power simultaneously wields the broadest
range of discretion.
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Ironically it is precisely this powerful and autonomous figure
who is ;' •.. relatively free to choose his causes, cases (and) targets"

(Blumberg, 1979: 122-23) and to choose the levels of prosecution that
are often neglected in the study of the criminal justice system.

The

paramount importance of prosecutors must not be overlooked any longer.
Given the nature and impact of their powerful and discretionary roles
and decisions, prosecutors will shape, if not determine, the effectiveness of enacted legislation through the implementation process.
Hhetber or not rape is to be treated as a violent assaultive offense
or a sexual crime, even under model legislation, is therefore largely

contingen"': upon the types of decisions rendered by prosecutors.
Prosecutors may, for instance, decide not to pursue a rape case without corroborative evidence, victim resistance, and so forth, with
relative immunity even when such requirements no longer exist in
statute.
Because of the virtual isolation and immunity which surround
prosecutorial decision-making, and because of the wide range of power
and discretion, it is crucial not or..ly to examine the types of decisions made, but also to discern the types of factors which impact
upon such discretionary decision-making.

The particularly germane

issue here concerns the role prosecutors play in the implementation
of new legislative enactments.

The factors considered, and thus

leading to the types of decisions rendered by prosecutors, hold bt;oad
implications for whether or not sexual assault cases will be handled
in an equitable and just manner, i.e., consistent with the objective
of comparable case treatment.
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Research on Prosecution
Several sets of factors have been identified as influences on
the exercise of discretion by prosecutors.

The traditional legalis-

tic school of thought, characteristic of much of the early work in
the field, posits that the prosecutor makes decisions based upon

legally stipulated criteria such as evidence for the various elements
of the corpus delicti of the crime (Cole, 1975; Grosman, 1969;
Jacoby, 1977; Kaplan, 1965; Mather, 1974; Miller, 1970; Neubauer,

1974; Newman, 1966; Sudnow-, 1965).

In other words, enforcement of

laws by prosecutors basically reflects the letter of the law as
enacted.

Miller 1 s (1970) classic work on the charging decision best.

reflects this early legalistic tradition,

He dis·cusses the existence

of probable cause, the sufficiency of evidence, and the severity of
the criminal act as legalistic elements impacting on prosecutors'
decisions to "charge a suspect with a crime" (1970},
A slight.ly broader conceptualization of legalistic factors is
found with Cole's categorization of evidential concerns (1975).

The

essential ingredient of evidential elements can be summed up as conviction probability.

Prosecutors have been hypothesized, observed,

and found to consider evidentiary factors such as past criminal
record of the accused and victim credibility in their assessments of
criminal cases (Cole, 1975; Miller, 1970; Neubauer, 1974; Newman,

1966;

Sudnow~

1965),

Tl:is legalistic tradition aligns itself with both consensus and
plural conflict perspectives.

The enforcement process is logically
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inferred to operate in the same interests as those underlying the
origin ot the law.

Since both view the state apparatus as impartial,

they would be consistent with the veiw that prosecutors consider

legally prescribed criteria, such as the amount, type, and quality of
evidence, in the decision-making process,

Elements not required by

the new law, e.g., victim resistance and corroboration, would not be
expected to influence decisions, given the legalistic orientation to
prosecution.
The research identifying ex:tra-legal factors as influences on
prosecutorial discretion challenges this legalistic position.

:Huch

of this research emanates explicitly from an instrumental Marxian

conflict perspective.

Variables such as race and socio-economic

status (SES) have been found to be associated with decisions rendered
by prosecutors (Hagen, 1974; Jones, 1977; Southern California Law

Review, 1969).

The interpretation herein is that prosecutors, as an

arm of the state and ruling class, make discriminatory/discretionary
decisions (against the lower class, minority group members, and the
young) which serve to perpetuate the status quo which benefits those
in power (Chambliss & Seidman, 1971; Quinney, 1969; Turk, 1966).

It

would therefore be expected that discriminatory law enforcement would
be characteristic of the administration of both old and new rape
statutes, not only in terms of defendant characteristics, but also,
and importantly, in terms of continuing to protect only a select
group of "legitimate" victims.

This perspective then portends the

comparability of treatment under old aild new law, rather than the
comparability of treatment in sexual and non-sexual assault case
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prosecutions.

The reason for lack of change in enforcement is that

extra-legal discriminatory factors (e. g. sexist attitudes, belief in
false accusations, etc.) persis-t as influences on discriminatory de-

cisions, regardless of legal enactments.
Cole (197 5) posits a further type of influence on the exercise

of discretion by prosecutors.

His classification of organizational

concerns suggests that the pressures within the office of the prosecutor itself need to be considered as they impinge upon decisionmaking in criminal cases.

Specifically, Cole (1975) and others

(Blumberg, 1979; Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977; Jacoby, 1977; Littrell,
1977; Meyers & Ragan, 1979) have delimited organizational matters as
those involving resource availability and allocation, community and
political pressures, and the "exchange relationship" (Cole, 1975) between prosecutors and other criminal justice official agents.
These types of influences Can be discussed in light of both
labeling and structural Marxian approaches.

Dickson's (1968) study

operating within the labeling perspective, for instance, points out
that organizational self interests (to surVive and grow as an agency)
have a bearing on the definitional process.

This is similar to the

organizational influence of particularly political, and conununity
concerns as they affect the elected office of the prosecutor.

Prose-

cutors decide their " ••• causes, cases, and targets for prosecution"
(Blumberg, 1979: 123) contingent in part on pleasing the citizenry
who have the ability to (re)elect them.

In jurisdictional positions

where prosecutors are appointed, they need to consider appealing to
those governmental units and agents that hold power over their
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position.

In a similar political vein, assistant prosecutors must

consider their superior chief prosecuting attorney in making deci-

sions about who is to be charged and at what level,

It would be

expected, therefore, that the attitudes of the citizenry and politi-

cally powerful people in the community would be reflected in the
implementation of the new rape statute by prosecutors.
The structural argument that superstructures develop and grow to
be relatively autonomous is also relevant to organizational considerations.

Structural accounts are amenable to taking into considera-

tion "exchange relationships" as identified by Cole (1975) as well as
political, COllliilunity, and resource concerns.

Structuralists

recognize not only that the state develops a degree of independence
from the infrastructure arrangements, but further that other agencies
falling under state control also develop a certain independence.
Thus, prosecutors function not only to meet agency needs as discussed
above, but also are constrained and influenced by other relatively
autonomous criminal justice organizations, such as the interests and
concerns of police and courts, in carrying out their role.
Cole's (1975) typification and structural Marxian theory coincide on a final type of influential factor pertinent to prosecutorial
discretion.

Cole states that a third influence on decisions can be

found in pragmatic considerations.

By pragmatic, Cole intends the

attempt to individualize justice, to act in a manner most fair to
defendant, victim, and society, given crime circumstances (Cole,
1975; Rossett & Cressey, 1976).

Examples of pragmatic influences

would be the severity of the sentence and the degree of victim trauma
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likely if the case were to b.e pursued, and th.e availability of

alternatives for case resolution.
The structural assertion that laws, in order to appear fair,
must at times be fair, is once again relevant in connecting the two

different types of approaches to the legal system.
critical component of pragmatic decisions.

Fairness is a

A second interpretation

given pragmatic structural considerations is that structuralists ad-

ditionally acknowledge that even so;ne upper class persons may act out
of "benevolent" motivation (Grau, 1982:197).

It is in this light

that the implementation of the new rape law might be expected to
achieve the objective of justice in the effort to legitimate the

capitalistic social system.
Insofar as dialectic Marxian theory is similar to both instrumental and structural Marxian perspectives, the same types of interpretations rendered above are pertinent,

Dialectic theory, however,

proceeds to take on a further direction in relation to prosecutorial
implementation.

Chambliss 1 contention that resolutions do not ad-

dress contradictions connotes that legislative alterations address
only the conflicts and dilenunas brought to the fore by feminists,
Therefore, the implementation of the new law by prosecutors would
function only to underscore dormant contradictions, such as the
discrepancy between enactment and enforcement of legislation, and
would thus, serve to generate new conflicts, challenges, and dile=as,
rather than resolve the problem of unique and inequitable rape case
treatment.

The discussion of extra-legal considerations

impiu~lng

on

prosecutorial discretion would therefore be relevant again here.
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Grau's w:ork. is compatible with. the above interpretation as can
be evidenced in his statement that social movements must view law
" ... not as the end product of their struggles, but as an intermediate
product, a further stepping stone to further struggles" and that such
movements must insist " ... on enforcement on their terms, rather than
on the terms the courts ultimately impose" (1982:206).

One need only

substitute the agency of the prosecutor for the courts here.
It is tenable however to r.raw a slightly more optimistic conclusion. given Grau's dialectic position.

If feminists view the legal

change as a stepping stone, insist that powerful prosecutors and
other criminal justice officials implement the objective as well as
rule of the law and insist "extralegally as well as legallyn thrpugh
for example continued monitoring, lobbying, and protesting (Grau,
1982:206), i t is possible that a synthesis representing true gains
for rape victims while simultaneously- protecting innocent accused
parties might materialize.

It is premature at this juncture to as-

sess the viability of such conditional "if" statements.

The signifi-

cance of the dimensions pointed out by the dialectic model above
(as well as by th£ other models) lies in the assessment and interpretation of research findings.
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CHAPTER III

RESEARCH DESIGN AND ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES

It is beneficial to reiterate the major research objective at
the outset of this chapter for clarification purposes.

This obj ec-

tive flows from the examination of discretionary charging and plea
bargaining decisions made by prosecutors in sexual and non-sexual
assault cases in a jurisdictioa operating under model rape legislation.

The primary objective of this research is to examine the

effec.tiveness of model rape legislation in the implementation process
by assessing the differences and/or similarities associated with the
prosecution of sexual and non-sexual criminal assault cases.

Theore-

tical perspectives on the origin and operation of the criminal law
will be applied in the interpretation of research findings to gain an
understanding of any differences/similarities discovered,

Design

The type of sexual assault cases included in this research are
all those delineated in the model Criminal Sexual Conduct (CSC) Code
in the State of Michigan.

Specifically~

these offenses are CSC in

the first, second, third, and fourth degrees, assault with intent to
commit criminal sexual penetration, and assault with intent to commit
criminal sexual contact (See Appendix A).
The selection of other personal and violent assaults was predicated upon the consideration of crimes classified as assault

80
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offenses in the Michigan Penal Code.

'\hese offenses are:

Assault

with Intent to Murder, Assault wi.th Intent to do Great Bodily Harm

Less than Murder, Ass·ault wlth Intent to Maim, Assault with Intent to

Commit a Felony Not Otherwise Punished, Felonious Assault, Assault:
Infliction of Serious Injury, Assault with Intent to Rob and Steal:
Armed, Assault wi.th Intent to Rob and Steal:

Unarmed.

Appendix B

provides penal code descriptions for these offenses.
Robberies, both armed and unarmed, are additional types of per-

sonal and violent assaults included in this study.

The difference

between assaults with intent to rob, as specified under the assault
heading in the penal code, and robbery itself lies in the realization
Of the intent to steal.

t..Thile murder does represent a personal violent assault, it was
excluded from this study for essentially two reasons.

First there

were too few cases in the research jurisdiction for analytic purposes.
Second, murder is not included in this study as victim credi'!Jility,
character, resistance, and so forth as elenients influencing prosecutorial judgments are moot issues with this offense.
The time frame for this research encompassed the years of 1980
and 1981.

The reason for this was to ensure both a sufficient number

of cases for analysis, and that the cases would be recent yet completed (not pending in the courts) at the time of data collection,
This time frame represents the new Michigan rape law in its operation
for a two-year period, five years after its enactment.
Data were collected on the ·~bove types of crimes for this twoyear period in Kalamazoo County, :Michigan.

All warrant requests for
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all of th_e above ass.aults from all police departments in this county
constitute the universe of cases for this research.

The universe of CSC cases for the two-year period were included
for analysis.

The same- is true for the. armed and unarmed robberies,

and for all assaults, excluding felonious assaults.
Ths sheer volume of felonious assaults for this two-year period
necessitated sampling.

fied systematic sample.

The strategy employed consisted of a strati-

All felonious assault cases for each year

were first stratified according to the warrant disposition as either
authorized or denied.

A systematic sampling strategy was then emp-

loyed to select first the denied and then the authorized cases to be
included in this study.

The list of cases (elements} was compiled

by listing every felonious assault warrant as it was encountered in
the prosecutor's files.

The prosecutor's files are in chronological

order by date (throughout the year) of police request.

This then

avoids the problem of "periodicity" (Babbie, 1979:178-179),

Cases

were then systematically sampled in first the authorized and then the
denied felonious assault cases.
The total population of cases, excluding these felonious assaults, were included, i.e., not sampled, due to the desire to permit
for flexibility in sentence (and thus discretion) range.

Another

reason for including the population of cases was that there were so
few cases of assault with. intent to commit murder, assault _with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, and assault with in- tent to rob and steal:

armed and unarmed, all added together that

sampling would have been disadvantageous, particularly given the
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s.trategy used for the operationalization of the. dependent variable.
(See pp. 89-93}.

Th.ere w.ere no cases of assault w-i.th intent to maim,

assault with intent to commit a felony not otherwise punished, or
assault:

infliction of serious injury encountered during the time

frame of this research..
The Independent Variables
Data were collected on a number of different independent variables.

For those cases denied at intake, only limited

available.

dat~

were

Demographics on the defendant and crime, the charge(s)

requested by various police departments, and the reasons for denial
were the types of information available for these cases.

In the

authorized instances, a wealth of information on victim, de£endant
and crime characteristics, and the criminal justice process existed
in the prosecutor files.

There were several different kinds ..of in-

formation involved in data collection in addition to the above types
of information in these authorized cases.

Th.e attempt was to gather

as much. pertinent information as possible, given the research
objective and literature reviewed.
The selection of variables for incorporation in the res.earch
analysis was predical;ed· on the amount of missing data found in the
variable, variable redundancy, and theoretical concerns.

Inspection

of preliminary frequency data led to the automatic exclusion of any
variable containing 50% or more missing data.

Examination of the

entire independent variable list yielded variable r.E'.duction due to
overlap in th.e dimensions being measured.

For example, defendant's
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income was an independent variable deleted as the. court appointment
of an attorney vs. the private payment of an attorney essentially
measured the same phenomenon,

i.e.~

social class.

While absolute

(internal/ratio) income of the defendant was the preferred measure,
the appoint!ng/ret~ining of one's defense attorney bad :::;.1ch less missing data.

Theoretical considerations provided a third basis for variable
deletion.

The theoretical and research literature reviewed in Chap-

ter I led to the inclusion of the following categories of variables.
Data on victim and defendant demographics, such as race, age, and
socio-economic status (SES) were included in. light of the attempt to

assess the applicability of theory as it relates to the .implementation process.

In this same effort, data were also included on

variables pertaining to the issues such as victim credibility,
precipitation~

character, and resistance in both sexual and non-

sexual assault cases.
Additional variables retained for analysis related to evidential,
pragmaric,. and organizational concerns as described in the literature
on prosecution.

The amount and type of evidence concerned, for ex-

ample, the number and type. of witnesses, presence and type of weapon,
injury, and so on.

Alternatives, such as psychiatric or alcohol

treatment, and likely victim trauma were factors considered in this
selection of data on pragmatic concerns.

The police departemnt re-

questing the warrant and investigating the crime was taken into
account, given Cole's {1975) organizational category.
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Once variables were narrowed down on these bases, the variable
categories were collapsed for several of the independent measures.

The categories of variables were manipulated in a couple of different

ways.

First, categories were frequently collapsed for variables

where numerous or low frequency categories existed.

Inspection of

frequencies on these variables revealed such low occurrences of certain categories that maintenance of all categoric distinctions was

unwarranted.

For example, after looking at the poliee department

requesting the assault or

esc

charge, all small police departments

corresponding to the low frequencies were joined together as one
category.

Similarly where race of victim/offender had originally

been coded as black, white, and other, the instances of minorities
other than blacks were so few, given the entire data set, that these
variables were dichotomized as white/other for analytic purposes.
The reasons given in prosecutor files for denying warrant requests and for plea bargaining were diverse and numerous • particularly for the latter variable.

In order to make these critical data

manageable and interpretable, reduction of categories was imperative.
The literature on prosecutors was drawn upon in this effort.

Most

all reasons offered for either denial of a warrant or for plea bargaining an assault or CSC were amenable to classification as either
evidential, pragmatic, or organizational.

Warrants were denied on

evidential grounds such as insufficient circumstance or testimony to
establish an element of the crime, or insufficient proof o.':: the
identity of the accused.

The referral to a diversion program or the

sending of a warning letter were taken as pragmatic reasons for
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failing to invoke the criminal justice process by denying a warrant.

Denial due to other charges pending against the accused or because
the police failed to get wi-tness statements at the time of the request represents an instance of organizational category.
The rationale for plea bargaining was similarly trichotomiz:ed.
Instances of evidential factors were found in stated reasons such as

"weak case, 11 "no weapon found," "question intent to do battery,"
"Possible mental defense," "poor conplaining witness."

Sufficient

sentence latitude was an often cited pragmatic type of reason for

plea bargains.

Other pragmatic elements were evidenced in concern

about victim trauma and testimony against a relative through court
proceedings.

Organizational factors relate to reasons such as the

willingness to testify against a co-defendant, or simply the willingness to enter a guilty plea to the original or reduced charge, and
thus save the prosecutor resources.
While most all reasons offered for warrant denials and plea
agreements could be conceptually linked to this trichotomy, there
were several reasons which did not fit neatly into this scheme.

A

fourth category was therefore devised to encompass these "other"
kinds of considerations.

This category can be conceived of as prag-

matic in the more literal sense of the word, i.e., practical, rather
than as an attempt to "individualize justice."

Reasons such as the

victim deciding not to proceed or desiring to drop charges were
included here.

Additionally, since the policy in this jurisdictional

office requires the complainant to appear for an interview with a
prosecutor before authorization in both esc and all types of other
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assault cases., failure to show: was considered as "practical 11 reason
for warrant denial.
There were two variables coded geometrically (permitting for a
variety of category combinations) which were receded into an ordinal

variable code.

Victim resistance was rank ordered according to exte'nt

of resistance, with no resistance at one end of the scale and vi.c.tim
use of a weapon at the other.

The interim categories were first the

non-assaultive category of flight, verbal persuasion, and/or screaming, then weak physical resistance, then the combination of w·eak

physical with the non-assaultive type of resistance, thee strong
physical resistance, and subsequently the combination of strong physi-

cal with the non-assaultive, then victim use of a weapon, and finally
the use of a weapon along with any of the above forms of resistance.
The categories and combinations in the independent variable of
weapons were also receded so as to be able to deal \-lith this variable
as ordinal for some types of analysis.

Weapons were trichotomized as

absence of weapons, use of hands, fist, feet as weapons, and presence
of gun, knife, or other sharp or blunt instrument.
The interval/ratio data such as age of victim and defendant,
number of convictions and arrests, etc., were not transformed in any
way because of the type of analyses conducted.

One final type of

category alteration did involve making durwny variables out of nominal
data such as race of victim and offender for correlation analysis.
Here nominal variables were treated as zero/one dichotomies.
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Dependent Variable Operationalization

The dependent variable in this research was prosecutorial discretion as manifested in the decisions to charge, plea bargain,

and/or nolle charges against the accused.

Ostensibly, each of these

decisions appears to represent a dichotomous choice by the prosecutor.
A nominal level of measurement on the dependent variable, however,
would have been detrimental to the study.

The most

~.)'hich

could have

been ascertained, if prosecutorial discretion had been categorized as
a series of dichotomous choices, would have been a simple set of
distinctions.

These distinctions could have only differentiated be-

tween cases in which warrants were authorized or denied, between

cases where the adjudicated charges were either adjusted or compa·rable to those requested, between cases which were plea bargained and
those which were not, and between cases where charges were retained
or dropped.
Because a great deal of information would have been lost by
treating the dependent variable in this type of dichotomous manner,
a strategy was conceived whereby it would be possible to quantita·tively measure the magnitude of prosecutorial discretion exercised at
each decisional stage.

To this extent it was first necessary to

construct a T.ank ordering of charges based upon the severity of the
criminal offense.

The charge severity was determined by looking at

the legislatively stipulated maximum sentences.
terion not only defines parameters

~dthin ~•hich

This type of cricriminal justice

officials must operate, but further can be assumed to reflect
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legislative interpretati_ons regarding the seriousness of different
criminal offenses.

The reason for employing maximum sentence guide-

lines was predicated upon the belief that the amount of discretion
exercised by prosecutorial altering of charges was directly related
to the type of crime and its severity as determined by the sentencing

structures associated with criminal cases.
An illustration is instructive at this point.

An armed robbery,

for one example, can be viewed as a qualitatively different and more

serious offense, than a simple assault and battery.

Plea bargaining

an armed robbery (which carries a life imprisonment maximum sentence)
down to an assault and battery (which carries a 90 day maximum sentence) obviously represents a different and greater amount of discretion than changing an armed robbery to a robbery-unarmed (which
carries a maximum sentence of 15 years).
The aim was to operationalize_ these types of discretionary
actions in a fashion such that the difference, due to alterations in
charges by prosecutors, would be presented as an interval/ratio scale.
Hence, the magnitude of prosecutorial discretion exercised at any
stage could be assessed, and the factors which influenced this magnitude of discretion analyzed.

The final weighted scale would then

portray the seriousness associated with each charge encountered at
every stage of the study, and attrition and alterations reflecting
the extent of prosecutorial discretion could be treated as interval/
ratio differences.

These differences could then be taken to reflect

both the direction and magnitude, or amount and type of discretion,
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exercised in dropping cases and altering

charges~

through charging

and plea bargaining decisions.

Once tile rank order of all offenses encountered in the data was
established by legislative maximums., it was necessary to devise a
means for assigning a numerical wei.ght to each category of maximums.
The baseline for t.he assignment of scale values was determined by

first looking at the most severe maximum of life imprisonment.

To

more accurately interpret the meaning of a life sentence, from the
standpoint of years in prison, the average age of defendants included

in the research project was calculated.
The mean age of defendants was calculated to be 28.863 years in

this particular research.

It is important to note at this point that

the mean age of all defendants in all crimes examined was utilized
for basically two reasons.

First~

there was not a significant dif-

ference in the average age of defendants in sexual and non-sexual
assaults and, perhaps even more importantly, it was necessary to have
a standardized scale for comparison of these two types of cases.

In

order to construct a realistic estimate of the time which could be
served under a life term, the rounded mean age of 29 was subtracted
from 65 - the life expectancy of a male born in 1950 (Delury,
1979:956).

The figure of 65 was the closest approximation to that

which would be representative of the defendants included in this twoyear study, as the actuarial tables are calculated on a decennial
baSis.

Thus, taking the difference between the mean age of the

defendants and their average life expectancy, a :iii&J::imum lifa sentence
at the time of the study would imply the equivalent of a 36 year term.
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This most severe sentence was accorded the highest scale weight
and subsequently served as the basis for calculating all other scale

weights.

The procedure used to determine all scale values was to

divide the maximum sentence for each lesser offense by the most severe maximum operationalized as 36 years.

Applying this criteria to

those offenses carrying a maximum of life resulted in a weighted
scale value of one.

To clarify, dividing the ultimate maximum of 36

years into the 36 year maximum associated with crimes carrying this
penalty yields a quotient of unity.

This number was then multiplied

by 1,000 (as were all other later quotients), in order to avoid
dealing with decimal numbers at any stage in the scale.

The second most severe sentence for an offense in this study was

15 years.

By dividing 15 years by the 36 year figure, it was pos-

sible to obtain a ratio of the proportionate distance between life
and the 15 year maximum.

The resulting quotient of .41667 was then

multiplied by 1,000 and subsequently dealt with as 417.
The same general logic

~~as

employed to calculate a

~~eigh ted

scale value for the next highest maximum sentence which was 10 years.
Ten years was divided by the previous 36 year figure and then multiplied by 1,000 yielding a scale value of 278.

The same strategy was

used to arrive at a weighted scale value for the remaining maximum
terms encountered in the study.

The operationalized values were 139

for a five-year maximum, 111 for a four-year maximum, 56 for a twoyear maximum, 28 for a one-year maximum, and 7 for a 90 day (!z, of a
year) ma:r.:imum term.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

92
Once new variables were created for each case representing the
points on the dependent variable scale associated with charge(s) re-

quested, charge(s) authorized, and final charge(s), three more new
variables were created.

The first of these represents the total

point values of the first plus the second charge requested.

If only

one count was requested this new variable was simply equivalent to
the points corresponding to the first requested charge.

The second

new measure represents the joint points of the first and second
authorized charge, and the third the added points of the first and

second final charge.

When cases were denied at intake, the points

for authorized charges were assigned as zero.

Similarly, when cases

were dismissed by the prosecutor in the form of a nolle prosequi at
any point after authorization, the points for final charge{s) were
assigned as zero.
Operationalizing discretion in this manner leads to the development of two dependent variables.

The first dependent variable

represented the magnitude of discretion exercised by prosecutors in
denying or authorizing an arrest warrant, i.e., change in this dependent variable represents the difference between the associated
value of requested charges and authorized charges.

Zero was the

baseline figure used to represent no charge alteration in this
dependent variable.

The second dependent variable portrayed the

degree to which prosecutors exercised their discretionary powers
primariiy when engaging in plea bargaining. i.e., the discrepancy between the authorized and adjudicated or final charges.

Again zero

was the figure used to represent the absence of charge alteration.
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Alteration of charges to the s.awe level of severity as those requested in the case of the first dependent variable or as those

authorized as in the case of the second dependent variable was not

deemed to be a significant exercise of discretion by prosecutors, and
thus represented no charge cases on these measures.
Hhile the original intention was to examine all such differences
for all sexual and non-sexual assault cases, this strategy had to be
altered later on in the research.

It was discovered that in a few

CSC and non-sexual assault cases, charges were increased at authorization from that which police had originally requested.

These

charging increase cases were excluded from analysis for essentially
three reasons.

First, there was an insufficient number of cases in-

volving charging increases for separate analytic purposes.

Second,

the same percent of both esc and non-esc assaults experienced such
increase· at the screening intake stage (5%).

Additionally, combining

the increased with the decreased charge alterations in the dependent
variable measure rendered interpretation of research results (particularly correlation coefficients) most problematic.

Analytic Techniques
The first type of analysis consisted of simple frequency and
percentage compilations.

This was conducted tdth the objective of

providing descriptive profiles of both sexual and non-sexual assault
cases.

This permits for a type of summary or overview of the dif-

ferences and/or similarities in case characteristics pertaining to
the two kinds of assault offense.
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A second type of analysis was conducted with a s-imilar purpose
in mind.

The means (for interval/ratio independent variable) and

proportions (for nominal independent variable) were first determined
and then compared.

The statistical significance of the difference

between the means/proportions was then tested in order to further
contrast case characteristics of sexual and non-sexual assault crimes.
Chi-square was the statistical test employed to determine the
significance of discovered differences with proportional variables.
While Chi-square can be utilized for several different purposes, it
was use.d h.,.re to

det.~rm~.ne

whether or not certain nominal independent

variables or case characteristics were statistically different for
sexual as opposed to other personal assault cri.mes.
The procedure for analyzing the statistical significance of the
difference in means was a.! test.

There are several diffE:orsnt for-

mulas which can be used for .! tests.

This research employed the two

sample.! test formulas designed for independent, but unequal size,
samples since there were a different number of CSC and assault offense cases.

This formula is additionally designed to correct for

excessive type I error when heterogeneity of variance exists and the
smaller variance is associated with the larger sample (as was the
case in several instances).

The formula employed in this research
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The type of information ascertained by this second kind of
analysis permits for determinations about whether, in a general sense,

certain elements such as force, injury, resistance, number of witnesses, and so forth, are more characteristic of one or the other
types of assaults.

After contrasting such composites, the next step in analysis was
to calculate and test the statistical significance of the difference

of means on the dependent variable in sexual vs. non-sexual assault
cases.

Once again, the

~

test for statistical differences in means

was utilized for the comparison.

The information provided by such a

procedure concerns whether or not prosecutors exercised comparable
amounts of discretion in an overall sense in those t\VO types of criminal cases.
Discriminate function analysis was then conducted in a:;. effort
to discern whether the independent variables, when considered simultaneously, rather than individually, could significantly differentiate the sexual from non-sexual assaults.

It was suspected that one

finding might be that the given independent variables might not be
strong enough to distinguish between these two types of cases when
considered one at a time, but when considered in combination, i.e.,
when all relevant variables were in the equation at the same time,
that some might significantly differentiate these cases.

Discrimi-

nate function analysis seeks to maximize the difference between a
clearly classified dependent variable, e.g., sexual vs. non-sexual
assault cases, given independent variable (case) characteristics.
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The

!. ratios.

calculated in discriminate function analysis were

examined to make decisions about independent variable significance

as it differentiated the cases.

The result with this type of analy-

sis is the discovery of the group of independent variableS" which best
discriminate between the (two) groups specified, given all variables
considered in the analysis or equation.
The discriminate function weighting factors can be interpreted
in a manner similar to regression coefficients.

This is to say that

they can be drawn on to assess the relative contribution of each

variable to the separation or discrimination of the groups.
A further kind of analysis was conducted in the effort to meet

the stated research objective.

Pearson product moment correlation

coefficients (E) were calculated and contrasted for these two forms
of assaults.

The :!._1 s represent a measure of correlation between a

given independent variable and the dependent variable measure.

This

measure provides information on the strength or degree of association
between a given independent and dependent variable, as well as directional information, i.e. • whether the relationship is positive or
inverse.

The square of the correlation coefficient, referred to as

the coefficient of determination

C.!?) •

provides interpretation as to

the percent of va!"iation in the dependent variable (charging reduc-

tions) explained by the given independent variable.
The probability level of each correlation coefficient was
examined in order to make assessments regarding the statistical significance of each correlation.

Where significance was not found

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

97
the relationship discovered in the data was likely to have occurred
Oy chance alone.

Put somewhat differently, the null hypothesis was

retained where correlations failed to meet the pre-selected .05 critical alpha level.
The test of the siginficance of the correlation coefficient

employed was the conventional students.!. test as determined by:
1/2

SPSS calculates specific probabilities associated with such coefficients given n-2 degrees of freedom.

It should be pointed out

that simultaneous testing of a series of correlation coefficients

from the same samples potentially inflates the likelihood of Type I
error.

To minimize this possibility, independent variables were nar-

rowed down to as few as absolutely theoretically necessary.

As

previously stated, the noted redundancy in data collection, given the
underlying dimension attempting to be discerned, facilitated this
task.

The caveat remains that significance tests can lead to false

rejections of null hy-potheses when numerous simultaneous comparisons
are made and critical values determined for sampling distributions
generated for the test of a single statistic are utilized for
decision making.
Partial correlation coefficients were additionally computed in
cases where there was reason to suspect that the observed relationship between an independent and dependent variable was related to
some underlying independent variable.

Partials represent the cor-

relation of a given independent and dependent variable where
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other independent variables have been statistically controlled, i.e.,
where the effect of such other variables has been eliminated from the

correlation.

Partial correlation coefficients were employed in the

effort to discover such patterns. as intervening and spurious relationships among variables.
Taken together these analytic techniques provide the basis for
answering the questions posed in the previous chapter.

The analysis

facilitates the examination of discretionary decision-making as it

shapes the implementation of enacted rape reform law through the
comparative scrutiny of sexual and non-sexual assault case prosecution.
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CIIAPTER IV
RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Introduction
There were a total of 420 cases included in the analysis of
sexual and non-sexual assault prosecution.

Two hundred and eighty-

five of these were the sampled non-sexual assault eases, and 135 the

total number of CSC's in Ke.lamazoo County over the ti.m.e span of

1980-1981.
Figure 2 on the following page depicts what can happen to cases
owing to the exercise of discretion by prosecutors.

At intake, pro-

secutors may decide to:
1)

authorize a charge(s) at the level requested,

2)

authorize as more or less serious crimes, or

3)

deny a request altogether.

These options comprise the first dependent variable for this study,
The decision to plea bargain a case cOID.prises the second dependent
variable.

Overall, 67% of all esc warrant requests were authorized.
versely, 33% were denied.
were plea bargained.

'!'he total number of non-sexual assaults for the

time pedod of 1980-1981 was 492.
authorized and 46% denied.
were identical.

Con-

One half (50.5%) of those cases authorized

Fifty-four percent of these were

The proportions in the research sample

Forty-three percent of the sample non-sexual

assaults were plea bargained once warrants had been authorized.

99
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Figure 2.

Stages of Prosecutorial Discretion
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Research Findings
The thrust of tile. rese'3.r.ch analysis w-as to discern whether or
not differences existed in the characteristics and traatment of
sexual and non-sexual assaults.

Chi-square and.!. tests were con-

ducted to assess the significance of discovered differences in
proportions and means pertaining to case characteristics.

Discrim-

inate function analysis was employed to discern, in an overall sense,
which case characteristics when considered simultaneously were best
able to differentiate the two types of assaults.

Pearson product

moment correlations were run on the selected independent variables in
relation to the dependent variables; ·and the significance of such
correlations examined.

This was done with the objective of discover-

ing factors associated wi.th charging reduction in sexual vs. nonsexual cases.

The Charging Decision
The dependent variable first analyzed represents the discrepancy
between the severity of crime as requested by the police and the
severity of the crime as seen in authorizations ·by prosecutors.
Charges were authorized as requested in 63% of the CSC' s and 31% of
the assaults.

Charges were issued for less severe crimes in 20 and

18% of these cases respectively.
quested charges

wer~

As previously noted, police re-

dropped from the criminal justice system because

of warrant denials in 33 and 46% of the CSC and assault cases.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

102

Charging and Denial
There were essentially only five independent variables of relevance which could be analyzed in relation to the charging reduction
including total denial at intake,

Tables 1 and 2 delineate these

variables as well as the results of analysis for each Variable.
Most variables differentiated the sexual from the non-sexual
assaults in terms of the case characteristics.

The only variable on

which data were available, where there existed no difference. was age
of the accused.

\·1hile defendants involved in CSC offenses were some-

what older than those involved in other violent assaults, this
diffl'!rence was not statistically significant.
The significantly different dimensions of these two forms· of
assaults involve police department requesting the warrant, time delay
between crime occurrence and warrant request, race and status of the
offender, .Snd the nature of reasons given for warrant denials.

The

first distinguishing variable concerned which police agency in the
jurisdiction made the warrant request.

It was thought that this

might potentially represent an additional factor influencing
prosecutors' decisions, i.e., the requests stemming from the less
experienced, less professional police departments might be denied/
reduced more frequently.

The significant difference discovered with

chi-square in this variable means that, while the largest and most
professional city wide police department made the majority of requests for both esc's and other assaults {understandably, p,iven its
size and jurisdiction), it proportionately requested more non-sexual
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Table 1

Case Characteristics in All Sexual and
Non-Sexual Assaults

esc

Assault

Proportion/

Proportion/

X

Variables

Police Department (KPD)

.49

Test

X

x2

.69

15.72

.001

Days Between Crime

and Warrant Request

26.81

Race of Suspect
(minority)
Age of Suspect

• 38
(30.02)

Status of Suspect
(jailed)

(12.51)

.49

-3.02

4. 55

(28.30)

.003
.05

-1.48

.001

• 30

.48

.67
0
0
.33

.23
.02
.01
• 74

28.97

.58
0
0
.42

• 35
. 09
0
.57

2. 39

Dependent Variable
Scale Points for
Requested Charge(s)

(681)

(326)

-7.73

.OOG

Dependent Variable
Seal£' Points for
Authorized Charge{s)

(411)

(182)

-5.16

.ooo

(-270)

(-144)

3.62

.000

1.43

First Reason for Denial:
Evidential
Organizational
Pragmatic
11

Practical"

.000

Second Reason for Denial:
Evidential

Organizational
Pragmatic
"Practical"

Point Discrepancy
between Authorized and
Requested Charge(s)
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Table 2
Correlation Coefficients for all Se.xual and
Non-Sexual Assaults

esc
Variable

Assault

'("

o<

Sig.

r'

0'-

.13

.164

.07

Days Between Crime
and Reports

-.01

.929

-.13

Race of Suspect

-.13

.146

-.11

.070

Age of Suspect

.02

. 867

.07

.208

Status of Suspect

.004

.961

.08

.288

-.25

.000

.01

.888

Police Department

First Reason for Denial

-.54

.000

Second Reason for Denial

-.17

.064

..;

Sig.

• 247

.032

.,;

assaults as compared to other smaller police departments, than i t did
CSC's.

This variable provided the first piece of information rele-

vant to separating the sexual from non-sexual assault cases.

There were four additional variables which were significantly
different as case characteristics in these two kinds of assaults.
Minorities were more frequently involved in non-sexual assaults than
was the case for CSC offenders.

Similarly, defendants were jailed at

the time of the warrant issuance rather than arrested and/or released,
proportionately more in these non-sexual crimes.

_The difference in

the mean number of days passing between the actual occurrence of the
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crime and the warrant reques.t (due to victims not reporting the crime
immediately, inability to locate suspect, etc.)

~.;as

significantly

higher in the sexual as opposed to non-sexual assaults.

The final

independent variable which significantly differed for these two offense types was derived from the reasons given by prosecutors for

warrant denials,

Warrants were denied for evidential reasons more

than twice as frequently in

esc's

than in assaults·.

It is interesting to note that when the evidential/non-eviden-

tial categories are broken down, although organizational and pragmatic criteria were infrequently utilized by prosecutors as reasons for

denial in non-sexual cases, they were never offered as either first
or second (additional) reasons for denying warrants in esc cases.
The category most frequently drawn upon as a basis for denying nonsexual assault warrant requests was what has been terme-J

11

practical."

Practical considerations most frequently involved the complainant/
vic tiro not showing for the required interview with the prosecutor.
In contrast to this, it is important to bear in mind that the modal
category for esc denials was lack of sufficient evidence.
In terms of the dependent variable itself, there were significantly greater charging reductions

~ri.th

CSC cases than was true for

non-sexual assaults at the screening stage.

The mean number of

points relating to the magnitude of discretion exercised by prosecutors at this initial screening stage was 270 for CSC' s and 144 for
other violent assaults.

Charge requests must, however, be examined

in interpreting this finding.

The mean points for requested charges
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in sexual assault cases was 681, as compared to 326 for other violent
offenses.

This means that more serious charges were more frequently

requested in the esc cases than was true for the other assault offenses.

Therefore, denial of a typical CSC resulted in a greater

point reduction than did denial of a typical assault, and hence the
difference in reduction at charging means with these two offenses,
The only independent variable significant in its correlation
with the first dependent variable of discretion exercised at screen-

ing was the first reason offered for warrant denial (Table 2).

This

means that while variaDles such as police department, race, and
status of offender werr>. significantly different as case characteristics, they did not impact upon charging reductions or denial at this
stage of prosecution in the sexual or in the non-sexual assaults.

It

additionally means that evidence was a decisive factor in reducing/
denying arrest warrant requests in both types of cases, but more
frequently for esc cases.
This factor alone explains almost one-third ('!_2 = • 30) of the
variance in the dependent variable for sexual, and 6% (!2 = .06) in
non-sexual assaults.

This suggests that evidence was a more impor-

taut consideration in charge reduction through denial at intake for
esc's than it was for other violent assault offenses.

Although this

same pattern ensued for the second reason given for denying arrest
warrants, the findings on this second reason were not significant,
meaning that the first cited reason was the more distinguishing and
important characteristic.
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Authorized Case 'Characteristics
Because more information was available for the authorized cases,
the case characteristics were separately scrutinized for these assaults.

Additionally, because of the type of information it was

possible to collect, the decision to reduce cbarge.s at authorization
was also separately

anal~zed

for these cases.

In terms of the

variables previously discussed, the same patterns were evidenced in
this separate examination.

That is, significant differences were

discovered in similar proportions in case characteristics such as
police department, status of defendant, days between crime and warrant request, and so forth in these authorized cases.
Table 3 summarizes the characteristics associated with the
authorized cases.

As this table indicates, there were several vari-

ables which were not significant in distinguishing sexual from nonsexual assault cases.

Defendants did not differ in these two types

of cases on the dimension of social class.

Almost three-fourths of

both types of defendants were of lower class as determined by court
appointment of defense counsel.

Defendant!!! were also not signifi-

cantly different in terms of having other additional cases pending
against them.

However, one difference was noted in terms of the type

of other charges pending.

In the. CSC cases, where outstanding crimes

were pending against defendants, they were for cscts in 73% of these
cases.

By way of contrast, in the assault offenses, pending charges

against the accused were most frequently (75%) for crimes other than
the type presently charged, i.e., not for assault offenses,
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Table. 3
Case Characteristics for Authorized

Sexual and, Non-Sexual Assaults

esc

Assault

Proportion/

Proportion/

Variables

Conviction Probability

1i'

1i'

(9.24)

(10.45)

Test

'!.2

Defense Attorney
(appointed)

.72

• 78

.63

Weapons (present)

.29

• 88

75.67

Victim Age
Victim Injury

!:.
2.17

.031

.ooo

(17.33}

(30. 4li)

6.49

.000

(!.53)

(1.95)

2.59

.001

.21
.51
.28

.43
.54
.02

Victim-Offender
Relationship
Strangers
Acquaintance
Family

34.13

.000

(1.53)

(3. 43)

5.13

.000

Evidence Available (yes)

. 63

. 82

15.32

.000

Victim Credibility
Problems

.34

.15

9.59

.010

No. of Eyewitnesses

Victim Precipitation
(yes)

.06

.01

3. 72

Victim Consent to
Contact

.45

.34

2. 67

Victim Initiation of
Contact

.24

.26

Victim Resistance
{present)

.53

.52

.00001

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

109
Table 3 {._Continued}
case Characteristics for Authorized
s·~xual and Non-sexual Assaults

esc
Proportion/

Test

x

i!

.44
.44
.12

.63
.03
.34

29.76

SES of Victim
(lower to lot>'e::: middle)

.81

• 75

. 85

Racial Composition
(interracial)

. 78

.73

.56

Pending Cases Against
the Accused (yes)

.20

.26

.40

Past Assaultive Behavior
by the Accused (yes)

.58

.33

10.83

.49
.33
.07

.52
.15
.24
.09

1.51

.48
.10
.42
0

.62
.08
.30
0

1.41

Variables

x

Assault
Proportion/

_t:_

o<

Type of Resistance

Non-assaultive
Weak physical
Strong physical

.000

.001

First Reason for Plea
Bargaining:
Evidential
Organizational
Pragmatic
"Practical"

.11

Second Reason for Plea
Bargaining:
Evidential
Organizational
Pragmatic
"Practical"
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Table 3 (Continued)
Case Characteristics for Authorized
Sexual and Non-Sexual Assaults

esc

Assault

Proportion/

Proportion/

x

Variables

x

Test

x'

~

""

Dependent Variable
Scale Points for
Requested Charge(s)

(756)

(432)

-4.99

.000

Dependent Variable
Scale Points for
Authorized Charge(s)

(608)

(342)

-4.57

.000

Point Reduction for
Authorized Cases at
Intake (Y )

(-148)

1.66

.090

(-90)

Victim characteristics were not found to be significantly dif-

ferent on the variables of social class, initiation of, or consent to,
contact; and on resistance.

The majority of all victims, like their

assailants, were judged to be of lower to lower middle SES.

Victims

initiated contact with their assailant in approximately 25% of all
cases, and consented to contact in roughly an additional 20% of the
sexual and 10% of the non-sexual assaults.

The existence of victim

resistance in these kinds of assaults differed most negligibly.

How-

ever, the type of resistance varied considerably (see below).
Assaults additionally evinced little variability in terms of
their interracial character.

Close to three-quarters of all assaults

were either white offender-t.,-hite victim or minority offender-minority
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victim.

The second type of characteristic associated with the crim-

inal offense, rather than victim or assailant per se, which showed

little variation between the two types of assaults coneerned the
nature of the reasons for plea bargaining.

On the average, prosecu-

tors offered evidential reasons for plea bargaining in one-half of
both the sexual and non-sexual assault cases.
such as sufficient sentence latitude,

~.rere

Pragmatic reasons,

the second modal category.

Reasons classified as organizational were cited roughly 10% of the
time, and "practical" reasons were infrequently utilized for plea

bargaining in both types· of assaults.
Certain independent variables pertaining to the defendant, vic-

tim, and crime did, however, individually differentiate the sexual
and non-sexual assaults.

Defendants had more frequently assaulted in

the past in the esc cases (58%) than was true for the other personal
assaults (33%).

Defendants had weapons a great deal more often in

the non-sexual crime categories than was evident in the CSC's.

It

should be noted, however, that the existence of a weapon is of course
part of the corpus delicti of the crime in these non-sexual assault
cases (See Appendix B) and thus understandably more highly represen ted in these cases.
Three variables relating to the victim were significant in their
ability to distinguish characteristics associated with the sexual and
other violent assault cases.

The first of these, as noted above,

involved the type of resistance put forth by the assault victim when
victims resisted.

Non-sexual assault victims offered stronger re-

sistance more often than was true for esc victims.

esc victims were
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evenly split between non-:aggressi.ve and weak physical resistance,
whereas other assault victims were primarily non-aggressive or

strongly physical in their efforts to ward off the attack.
The second and third independent variables differing significantly occurred in variations regarding victim credibility and judg-

ment.

Victim credibility problems were noted in a S-ignificantly

higher proportion of CSC's (slightly over one-third of these cases)
than other assaults (15%).

And although prosecutors rarely stated

that victims used bad judgment and thereby connoted that they precipitated the attack, when they did so, this was proportionately
more often the case for CSC's than the converse.
One of the variables associated with the crime itself c;an be
interpreted in this light.

Evidence such as bruises, blood, crime

scene photographs, confessions, and eyevitnesses significantly differed in availability for these two types of assaults.

The fact that

evidence was less often available in CSC cases might be drawn upon in
the effort to explain the higher incidence of credibility problems
noted.

When corroborative evidence is lacking, the credibility of

the victim is more heavily focused and/or relied upon and frequently

found wanting.
The second crime characteristic differentiating these cases was
victim-offender relationship.

Strangers assaulted victims about

twice as often in non-sexual as opposed to sexual assaults.

Acquaint-

ances of some sort were involved in roughly half of both of these
types of cases, with the remainder being represented in family assaults in 28% of the CSC r s and only 2% of the non-sexual crimes.
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It should be noted that domestic assault cases involving family victim-offender relationships were f:equently excluded in this study
because of the request for authorization of the misdemeanor charge(s)
of assault and battery.

A high. percentage of domestic assaults were

therefore excluded by virtue of the case· selection of only felonious
sexual and non-sexual assaults.
The.!. test indicated four additional variables significantly
different for these offenses.
jury, conviction probability

Tl1ese variables were victim age, in(a~

scored by prosecutors on a scale of

1 to 10) • and number of eyewitnesses.

Victims were much younger in

the CSC cases than in other violent assaults.

Victims sustained

greater injury in this latter category; this perhaps contributing to
the higher conviction probability associated with such cases.
tionally~

Addi-

the mean number of eyewitnesses was more than twice as high

for those offenses.
When all relevant variables were considered in an overall simultaneous sense in the discriminate function analysis, it was evidence,
victim credibility problems, victim injury, and victim-offender relationship which most strongly differentiated the sexual from the
non-sexual assaults at the .05 critical level.
summary of these findings.

Table 4 presents a

The preliminary interpretations offered

above are applicable to these findings.

The discriminate function

analysis indicates that these four previously described variables
best differentiated these two forms of assaults.
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Table. 4
Function Analysis Results for Authnrized
Sexual and Non-Sexual Assault Cases

Discrinlinat~

Variable

~

!

Significant

Evidence Availability

-.328

Victim Credibility
Problems

-.247

6.458

/

Victim Injury

-.076

4.411

v

13.458

Victim-Offender
Relationship

-.149

3.963

Victim Resistance

-.093

1.511

Victim Consent to
Contact

-.0498

Number of Eyewitnesses

-.0025

. 370
.252

5.18

Overall

Charge Re-duC!tion in Authorized Cases:

Initial Screening

Of all the variables .discussed, only a few were significant in
their relationship to the dependent variable of charging reduction at
warrant authorization stage.

Table 5 presents the correlation coef-

ficients of each of the independent variables with the first dependent variable of charge reduction at intake in the authorized esc
and non-sexual assaults.
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Table 5
Correlation Coefficients for Charge Reduction
at Authorization

Variable

,...

esc
<>'-

Assault
Sig.

)-'

""

Defense Attorney

--.01

.917

-.06

.567

Victim Age

-.12

.326

16

.130

Victim Injury

-.13

.242

-.02

. 805

Victim-Offender
Relationship

.22

.047

.12

.175

No. of Eyewitnesses

.06

.567

Evidence Availability

.26

.030

Victirr. Credibility
Problems

...;

/

.06

.525

-.05

.598

-.15

.180

-.OS

• 569

Victim Resistance

.10

.573

.06

.631

Victim Consent to
Contact

.10

.425

-.10

• 350

Victim Initiation of
Contact

.01

.966

.02

• 857

Victim SES

-.07

.587

.07

.448

Pending Cases Against
the Accused

-.35

.004

.10

.350

.01

.929

. 23

.020

Past Assaultive Behavior
of the Accused

y

Sig.

/

The probability level (alpha) selected for decisions on these
correlation coefficients was .05.

This

mean~;

that the null hypo-

thesis was retained, i.e., that the observed correlation coefficient
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was likely to be due to chance alone, in all instances where the
probability associated with the coefficient did not reach the .05

level.

It should be noted again that when making simultaneous com-

parisvns of

s11c.~

coefficients drawn from the same research sample,

there is the possibility of inflated significance/probability levels.

For this reason, variables were narrowed down to as few as was theqretically tenable before such_ analysis.

The potential problem here,

however, remains.
Before discussing the significant correlations it is instructive

to examine the mean charge reduction involved in both these kinds of
authorized cases.

Hhile the same pattern evinced for all cases in-

clusive of denied warrant cases obtained here, the difference in mean
charge reduction was not significant.

Therefore, although charges

were reduced at the screening stage by an average of 148 points for
esc's, and 90 points for other -personal assaults, this difference was
not statistically discrepant.
The strongest independent variable in relationship to esc
charging reduction concerned

~vhether

or not other separate cases

(generally involving ather victims) were pending against the accused.
The significant correlation coefficient indicated that there was less
charge reduction at authorization for CSC' s when defendants had other
outstanding cases against them.

It is likely that, under this cir-

cumstance, prosecutors were more likely to operate under the presumption of guilt, have more confidence in sustaining a conviction, and/
or operate to assure later plea bargaining leverage.
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As previously noted, there did not exist a significant difference in the proport:ion of CSC and assault cases where other

charges were pending yet the type of pending case did differentially
impinge upon charging reduction in the two assault types.
general reticence of victims to pursue

esc

Given the

charges in the first place,

and the overall more serious nature of a esc charge (see dependent
variable scale points) it can be speculated that when CSC charges are
not only presently under review, but also otherwise pending, prosecutors are likely to reduce charges less.

This may be attributable

to not only the presumption of guilt, but also to concern for specific deterrence and incapacitation.

The second significant independent variable correlating with
charge reduction at authorization in esc cases concerned whether or
not evidence such as weapons, eyewitnesses, confessions, semen, injuries, and so forth was available.

The absence of corroborating

evidence correlated with greater charging reduction at this stage of
prosecution for the sexual assault cases.

It should be remembered

that the absence of corroborating evidence places greater emphasis on
victim credibility, which was found to be more often problematic in
these same cases.
There was a significantly greater proportion of assaults t<?here
corroborative evidence was available than was the case for CSC's, yet
this variable did not impact significantly on the charging decision
in these non-sexual assault cases.

It was relevant in explaining

only esc charge reduction due to lack of evidence at authorization.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

118
Th.e. third and final independent variable significant in its correlation with charge reduction at authorization for CSC's was victim-

offender relationship.

Charges were reduced in CSC cases to a

greater extent when acquaintances of any s.ort • from family member to
old/new acquaintances, etc., were im•olved in the offense.

This

greater charge reduction with CSC's involving victims and offenders
who knew one another in some way can be related back to the issue of
victim credibility.

It can De suggested that prosecutors decreased

charges authorized to a greater degree with these cases due to lack
of belief in the severity of original charges requested by police.
Prosecutors might not have been as "sensitive" to CSC co:nplaints as
specialized and frequently female officers who requested the more
severe charges regardless of victim-offender relationships.

Alter-

natively, prosecutors may have been attempting to fit the charge with
the corpus delicti of the crime, given the absence of the :relationships involving family members and authority figures as is specified
in the CSC code (See Appendix A).
In terms of the other component of victim-offender relationships,
those cases which involved family members were, at times, reduced
given victim/complainant desires.

It was noted in reading through

the files that, in cases involving related parties, e.g., incest
cases, that the entire family was at times reticent to follow through
on a case

~o1here

a life sentence potential was involved.

Therefor~,

prosecutors may have reduced charges at the authorization stage in
such cases in order to meet the desires of the victim or complainant
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(e.g., mother of victim) and thus still be able to proceed criminally against the accused.

While these three variables of pending cases, evidence availability, and victim-offender relationships did not significantly cor-

relate with charging reduction at authorization in the non-sexual
assault cases, previous assaultive behavior did.

TheE_ indicated,

somewhat surprisingly at first, that past assaultive behavior
correlated with greater charge reductions at authorization in these

non-sexual assault cases.

i.Jhat must be borne in mind in interpreting

this finding is that police requested charges may be inflated for a
number of reasons.

i\lhat is indicated here is that police may over-

charge when suspects have histories of assaultive behavior, in their
attempt to get particular "criminals" put away.

Prosecutorial

alteration of charges may once again be interpreted in light of this,
i.e. • prosecutors authorize to better fit the charges with what can
potentially be sustained in a legalistic sense.
Examination of the type of past record of the accused in these
cases sheds further light on this f:.nding.

Where data were available

in the assault cases, it was found chat non-sexual assault suspects
most frequently had misdemeanor arrests and convictions as a part of
the.ir past record.

By way of contrast, the past record of esc as-

sailants more frequently involved a higher number of past felony,
related (i.e., sexual assault) and other violent convictions than was
the case for non-sexual assaults.

Although this variable was not

significant in the esc cases, it is still tenable -chat police and
prosecutors were likely to view charges and cases in a comparable
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(severe) manner in CSC cases involving this above type of defendants.
but non-comparably in the other assault cases

~1here

past records in-

volved mere misdemeanor offenses.
Charge Reduction in Authorized Cases:

Plea Bargaining

The decision to reduce charges once cases have been authorized
comprises the second independent variable of this study.

No cor-

relations were found to be significantly related to the plea bargaining decision in the CSC cases.

The reasons/interpretations

pertaining to this are explored in the next section dealing with
theoretical considerations.

Table 6 portrays the findings pertaining to this second dependent variable.

In the assault cases there existed essentially four

independent variables contributing to the explanation of cha:Lgiug
reduction through plea bargaining.
Race of the accused significantly correlated with plea bargaining reductions in the non-sexual assault cases in the direction
contended by "conflict" theory.

The r-esearch result showed that non-

sexual assault cases involving mino'rity group members as defendants
experienced less charging reduction than was ·the ·case .for the nonsexual assaults involving white assailants.

Given the research

literature in the criminology field, i t was thought that. this relationship might be. confounded by the influence o.f such variables as
the past record of defendants and the race of the victim.

The best

available data on the former dimension concerned past assaulti·ve
behavior and pending cases against the accused.

The partial
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Table 6
Correlation Coefficients for Charge Reduction

through Plea Bargaining

esc
Variable

Assaults
Sig.

Sig.

'r

"""

Defense Attorney

.02

.576

-.06

.581

Victim Age

.14

.240

-.24

.021

./

Victim Injury

.16

.lt:5

-.17

.052

v

Vic tim-Qf fender
Relationship

.::!:

d-.

-.16

.165

-.01

.911

No, of Eyewitnesses

.08

.452

.14

.119

Evidence Availability

.12

.338

-.10

.283

Victim Credibility

.14

.222

-.04

.656

Victim Resistance

-.05

• 791

.07

.589

Victim Consent to
Contact

-.02

.900

-.08

.377

Problems

Victim Initiati.on of
Contact

.01

.913

-.05

.618

Victim SES

.03

• 824

.01

.931

Race of Offender

.03

.800

-.25

.003

Pending Cases Against
the Accused

-.16

.217

.14

.165

Past Assaultive Behavior
of the Accused

-.07

.541

-.01

. 902

First Reason for Plea
Bargaining

-.09

.433

-.18

.036

v

Second Reason for Plea
Bargaining

-.18

.112

-.17

.047

/

v
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correlation coefficients indicated, however, that the relationship
between race and charge reduction through plea bargaining held, i.e.,

remained significant when the effects of these variables were removed
(zero order -.25, first order partials for past assaults and pending
cases -.25 and -.26 respectively).

Similar findings were portrayed

by the partials when controlling for the race of the victim and the
victim-offender relationship as acquaintance/non-acquaintance.

In

other words, statistically removing the effects of other suspected
independent variables did not render the correlation to non-significance.

This means that conflict theory was supported by this finding

insofar as the cases involving minority group members experienced
less lenient treatment in plea bargains than was the case for white
assailants.
The second strongest correlation in non-sexual assaults. was between the age of the victim and plea bargaining reductions.

The

older the victims, the less the reductions through plea negotiations.
I t is tenable that victim credibility is higher when older victims

are involved and thus prosecutors are less amenable to plea bargaining in these cases for two reasons.

First, prosecutors themselves

may take victim accounts and the nature of the case more seriously in
cases i:1volving older victif.'.s, and sec'J::.d, th9.y may "'nticip.:lte
greater jury appeal/sympathy with such cases.

Partial correlation

coefficients were again examined in the effort to discern whether
particular independent variables other than speeifically age of victim were directly relevant to the charge reductions involved here.
Controlling for age of offender, the age difference between offender
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and victim, victim credibility problems, and attributions of victim
precipitation did not in any instance significantly affect this rela-

tionship between age and charge reduction,

The third significant independent variable of victim injury is
wholly consistent with the above interpretation.

Cases involving

more serious victim injury were reduced through plea bargaining to a
lesser extent than was true for cases involving either nominal or no
victim injury.

One interpretation is that the more serious injury

cases were reduced less due to prosecutors' judgments about the severity of the case and their anticipations concerning judge and jury
concurrence as manifested in convictions.
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CHAPTER V

INTERPRETATIONS: THE DISC3.ETIONARY IMPLEMENTATION
OF MODEL SEXUAL ASSAULT LEGISLATION

The viability of each of the theoretical perspectives described
in Chapter II can now be explored given the research findings.

The

discovery of significance on certain variables at certain stages
holds implications for each of these perspectives.

It is important

to point out that several of the findings of non-significance are of
equal importance in attempting to theoretically explain the prosecution of sexual and non-sexual assaults under the model CSC code.

Cons·ensus and Plural Conflict Theory

The first perspective on the origin and enforcement of the criminal law discussed was consensus theory.

From this perspective it

was anticipated that the type of implementation of the

ne~v

sexual

assault law involved the issues of equitable case treatment in terms
of an overall outcome, and legalistic or evidence-based considerations in terms of prosecutors and discretion.

The reason for the

expectation of comparable treatment in regard to sexual and nonsexual assault cases with consensus theory was explained as owing to
the consistency of values permeating society.

In other words, given

the assumption that societal value consensus is pervasive, the value
predicates leading to the change in law are necessarily the same as
those influencing its implementation.

124
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Plurali:'tic conflict theory ends up with a similar type of conclusion albeit using different logic.

Although plural conflict

theory posits diverse and competing values and interests, it assumes
that the agencies of the state operate in a neutral and objective

fashion.

The state 1 s role as impartial mediator between conflicting

interests and groups renders the same commitment to equitable case

treatment.
Because both of these perspectives lead to the conclusion of
comparable case treatment, the variables indicative of such will be
discussed jointly as they pertain to the discretionary implementation
of the new sexual assault legislation vis-'a-vis non-sexual offenses.
There were several research findings which can be interpreted to be
consistent with such contentions.

At the outs·et, th_e percentages of

warrant denials for CSC' s (33%), and non-sexual assaults (46%)
favored the CSC cases.

In other words, support for continued dis-

criminatory treatment of rape cases was not found to be the case in
the research jurisdiction operating under the model code, given the
proportion of cases denied at intake.

Additionally, when esc cases

were dropped at the screening stage, they were denied for evidential
reasons in two-thirds of these sexual assault cases.

One possible

interpretation of this is that prosecutors consider only legally
relevant criteria and exe);"cise their discretionary powers so that the
implementation mirrors the letter of the law as enacted.

The fact

that non-sexual assaults were denied for what has been referred to as
practical reasons (_such as the failure to show for an interview as
required for authorization in all assault cases). in the majority of
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these. cases migfLt b.e taken as. an indicator that

esc

victims are more

determined or seriouf' o:c :iess fearful aDout pursuing their case

through the criminal justice system under the

esc

statute.

Unfor-

tunately, comparative baseline data were not available to substantiate this, and hence the notion must remain a

speculation~

Regardless,

the lesser rather than higher frequency of denials for esc 1 s and the
legalistic reasons offered for such denial can bt• interpreted as
congruous with the consensus and pluralistic perspective assumptions
about agreed upon morality, rational and neutral decision making
leading to new- laws, and such laws being implemented as enacted.
When examining all denied and authorized cases jointly, and when
examining strictly those cases accepted by the prosecutor, consensus
and plural conflict theory can additionally be brought to bear on
research findings.

The race of the offender, and status at the time

of the warrant request, were neither significantly correlated with
charging reduction including denial, nor with charging reduction associated with the authorized cases when analyzed separately.

The

socio-economic status of the defendant, of the victim, and the interracial composition of offenses all failed to significantly contribute
to the explanation of the first dependent variable of charge reduction
at intake.

The absence of influence of these variables is best

explained by consensus theory, which stands in stark contradiction to
the conflict tenets concerning discretion and discrimination.
The mean charge reduction sco!:"es f~iled to disti_nguish esc's
from non-esc assaults.

This lack of significance can be interpreted

to mean that the degree of charge reduction for authorized cases
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differed insignificantly for the sexual and non-sexual assaults that
were authorized.

In terms of plea bargaining these cases, prose-

cutors did so in approximately the same proportion of each of the
sexual and non-sexual asSaults (50.5 and 54% respectively).
Investigation of the types of reasons for reducing charges
through plea agreements failed to reveal significant differences once
again, i.e., evidential and other types of reasons were employed for
plea l)argainittg

C8S€S

in COmparable ptOpOttiOUS for the CSC I 8 and

other violent crimes.
All of this can be interpreted as consistent with the comparable

as opposed to discriminatory treatment of sexual assault offenses.
These variables can potentially be taken as indices of the success of
the law, or in other words, as evidence of the congruity between objective and enforcement.

However, further analysis results point to

contradictory conclusions.

Labeling Theory

Labeling theory, primarily as formulated by Lemert (1951) and
Becker (1963) focuses on the consequences of social definitions.
Lemert directed attention to the effectB 0£ Ja])P.l_:!ng on secondRry
deviance and the creation of deviant careers.

Becker highlighted

differentials concerning the making and enforcing of rules as they
pertain to deviance designations.
The significance of the labeling perspective for this study of
implementation of sexual assault legislation concerns not the accused, but the victim of sexual assaults.

There were some

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

128
indications in the research_ findings that the office. of the prosecutor has not fully resolved the issues concerning the victim contribu-

tion to the commission of the. crime.

For example, while victim

precipitation was not often an evaluation rendered with either type

of case, when such judgments were m.sde they were significantly more
frequent in the

esc

as opposed to non-sexual assault cases.

Thus,

there is some limited basis for inferring that traditionally conditioned conceptions or definitions about sexual assaults persist in
the face of model legislation aimed at altering such conceptions.
Although labeling theorists assume that power differentials
exist within society, the perspective does not explicate the role of
such power in relation to the failures or successes in the definitional process.

'lfuether or not sexual assaults have been successfully

redefined as violent rather than sexual crimes remains to be
explained by the subsequent interpretations facilitated by the
Marxian theories.

Instrumental Narxian Theory

The contentions made by instrumental Marxian theorists stand in
strong opposition to the above.

One thrust of this perspective lies

ir:. assertions that laws enacted and appearing to be equitable are

laws which are implemented in such a t-lay as to maintain the status
quo.

The passage of the new CSC Code was interpreted in this vein a!:l

a means to quell collective challenges

~.,-bile

simultaneously not being

expected to substanti\rely alter prevailing practice and sexist ideology serving dominant class interests.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

129
Several of the differences discovered in this research can be
explained with this instrumental conflict approach.

The form of the

new esc law in Michigan met the objectives of doing away with the
differential and unique corroboration requirements, consent and resistance standards, admissibility of past sexual character evidence,
~...•d

notions of vietim precipitation.

In short, the form and wording

of this model statute met with_ intents to shift the burden of proof
and assumption of "guilt" (consent} away from victims of se11:ual as-

sault and thereby render the treatment of this crime more compatible
with other violent and personal assaults.

Yet the implementation of

this new law as studied in this research departed from such objectives, interests, and form.
Sequentially, the first finding t.;hich can be interpreted as
consistent with this perspective is drawn from the dependent variable
of charge reduction at at:.thorization.

The average charge reduction

for all cases at the intake screening stage
for non-sexual assaults.

~ras

higher for esc's than

This pattern persisted for the separately

analyzed authorized cases in terms of authorization for less serious
offenses, and for charge reductions through plea bargaining.

Al-

though the difference 1:vas not significant for authorized reductions,
a statistical difference was determined to be existent at plea bargaining.

The dependent variable then indicated a general pattern of

less favorable treatment of CSC's.
More conclusive findings congruous with instrumental assumptions
were discerned when examining the independent variables.

In the

denied cases, problems of evidence were significantly correlated in
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the sexual as oppos.ed to non-s·exual assault cases,

This criterion

differed for the two types of assaults sufficiently enough to analytically separate the CSC from other violent assault offenses, given

all other potentially relevant variable information.

These findings

mean that evidence, in addition to the victim's complaint, was found

wanting.

To put it somewhat differently, evidence was deemed insuf-

ficient by prosecutors more often in sexual assault crimes.

In the

non-sexual assaults, victims' decisions to not proceed as seen in

the practical reasons for denial occurred more frequer.tly for denials.
The need for corroborative evidence, in spite of the specific
lack of requirement in statute, was found to be true in authorized
esc cases as well.

The most significant distinguishing case charac-

teristics of CSC's vis-~-vis other assaults were found to lie in
considerations of victim credibility problems and evidence availabili ty.

In the esc cases, less evidence was available and the veracity

of victim accounts doubted to a greater extent than was true of nonsexual assaults.

As was stated previously in the literature r.::.view,

the very nature of sexual assault cases is such that less evidence is
generally available than is true of other crimes.

One purpose of the

new CSC Code was to remove burdens from sexual assault victims by not
requiring corroborative evidence, in addition to simply the complaint
and testimony (which is often unavailable as was found to be the case
here) as is the practice for other non-sexual crime categories.

One

possible interpretation of the findings on evidence and credibility
in sexual vs. non-sexual assaults is that this objective of the law
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was not realized through implementation.

The absence of corroborat-

ing evidence was not only significantly different and discriminatory
for these

t~vo

types of offenses, but further significantly correlated

with charging reductions in the authorized esc cases.

The greater

frequency of victim credibility problems associated with

esc

cases

means that when victim accounts were focused on, particularly in

light of the absence of other corroborating· evidence, they were not
given credence.

This indicates that unique burdens remain for sexual

assault victims in terms of not being believed and needing to have
additional evidence pertaining to their cases specifically not required by law.
The finding that pending cases against the accused correlated
with less charging reduction can be interpreted along these same
lines.

One possible interpretation of this research result is that

when other, and most frequently other esc, cases \vere pending against
the alleged CSC assailant, prosecutors had more reason to believe
victims, i.e., more potential evidence given past attacks on this vic·tim by this suspect, or given other victims sexually assaulted by the
accused.

Thus, the existence of other open CSC cases in the criminal

justice system being held against the accused can be seen as a type
of corroborating evidence leading to less charging reduc:.ion.
The issue of victim consent to sexual assault can additionally
be explored with instrumental contentions regarding the discrepancy
between enactment and enforcement of laws.

One explanation offered

for the influence of victim-offender relationship in charging reductions was relevant to this consent issue.

The fact that charges were
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accepted as more severe when strangers were involved in the CSC's

than when an acquaintance of some form was the assailant can be seen
as an indicator of prosecutorial assumptions about consent.

Although

alternative explanations, such as victim reticence, given sentence
severity and familiarity with the accused, must and have been considered, it remains -tenable that prosecutors are less likely to question whether or not the victim consented to the sexual act(s) when

strangers are involved, and thus proceed with the most severe charges.
This then again relates back to the issues of victim credibility.
The new law's attempt to strictly limit victim sexual history
or character evidence can also be interpreted along an instrumental
Marxian line of reasoning.

Although this pertains to the criminal

justice system as a whole, rather than to prosecution, it is discussed here for its relevance and continuity with the discussion of
instrwnental Marxian theory and the implementation of altered laws.
The most supportive finding of differential enactment and implementation here would have been if in-camera hearings were frequently requested and held, and the results deemed to be "relevant" and therefore admissible in court.

While this was anything but the case, the

findings on this dimension remain similar.

In-camera hearings

~o1ere

requested and held in only one of all of the esc's examined for the
two-year period.
deemed irrelevant.

And even here, evidence of past sexual activity was
However, it was discovered through discussions

with prosecutors and through the reading of various case transcripts
that this issue arises not so infrequently in open court.

The

typical scenario is a defense attorney questioning the victim on the
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s.tand about pas~ sexual activity in front of the judge and/or jury,
the prosecutor objecting, the judge sustain:!.ng, and telling the jury
to disregard.

The instrumental argument that implementation of legal

change will be discrepant from the apparent intent underlying enact-

ment can be applied to this discovery.

This above described practice

which engenders victim trauma and discriminatory rape case treatment
persists, albeit in a new form, in the face of legislation allegedly

designed to preclude it,
The notion of victim precipitation has similarly not been total-

ly abandoned under the new code.

In spite of the fact that there

were few cases of either sexual or non-sexual assault where prosecutors intimated culpability to victims, a significant difference was
found to exist when such judgments were made.

Attributing blame to

the victims was proportionally more frequent in sexual as opposed to
non-sexual assault offenses.

This then again provides a basis for

the substantiation of instrumental l1arxian theory claims regarding
the alleged or apparent interests behind legislation (i.e., comparable case treatment) and the reality as evidenced in the enforcement
process.
There was one additional research result which was consistent
with the· contentions of this perspective.

It was found that race

correlates with charging reductions through plea bargaining for the
non·-sexual, but not for the

esc

cases.

The correlation indicated

less charge reduction, i.e., less favorable treatment, for defendants
who were minority group members.

This in and of itself is predicted

and borne out empirically by the work of instrumental conflict
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theorists.

Hhat is required is an examination of the finding that

race did not show as a factor influencing charge reductions in the

sexual assault cases.

Certain theorists operating out of this orien-

tation suggest one interpretation.

Chiricos and Waldo, for instance,

(19 75) assert that race and SES are more likely to represent influ-

ences on discretionary decision making processes when crimes are less
serious i!!. nature.

This was precisely the finding at hand.

The

remaining findings on plea bargaining are best explained by the
remaining two theoretical orientations,

Structural Marxian Theory

The major divergence of structural from instrumental Marxian
theory lies in the emphasis on the relative autonomy of the state and
its branches from a ruling class who are not viewed as an homogeneous
ruling elite.

Structural Marxists further point out that in order to

reproduce or perpetuate the capitalistic social order, the dominant
class relies on ideology to legitimate and thus maintair.. rule through
consent rather than coercion.
There are several research findings which can be interpreted
within these structural tenets.

The developing autonomy of the state

in modern capitalist societies is most relevant to the explanation of
the exercise of discretion by prosecutors.

Not only does the state

develop a measure of independence, its own interests, and even its
own co!l.tradicti::n:.s, but sc teo do the sub-branches of this embodiment
of political power.

Prosecutors' offices represent one legal agency

which can be understood to have relative autonomy, self interests,
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and even inherent contrad:i.ctions.

The autonomy of the prosecutor has

been previously discussed in light of the few controls which exist to
regulate decision-making.

'Tile fact that the office of the prosecutor

is not generally conceived of as: a part of the trichotomy of police,
courts, and corrections, and that prosecutors can and do operate and
make many decisions with a good deal of anonymity and few effective
checks over them attests to the relative autonomy of this office.
Prosecutors function independently with different types of interests
than the state and other criminal justice agencies.
The particular vested interests of individual prosecutors may
vary along a number of dimensions.
that this office is a political one.

However, it is well understood
Prosecuting attorneys often use

their offices as political stepping stones to more powerful positions
in society.

Because prosecutors are, by and large, elected officials.

it is important that they act wi.th political acumen.

An important

political concern is, therefore, found in the organizational interest
of chief prosecutors to have their agency's actions please the voting
public, whether this be for purposes of re-election or election to
higher office.
At first glance~ there might appear iO be an inconsistency between the dimension of prosecutorial autonomy and sensitivity to the
electorate.

However, it must be remembered that there is a low de-

gree of monitoring or surveillance of the everyday operations of
prosecutors.

Accordingly, the office of the prosecutor has consider-

able latitude in presentation to the public.
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The contradiction which develops in terms of esc case prosecution is in terms of how to appease the community.

Prosecutors 1 of-

fices are generally perceived to be effective when conviction rates
are high.

This batting average, so to speak, is an important aspect

of decision-making for prosecutors.

Yet, simultaneously, prosecutors

need to please generally the voting female (and to an unknown extent

male) populace by accepting, proceeding, and treating sexual assault
cases as any other.

The contradiction lies in the lower conviction

probabilities associated with these cases, the anticipated juror re-

action if taken to court, and so forth on the one hand, and the need
to not require corroborative evidence, not to question credibility,
etc. on the other.

In short, prosecutors are faced with the dilemma

of treating sexual and non-sexual assaults comparably in their
decision-making capacities and still maintaining high conviction
rates.
The recognition of relative autonomy, independence, organizational interests, and these types of contradictions brings to light
some important insights for this study.

The independence of the

prosecutor's office as an entity unto itself represents one level of
autonomy.

Another level is found in the amount of individualized

discretionary power wielded by individual prosecuting attorneys.
After reading cases and talking with prosecutors, it was the opinion
of this researcher that consensus about the nature of sexual assault
offenses

~vas

not total or shared in this jurisdiction and office.

Given that individual prosecutors have a range of discretion and that
total consensus was not interpreted to exist on the issues of consent,
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corroboration, credibility, and so forth, the research finding of no
systematic correlation with plea bargaining charge reductions for CSC
cases can be better understood.

If prosecutors do not agree on re--

quirements, standards, and case evaluations, then consistency in
factors associated with such case decisions is likely to be absent,
as was discovered for the esc offenses plea bargained.
Cole's organizational category as

~rell

as labeling theory's as-

sertions about organizational and bureaucratic self-interest are
clearly intertwined with the above discussion.

The political nature

of discretionary decision-making is one facet of organizational factors described by Cole.

This is precisely

~.;rhat

was found to be the

case in terms of deviance designations in the work of Becker (1963)
and Dickson (1968),

The type of decisions and thus definitions of

what is or is not a criminal sexual assault, or how serious it is,
and how much burden or stigma is attributed to the victim are all
tied to the political process and nature of prosecution as discussed
above.
The exchange relationships

bett~1 een

criminal justice officials

referred to by Cole are also relevant here.

For example, it was found

that past records of assaultive behavior correlated with charging reductions at authorization for non-sexual assault offenses.

Police

with their own set of interests, roles, and responsibilities, were
denied the higher requested charges in these cases, most: likely due
to the differential standard requirements pertaic1ing to the agency of
police and prosecutor.

While police need only probable cause for an

arrest, prosecutors must be able to demonstrate beyond a reasonable
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doubt that the crime authorized was committed by the. suspect at hand.
Therefore, while police may have a sufficient probable cause basis

for their request and their desire to rid society of and their job of

dealing with recidivating (and usually less serious) assualt offenders, prosecutors could not justify the higher charges, given the
standards and interests of their office.

Exchange relationships as a factor influencing charge reductions
were also found to be relevant with plea bargaining,

Prosecutors

plea bargained both sexual and non-sexual assault cases because of

known patterns of dismissals by anticipated judges in these cases.
They additionally plea bargained cases in order to save resources by
reconnnending sentences that would have likely been handed down even
with trial, again given the past patterns and practices of different
judges in the jurisdiction.
A somewhat different aspect of struetural Marxian theory facilitates a different set of interpretations.

Bierne states that, in an

attempt to meet Lhe objective of the ".,.long-run stability of the
social system" the law must at times " ... pursue policies which are at
variance with the interests or wishes of certain factions of capital"
(1979:379-380).

\.Jith theoretical refinement, this: element of struc-

tural Marxian theory can be brought to bear on research finding
interpretations.

One critique, previously noted, on this account was

that structuralism does not indicate 1-1hich laws will be those which
are fair in appearance, and which laws will be those that are fair in
reality.

The additional critique of structural accounts that is pre-

sently being offered as a potential refinement of the theory concerns
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a further breakdown along this dimension.

If some laws must he fair,

perpetuate ideology and status quo arrangements, it is tenable to

logically infer that some aspects of certain
be fair in reality as opposed to appearance.

la~vs

might alternatively

Hhile structural tenets

do not lead to conclusions aQout which lavrs or which segments of

which laws will actually opE::.::-at:c in the true public interest, they do
call attention to the possibility of such.

In terms of the model esc statute examined in this research,
certain findings indicated actualized fairness from a victim advocate
point of view, while others pointed to fairness in appearance (in

enactment) rather than i11rplemente.d form.

The findings consistent

with "fairness" in appearance only •,.;rere discussed in terms of the
difference in enactment and enforceJlent as discussed by instrumental
Marxian theory.

To briefly reiterate, the issues of victim credi-

bility, character, consent, and differential corroborative evidence
requirements could all be interpreted to exist in a discriminatory
manner for esc victims even under model legislation.

The findings

in terms of fairness in reality or as evidenced through implementation are discussed belm-1.
The objective of removing unique burdens historically placed on
rape victims and the prosecution of such cases met in some measure
with success.

The evidence for this can be found not only in the

form of law passed, but in the implementation process.

For example,

past sexual history evidence 1-1as never- allowed in courtroom proce,.dures, in spite of the fact that defense attorneys tried to introduce
it at trial.

The fact that victim initiation or consent to contact
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did not correlate trith charging reductions provides further evidence
of comparable case treatment.

Resistance by victims was additionally

not singled out as a factor influencing prosecutors' judgments in

either the sexual or non-sexual assaults.

And, t·rhile victim preci-

pitation t;ras attributed in proportionately more CSC than non-CSC assaults, this was done in only 6% of these formel" types of cases.
The reduction of charges through plea bargaining was additionally for
pragmatic reasons, such as concern over and attempts to preclude
victim trauma, in many (roughly one-third) of the CSC cases.

Eviden-

tial and other types of reasons for plea bargaining manifested

comparability for these two types of assaults.

In short, there were

findings which indicated both the mere guise of fairness and the
fairness in reality for victims of sexual assault.

Dialectic Marxian Theory

The advantage of dialectic l'larxian theory lies in its dynamic
'approach to enacted and implemented legal change.

The distinguishing

characteristics of dialectic Marxian thought lie in the possibility
for progressive change.

Ttfuile Chambliss' "dialectic paradigm'' is

applicable because of the focus on contradiction, conflicts, dilefTllllas,
and resolutions, and because of his conclusion that the dominated
class may, in fact, gain some advantap.:e throuP.;h such change, his work
leads to a more cyclical than progressive type of change conclusion.
The pessimism evidenced in Chambliss' vmrk is only mildly offset by
the allol..,ance for some increment of advantage for those ll7ith less
resources and

pm~er.

The coexistent pessimism and accommodation for
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gains for the disadvantaged segments of society renders his work
somewhat ambiguous.

The writings of other dialectic theorists such

as Bierne and Quinney, and Grau, permit more decisively for progres-

sive outcomes.

The historically specific contradictions of capital-

ism, including particularly the relative power accruing to the subordinate group of women because of political position, voting power,

and so forth, has facilitated both challenge and change.

enacted change endeavoring equitable case treatment that

It is this
~?as

empiri-

cally assessed in this research.
The paradigm put forth by Chambliss

~'auld

predict that the

outcome of the enacted esc Code would ultimately favor the status quo
arrangement, since resolutions, such as the new law, do not address
the basic causes of the phenomena, e.g., sexism and the unequal
treatment of women in all spheres of social life.

Support for this

type of conclusion has already been discussed, albeit for different
reasons, in relation to the other Marxian perspectives.
tic model proposed by Chambliss goes yet one

ste;=~

'Ihe dialec-

further.

Chambliss

explains that resolutions underscore previously latent contradictions
and thereby provide the basis for new conflicts and dilemmas, and
then new resolutions.

In the case of the CSC legislation and the

noted discriminatory differences between sexual and non-sexual assaults, the discrepancy between the objectives supposedly built into
the CSC code and the actual case treatment can be viewed as the
impetus for further conflicts, resolutions, and change.
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The dialectic work of authors such as Grau poses a final tvpe
of consideration which can productively be explored with regard to

this research.

Grau brings to light two important considerations

which are worthy of elaborations at this juncture.
low directly from the above discussion of Chambliss.

These points folr.rau' s caution

about the individualization of rights can be applied to the women 1 s

movement in relation to rape.

The intent was to enact legislation

guaranteeing rights for individual sexual assault victims, e.g., not
to be required to resist, provide corroborating evidence, and so on.
This intent can be interpreted as short-sighted in light of Gran's
and Picciotto's caveats about the individualization of rights as
fragmenting rather than cementing class solidarity and true change
(Picciotto, 1982:175; Grau, 1982:206), and Chambliss' regarding resolutions '\·.'hich fail to address basic social structure contradictions.
Grau's discussion on the outcomes of social movements, challenge,
conflict, and struggle goes on to factor in the elements of power and
tenacity.

What this branch of dialectic theory suggests is that

since women as a group do have pmver, and since they have the ability
to develop alliances

~vithin

and between class structure, and so

forth, if the goal of comparable and equitable case treatment is
be realized, efforts aimed at change must not halt with the sheer
enactment of legal chanr,e.

Grau pro!}Oses that if victim advocate

groups monitor the enforcement process and "insist" on implementation
of objectives underlying such change, and view the statutory alterations as mere stepping stones to real change, that a type of progressive synthesis protecting the rights of all human bein5s, as
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in this instance both sexual assault victims and assailants; might
materialize.

lfuat this research indicates then is a need for the :nonitoring
of the implementation process, given discovered differentials in the
treatment of these two types of crime.

Dialectic Marxian theory ad-

ditionally highlights the nature of some actual gains made by \·ramen
in terms of rape victims' rights as was discussed wi·th the reality as
opposed to appearance of fairness in structural Marxian theory.

The

additional caveat of dial8ctic theory is to take into account social
structural arrangements as potentially precluding real change, if not
directly assessed and thereby involved in the resolution process.
In this sense dialectic theory calls for the integration of the historical specificity relevant to instrumental Harxian work, and the
recognition of the ideological legitimation functions often accomplished by change in form rather than substance as highlighted by
structural Harxian theorists.
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CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary

The purpose of this research_ was to discern 'tvhether or not model
rape legislation met tvith the.salieut o_bjective as put forth primarily
by women's groups of equitable case treatment in our criminal justice
system.

A major objective of }fichigan 1 s Criminal Sexual Conduct Code

was to facilitate the comparable, rather than unique, case treatment
of sexual assaults.

The focus of this research was, therefore, di-

rected towards the dis-covery of differences in sexual and non-sexual
assault case prosecutions.

Particula-r focus was directed towards

those dimensions specifically altered in the new sexual assault statute, namely, corroboration requirements, consent and resistance
standards, and issues relating to victim precipitation and credibili-

ty.
A second objective of this research tvas to apply theoretical
perspectives on the origin and operation of the criminal law to the
enacted and enforced statute change pertaining to sexual assault.
Previous research in this field has neglected not only to assess the
changes effected through the enforcement and administration of new
rape law, but additionally failed to examine the comparative viability
and/or implications of differing theoretical orientations regarding
legal reform.

Additionally, the rape literature is notably lacking

for any application ot theoretical perspectives in empir·i.c.:al t·e::;e,:ad,.

144

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

14.5
This research focused on the office of the prosecutor in the
attempt to make a preliminary assessment of the type of change effected by Michigan's model esc statute and to theoretically explain
any such change.

Prosecutorial decisions were focused on because

they have a critical impact upon case treatment and outcome and have
rarely been studied.

Discretionary decisions made by prosecutors

such as those to charge or plea bargain, comrrise a significant component affecting the type of change effected by reform legislation
through its implementation.
The data for this study were collected from prosecutor files in
Kalamazoo County, Michigan for a two-year period,

All sexual and non-

sexual assaults were included in the research sample, with the exception of felonious assaults which had to be stratified and then
systematically sampled due to their large number.
employed chi-square and

!

The analysis

tests of significance in the attempt to

discover case characteristic differences on a variable by variable
basis.

Discriminate function analysis was then conducted to examine

in a simultaneous manner

~•hich

independent variables best differen-

tiated the sexual from non-sexual assaults.

Pearson product moment

correlation coefficients \,Tere subsequently scrutinized, along with
the respective significance levels in the effort to disclose relationships

bet~•een

the magnitude of charge reduction as operationalized in

an interval/ratio scale and the independent variables in the sexual
and non-sexual assault cases at various stages of prosecution.

Par-

tial correlation coefficients were also computed to examine multiple
variable relationships.
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There were six theoretical perspectives considered as they related to the origin and most particularly to the implementation of

the new sexual assault statute.

These were consensus, plural con-

flict, labeling, and instrumental, structural, and dialectic Harxian
theories.

General explanations of the origin of the new esc law were

offered, given each orientation, and then discussed in terms of
general expectations regarding the likely forms and consequences of
implementation.

It is instructive to highlight the salient aspects of

each theory in relation to the new law before discussing the findings
of this research.
The consensus orientation assumes continuity between the shared
values and interests which give rise to law and the enforcement process.

Given consensus theory, it was anticipated that the new CSC

code would be implemented in such a manner as to reflect the underlying interest of comparable, rather than discriminatory, rape case
treatment.

Plural conflict theory recognizes competing rather than

singular groups, values, and interests, yet still basically views the
state as objective and acting in the general public interest.

Be-

cause of this, pluralistic perspectives lead to much the same type of
conclusion as consensus theory, i.e., few, if any, differences to be
manifest between the prosecution of sexual and non-sexual assault
cases after the enactment of the new sexual assault law.
The labeling orientation calls attention to power in the definitional process and in this way is similar to the variants of plural
conflict theory which reco-gnize the differing amounts of power accruing to the various groups in society.

Yet labeling perspectives
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assume essentially a dichotomous power structure in society and
therefore can be seen as more similar to Marxian orientations.

The

problem discussed with regard to labeling was that neither the nature
of society nor the state are specifically delineated, which renders
difficult the task of making specific anticipations concerning the
enactment and implementation of law.
lead to expectations that power will

This orientation did however
~nfluence

that which is defined

as eriminal or deviant, how such individuals will be defined and
treated, and what consequences any such labels will have for individuals so defined.

The nature of the constructed definitions and

their application are relevant for both offenders and victims of
sexual assault.

The new law in Michigan specifically endeavored the

redefinition of 'rape as sexual assault in part to shift negative connotations and stigma from victims to offenders involved with this
crime.

Given labeling tenets, it was anticipated that considerations

of power would determine the effectiveness of this effort, i.e., the
economically and socially powerful would engage in the labeling and
consequent stigmatization of the powerless and lower class men and

Consideration of the Marxian perspectives facilitated more specific and rather discrepant anticipations.

Instrumental Marxian

theory asserts that the state and law originate in class conflict and
operate to perpetuate the inequitable distribution of resou~ces, viz.
the status quo favoring the bourgeois.

Given that orientatiop. it

was therefore expected that the new sexual assault law would make no
difference in terms of abating historically grounded discriminatory
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tactics, practices, attitudes, and problems concerning-victims of
rape, and serve only to perpetuate false consciousness and the status

quo.
Structural Marxian theory provides for more latitude in the interpretation of Marx's works and contends that the state is not an
instrument manipulated at will by the ruling class, but rather a
relatively autonomous part of the superstructure.

In order to realize

the long range interest of status quo perpetuation, the state must
engage in legitimation functions, not simply coercive tactics.

Be-

cause a system must appear fair in order to endure, it must at times
actually be fair.

This type of logic led to the expectation that the

new CSC code might actually result in fairness for sexual assault
victims, but this would serve the long term interest of capitalists.
Dialectic Marxian accounts recognize both the repressive and
consensual nature of the state and law, and additionally call attention to contradictions inherent in a capitalist social system which
can engender bona fide change (in contrast to change merely in appearance or change still aimed and tied to perpetuation of the social
order).

Because of contradictions in the political economic struc-

ture of society women have gained power.

The new rape legislation

which women's groups have moved through legislatures might therefore
be expected to truly represent the interests of this group as manifest of sexual assault and its victims.
The actual findings from this investigation revealed several
different patterns.

The above theoretical orientations and expecta-·

tions were drawn upon to interpret all research results.

For
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purposes of clarity, the findings are first sutmllarily presented and
then discussed in light of the different theories.

OVerall, one-third of all CSC cases were denied for prosecution
at the intake charging stage.
half were plea bargained.

In the remaining cases roughly one-

In the non-sexual assault cases approxi-

mately one-half were denied at the outset, and slightly less than onehalf were plea bargained.
In the joint consideration of all denied and authorized or accepted cases, it was found that the case characteristics of police

department, number of days elapsed between crime occurrence and
warrant request, race and (jailed) status of the suspect "all significantly differentiated the sexual from non-sexual assaults,

Propor-

tionally, police requested charges from the largest police department
more often for non-sexual than sexual assaults.

Non-sexual assault

case requests also involved minority group members, jailed suspects •
and a shorter time span between the crime and warrant request more
frequently than was the case for the sexual assault request group.
There was not a significant difference between these types of cases
on the remaining available data item of defendant age.
In examining how independent variables impacted on the decision
to deny police warrant requests, it was found that only the reason
offered by prosecutors for denials significantly correlated with this
ultimate form of charge reduction,

Although significant in correla-

tion with the denial decision in both sexual and non-sexual asaults,
the type of reason offered was different with each type of assault.
Warrants were not issued for evidential reasons more than twice as
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frequently in CSC's as opposed to non-sexual assaults.
~o1ere

The latter

more often denied for what was categorized as practical types of

considerations.

When looking at the denied warrant case characteristics simultaneously it was found that evidential reasons for denial, police
department requesting the warrant, and number of days between crime
and request distinguished (in rank order) the sexual from the nonsexual assaults.
Because more information was available in the authorized case

files, the discretionary decision to reduce charges at intake was
separately analyzed for sexual and non-sexual assaults.

The charac-

teristics which differentiated between them were past assaultive
behavior and pending cases against the accused, resistance type
efforts by victims, evidence availability, victim-offender relation-ships, victim age, injury incurred, number of eyewitnesses, weapons
present, judgments about victim precipitation and victim credibility
problems.

In the CSC cases defendants had more frequently assaulted

in the past, less often had other charges pending against them, and
less often had weapons; victims offered less aggressive resistance,
knew their attackers more often, were younger, and sustained fe;ver
injuries; and the crime presented less evidence, fewer eyewitnesses,
and greater problems of victim credibility and precipitation than was
the case for non-sexual assaults,

When all relevant variables tvere

considered simultaneously in the discriminate function analysis, it
was evidence availability, victim credibility problems, victim
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injury, and victim-offender relationship which most strongly differentiated the sexual from the non-sexual assaults.

The variables which were significant in the explanation of charging reduction at intake for the authorized CSC cases were additional
pending cases, evidence availability, and victim-offender relationship.

The findings here :!.ndicated that charge reduction correlated

with the absence of pending cases and evidence, and with acquaintance
assaults.

The only independent variable significantly related to

as-

intake charge reduction in the non-sexual assault cases was past

saultive behavior of the accused.

Charges were reduced less when

such was the case.
The magnitude of charge reduction involved in plea agreements
was separately scrutinized for both types of assaults.

There were

not any independent variables significantly related to charging
reductions through plea bargaining in the·

esc

cases, but several

statistically significant for non-sexual assaults.

~1ere

These were race

of offender, victim age and injury, and type of reason offered for
entering into plea agreements.

Charge reductions here were cor-

related with non-minority groups (whites), younger victims, non-injury
cases, and cases

~.;rhere

evidential problems were identified to be

existent by prosecutors.
By way of summary, it is important to discuss the interface of
the previous theoretical perspectives and the research results rather
than to describe each of these Er..dings.

Different sets of findings

in terms of case characteristics, significant and non-significant
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differences and correlations, were amenable to interpretation
predicated upon the six differing theories presented.

Both consensus and p1 1Jral conflict theory led to anticipations
that the type of implementation of the new sexual assault law would
reflect equitable case treatment and legalistic considerations in

terms of influences on prosecutors' discretionary decision making.
Some of the findings were consistent with Such expectations.

Consen-

sus and plural conflict perspectives positing congruity between values

and interests engendering legal change and implemented outcomes were
thus drawn upon to discuss findings such as a relatively low rate of

warrant denials for CSC cases, the absence of race or SES as decisive
criteria in charging decisions, and the straightforward legalistic
or evidence-based criteria often drawn upon in prosec.utorial decisionmaking.

In other words, support for continued discriminatory rape

case treatment was not found, given these types of results, but rather support was lent to the notion that the law was enacted and
enforced to better prote.ct victims.

Fewer warrants were denied in

the sexual as opposed to non-sexual assaults, and when they were
denied it was most often due to legalistic factors, and approximately
the same proportion of these t1vo forms of assault involved charge
reduction because of plea negotiations.
Although specific predictions did not flow easily from the labeling orientation, attention was called to a significant dimension
involved with the new sexual assault law.

The primary importance of

the labeling perspective for this study concerned the implemented
form o£ the new law, not necessarily from the point of view of the
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accused, but rather from the victim.

Part of the movement to rede-

fine rape as sexual assault had as its impetus the objective of
altering connotations and stigma historically relating to victims.

One research finding which indicated partial success in terms of such
an objective was that attributions of victim precipitation and blame
occurred rarely in sexual assault cases (less than 10% of the cases),

However, comparability of sexual with non-sexual assault crime definitions was not totally realized as evidenced by the finding that,
while precipitation attributions were infrequent 1..rith sexual assaults,

they were much more infrequent 1..rith non-sexual assault case victims.
The Narxian perspectives more directly facilitate the assessment
and explanation of the new

esc

code in relation to research findings.

Certain research results were amenable to interpretation given the
instrumental Marxian approach,
tions,

esc

In looking at overall charge reduc-

cases fared less favorably both at charging and at the

plea bargaining decisional stages.

Warrants were frertuently denied

in CSC cases for evidential reasons indicating the possibility that
prosecutors still need or require more evidence than the victim's
complaint in the sexual assault cases, in spite of the model legislation designed to encourage such prosecution.

In the authorized

sexual assault cases, corroborative evidence t;ras less often available
and the veracity of victim accounts more suspect than was so for the
non-sexual assaults.

These variables not only distinguished the two

forms of assault, but further significantly correlated with charging
reduction in the esc cases.

The anticipation which was interpreted

as tenable, given this theory, was that the objective of comparable
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case treatment as manifest in, for example, the lack of corroboration
requirements in the new law, was not realized through. implementation.
The findings on victim preci.pitation (_as previously described), victim-offender relationships, and pending cases were similarly dis-

cussed.

To briefly· reiterate, pending cases were seen as additional

evidence and therefore negatively correlated with charging reductions,

and victims who were acquainted tvith their attackers were less credible in terms of consent issues than were thos~ who were complete
strangers.

One final research result cons is tent with instrumental

Harxian assertions was that whites received more favorable treatment
in terms of greater charge reduction through plea bargaining in the
non-sexual assault cases than minority group members, even when controlling for other factors such as past assaults.
Structural Marxian tenets facilitated a different set of insights
into the research findings.

The structural discuss.ions about the

relative autonomy of the state and its branches, and about laws
actually being fair at times were employed to interpret some o£ the
research results.

The office of the prosecutor is a political one in

this country with most prosecutors being elected officials.

This

sub-branch of the state, like the state, develops autonomy, interests,
and its own set of contradictions.

In this vein, it was stated that

prosecutors 1 need to please. the voting public engenders certain conflicts.

On the one hand, prosecutors desire to please women such as

those instrumental in the passage of fair and equitable sexual assault legislation, and on the other, desire to please the more traditional populace who accept prevailing mythology about "innocent and
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falsely accused" men.

Additionally, prosecutors are concerned about

developing and sustaining good "batting averages" or conviction rates,
and this is not easily accomplished Hith the acceptance and prosecu-

tion of many sexual assault offenses.
prosecutors

B$

This type of explanation of

facilitated by structural Marxian theory was drawn

upon to explain two important categories of findings.

First, the

findL:1g that none of the independent variables significantly correlated with

esc

plea bargaining charge reductions could be inter-

preted as being due to the autonomy that develops not only between
the prosecutor's office and the state, but additionally within this
office itself.

Differences in attitude and interest, and the dis-

cretion which permits for their manifestation, may be so vast and
individualized that no systematic pattern of influences can be
discussed in relation to 'this decision with this specific type of
case.

Second, the preceding logic can be employed to interpret what

might appear to be inconsistency in the research findings and interpretations,

In other words, these conflicting pulls on prosecutors

help shed light on the previously discussed findings that indicate
both failure and success in the implementation process.

The signifi-

cant type of summary statement, given structural Marxian theory, is
that not only must laws be fair at least once in awhile in order to
perpetuate the social system, but also that certain aspects of certain
law·s may be fair while other aspects may only appear fair in order to
accomplish this same objective.
code

~.;ras

The partial success of the new CSC

interpreted in this regard.

The success or fairness was not

complete as evidenced in the sectior. dra\.;ring on instrumental Marxian
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theory~

but fairness, from a victim advocate point of view, was

found in terms of some aspects of the law such as past sexual history
and character or reputation evidence not becoming an issue, resistance and victim initiation of contact not being a factor, and victim
precipitation not becoming involved as a consideration in many cases
in the prosecution of this offense.
Dialectic Marxian theory shed light on the nature of expected
outcomes in more of a longer run sense, given that which was discovered in this research project.

The dynamic approach entailed here

called attention to the nature of change as progressive.

The contra-

dictions yielding power to women as a group helped to bring about
challenge and change as seen in the model Michigan law,

The outcome

through the implementation process was not a total and complete gain
for the subordinate group because "dilemmas" rather than causes Yere
addressed in the enactment or resolution phase.

One anticipation was

that resolutions would underscore new contradictions and thereby
engender new conflicts, dilemmas, and resolutions.

This was seen to

be the case as recognition of the discrepancy between enactment and
implemented form can quite tenably lead to further change in the area
of rape law and case treatment.

The second anticipation entertained

was that true gains may in fact materialize, owing to the contradictions and power accruing to previously disenfranchised groups or
segments of the population.
lighted here,

Some gains have been made and high-

The degree to which true strides have been made is best

left to concluding considerations.
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Conclusions

The first conclusion is given in the form of a caveat.

Hhile

theoretical interpretations were rendered for research findings in a
general sense in order to explore the implications and meanings of
results, only one jurisdiction in the state operating under model
legislation was studied.

Because of this, the findings and inter-

pretations herein are not amenable to generalization about the relatively ne•..;r model legislation elsewhere in the state,

This study does,

however, clearly indicate the need for further empirical and theoretically guided research concerning the type of implemented outcomes
concomitant t,Tith the alteration of rape legislation so pervasive in

this country.
Research is needed to assess whether or not the patterns observed
in these data prevail elsewhere in the state i f the model law is to
truly be assessed.

Research could most productively be conducted

examining the decisions rendered, not just by prosecutors, but additionally by other criminal justice agencies and personnel involved in
the implementation process.

A scale such as that devised in this

project for the measurement of discretion might be utilized (with
modification) to assess criminal justice decision making by a host of
officials.

Moreover, baseline data could be examined in order to

discern differences in case requirements and treatment before and
after the model law was

enac~ed.

All of these kinds of research

might also be done on a comparative, -5tat:e-by-state basis in the
effort to assess the varieties of legal requirements, changes, and
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effects on sexual assault victims, offenders, convictions, and so
forth.

This type of examination might then provide insight into

other types of regional, geographic, or demographic variables as influences on criminal justice decision making and the implementation
of alleged legislative intent.
The application of theories to th.e explanation of the origin and
enforcement of the
comments.

esc

code provides the basis for different types of

While the different types of theoretical perspectives

facilitated interpretation and insight into the research project results, they did so with varying degrees of adequacy.
Consensus theory has been critiqued as being unable to account
for the emergence of collective challenge to the prevailing value
consensus it assumes.

This orientation falls short in the capacity

to explain the large number of women, feminist, and victim advocate
groups lobbying for change in rape law.

The application of the con-

sensus perspective to the findings concerning implementation in this
research points to yet another shortcoming of this perspective.

It

was possible to draw on consensus theory in order to interpret only
a particular set of research findings, those indicating the absence
of discriminatory or unique sexual assault case treatment.

Consensus

theory could not be utilized to shed light on the host of findings
obtained in this investigation.
Because plural conflict theory assumes objectivity, balanced
compromise, and a neutral mediating role for the state, its applicability can also be concluded to be problematic.

The only real
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findings that could be explained, given the assumption of impartiality in law enactment and enforcement, were those indicating just such
continuity.

In other words the results indicating success in terms

of the realization of intents underlying the sexual assault legisla-

tion were the only ones amenable to interpretation from this perspective.

It remained the task of other approaches to more fully account

for the variety of findings obtained in this research.

The assumption of the labeling perspective that stigma and
definitions flm<l' from power and organizational self interests were
useful to draw on for certain interpretation purposes.

However,

given that the labeling orientation assumes rather than analyzes a
dichotomy in power and that it fails to assess the success or failure
of attempts to alter socially constructed designations, this theoretical orientation also falls short in its ability to account for the
type of findings which emerged in this research.
Both structural and dialectic Z.larxian approaches, however, were
consistent with the various research findings.

Structural-Narxian

arguments about fairness in appearance and in actuality were drm:m
upon to explain both the positive and negative results.

The recog-

nition of the relative independence of superstructural institutions
greatly facilitated the interpretations of prosecutorial discretion
in the implementation process.

Structural accounts were, however,

critiqued for lack of historical specificity and thus the inability

to distinguish which laws, and which portions of which laws, will be
fair in reality and which will be so only in appearance.
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Dialectic Marxian theory, through_ its attempt at synthesis,
sents an alternative to th.e above.

pre~

It can be viewed as an integra-

tive approach_ to the study of crime and law.

Dialectic theory calls

attention to specific time, contractions, and struggles, pointing the

way to considerations of political and economic power as they influ-

ence outcomes.

Because of the recognition of autonomy as discussed

above, the recognition of historically situated conflicts, and the
recognition of both the consensual and coercive operations of the

state and law, dialectic theory can more fully accommodate and explain the range of outcomes found in this study.
The success of the sexual assault law was interpreted as being
tied to contradictions· which engendered challenge by a subordinate
segment of the population who bad increasingly gained position and
power.

The failure as evidenced in the implementatiDn process was

interpreted from this theoretical stance as owing to the type of problem and resolution entailed in th_e conflict.

In other words, root

causes and solutions were not addressed by the model law, a point to
be elaborated shortly.
Dialectic :-farxian theory additionally highlights future types of
considerations such as those pertaining to new conflicts, contradictions, and resolutions, and pitfalls to be guarded against, in the
effort to effect- true gains.

One of the new contradictions pre-

viously noted was the discrepancy between intents underlying the model CSC code and that which_ was realized through implementation.

Once

recognized, this could act to bring about new challenges, conflicts,
and ultimately new resolutions.

Dialectic. theory asserts that this
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dynamic kind of process is to be expected as resolutions do not
address caus·es.

Additional kinds of conflicts engendered by change in, as in
this instance, rape law concern the form of the law itself.

Reform

legislation can be seen as a problenatic resolution which has led to

challenge.

Statutes such as the model

esc

code in Hichigan have been

criticized as unfair from the perspective of the rights of the ac-

cused.

Sasko and Sesek (1971), for example, discuss the violation of

constitutional principles potentially involved by the exclusion of
victim character and reputation evidence.

Although untested as yet,

this element of reform has been protested as a violation of the sixth

amendment right to confront the witnesses against the accused and as
a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.

The fear is that relevant exculpatory evidence will not be permitted
to emerge at trial.

Thus, the balance of the rights of the accused

and of rape victims are called into conflict in a new way because of
reform measures.
Another example of problems brought about by reforms can be found
in the early 1980 Michigan law which forbids the mere suggestion of
polygraphs for sexual assault victims in order to reduce victim
trauma and harassment.

The contradiction which emerged ·was that,

\o.'hile the thrust of this piece of legislation was to better protect
sexual assault victims, it can be argued that the law has operated
against victim interests.

Some cases that are lost to acquittal or

even warrant denials could have been effectively prosecuted had victims been e.ware of the effect taking a polygraph could have made.
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Reform efforts dealing with the crime of rape have further been
criticized as the proclivity appears to be a move towards harsher

sentencing.

As Sasko and Sesek note:

If the severity of the sentence is such that it negates
the possibility of conviction, it is obvious that the
effect will not be upon the criminal but rather upon
the jury (1975:492),
This indicates once again that, as dialectic Marxian theory would suggest, new lEUJs can serve to underscore contradictions, conflicts, and
dilemmas rather than to serve as resolutions.
These kinds of issues comprise one shortcoming of rape reform
statutes designed to ameliorate the problems associated with this
crime.

A different sort of pitfall discussed by dialectic Marxian

theory relates to the individualization of rights (Grau, 1982).
cerns about wide

issues~

Con-

such as the treatment of women as well as

rape victims in .American society get translated in the legal realm to
more microscopic or individualized problems and rights which results
in solutions that may satisfy the challenging group but do not address the core problem(s).

Grau explains that:

••• social movements equate changing the law with transforming society. Collective needs asserted by these
movements get articulated in terms of individual rights;
political decisions become delegated to a caste of legal
professionals. Laws perhaps are changed, and if changed,
challenged. Interpreted by the courts, the changed laws
acquire meanings other than those held by those who sought
the changes. Turned solely to legal ends, the social
movement is diffused (1982:206, citing Klare, 1977).
What this means is that not only can laws be ineffective because they do not attend to underlying causes, but additionally that
the law may quite tenably not represent a viable means of solution at

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

!63
all.

These two points are inextricably related and provide the basis

for a final concluding point.
The root causes of not only the unique and inequitable treatment
of rape cases but also of the phenomenon itself are tied to the very
social structure of this country.

The pervasive violence, inequality,

and sexism in bur society give rise to the act, the enactnent, and the
operation of laws relating to rape.

Altering legislative codes there-

fore ignores both the causes of the phenomen::m and the influences
which determine implemented outcomes, and thus represents a resolu-

tion aimed at a symptom.

Treating symptoms may be a stopgap measure

which curtails some problems for a short time, but is doomed to very

limited success at best.

The political economic structure which has

given rise to rape, rape law, and rape case treatment over the decades must be scrutinized· and taken into account in calls for and
forms of change if significant impact on any of these dimensions is to
be realized.

Modifications of the legal form alone fall short in

terms of resolving the problems associated with rape.
In terms of the model

esc

code enactment it is concluded that

legal statutory change alone represents an insufficient measure to
abate the problems concomitant with sexual assault prosecution in
the criminal justice system.

Addressing the symptom rather than the

causes of both rape and its treatment in our legal system guarantees
nothing by way of solution.

As dialectic theory suggests, inroads

may be gained (Bierne & Quinney, 1982) with victims traumatized and
discriminated against to a lesser extent with such resolutions, as
was evidenced here, but when these resolutions do not address the
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underlying causes, i.e., oi inequality, sexism, and violence as it

permeates the political-economic structure, true solutions to the
totality of the problem of rape lVill yet be forthcoming.
Enactment of even model legislation is inadequate not only be-

cause implementation cannot be assumed to mirror the content and
(alleged) intent of law, but additionally because implementation will

reflect status quo arrangements and ideologies which were not involved in the statute alteration process.

If root causes are not

addressed in the enactment of laws, they will surface to permeate the
implementation process, and thus act to preclude true gain and progress.
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The People of the State of Michigan Enact:
Section l.

Act No. 328 of the Public Acts of 1931, as amended,

being sections 750.1 to 750.568 of the Compiled Laws of i;;i7iJ, is
amended by adding sections 520a, 520c, 520d, 520e, 520£, 520g, 520h,
520i, 520j, 520k, and 5201 to read as follows:
Sec. 520a

As used in sections 520a to 5201:

(a)

"Actor" means a person accused of criminal sexual conduct.

(b)

"Intimate parts" includes the primary genital area, groin,

(c)

"Mentally defective" means that a person suffers from a

inner thigh, buttock, or breast: of a human being.

mental disease or defect which renders that person
temporarily or pe·rmanently incapable of appraising the
nature of his or her conduct.
(d)

"Mentally incapacitated" r..eans that a person is rendered
temporarily incapable of appraisino;,; or controlling his or
her conduct due to the L-,fluence of a narcotic, anesthetic,
or other substance administered to that person without
his or her consent, or due to any other act committed upon
that person without his or her consent.

(e)

"Physically helpless" means that a person is unconscious,
asleep, or for any other reason is physically unable to
connnunicate unwillingness to an act.

(f)

"Personal injury" means bodily injury, disfignrement,
mental anguish, chronic pain, pregnancy, disease, or loss
or impairment of a sexual or reproductive organ.
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(g)

"Sexual contact" includes the intentional touchir:.g of the

victim's or actor's intimate parts or the intentional
touching of the clothing covering the imme<'!i2te

:..!'<:>!?.

0f the

victim's or actor's intimate parts, if that intentional
touching can reasonably be construed as being for the
purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.

(h)

"Sexual penetration" means sexual intercourse, cunnilungus,

fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however
slight, of any part of a person's body or of any object

into the' genital or anal O{)enings of another per~ on's
body, but emission of semen is not required.
(i)

"Victim" means the person alleging to have bet'ln subjected

to criminal sexual conduct.
Sec. 52Gb.

(1) a peJ:.son is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in

the first degree if he or she engages in sexual penetration with another person and if any of the following circumstances exists:
(a)

That other person is under 13 years of age.

(b)

The other person is at least 13 but less than 16 years of
age and the actor is a member of the same household as the
victim, the actor is related to the victim by blood or affinity to the fourth degree to the victim, or the actor is
in a position of authority over the victim and used this
authority to coerce the victim to submit.

(c)

Sexual penetration occurs under circumstances involving the
commission of any other felony.
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(d)

The actor is aided or abetted by 1 or more other persons
and either of the following circumstances exists:
(i)

The actor knows or has reason to know that the
victim is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated,
or physically helpless.

(ii)

The actor uses force or coercion to accomplish the
sexual penetration,

Force or coercion includes but

is not limited to any of the circumstances listed in
subdivision (f) (i) to (v).
(e)

The actor is armed with a weapon or any other article. used
or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim to l:'easonably
believe it to be a weapon.

(f)

The actor causes personal injury to the victim and force or
coercion is used to accomplish sexual penetration.

Force

or coercion includes but is not limited to any of the following circumstances:
(i)

When the actor overcomes the victim through the
actual application of physical force or physical
violence.

(ii)

When the actor coerces the victim to submit by
threatening to use force or violence on the victim,
and the victim believes that the actor has the present ability to execute these threats.

(iii)

t-.'hen the actor coerces the victim to submit by
threatening to retaliate -in the future against the
victim, or any other person, and the victim believes
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that the actor has the ability to execute this
threat.

As used in this subdivision, "to retaliate 11

includes threats of physical punishment, kidnapping,

or extortion.
(iv)

When the actor engages in the medical treatment or

examination of the victim in a manner or for purposes
which are medically recognized as unethical or unacceptable,
(v)

When the actor, through concealment or by the element of surprise, is able to overcome the victim.

(g)

The actor causes personal injury to the victim, and the actor knows or has reason to know that the victim is mentally
defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless.

2.

Criminal sexual conduct in the first degree is a felony pun-

ishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term
of years.
Sec. 520c.

(1)

A person is gdlty of criminal sexual conduct in

the second degree if the person engages in sexual contact with another person and if any of the following circumstances exists:
(a)

That other person is under 13 years of age.

(h)

The other person is at least 13 but less than 16 years of
age and the actor is a member of the same household as the
victim, the actor is related to the victim by blood or
affinity to the fourth degree to the victim, or the actor
is in a position of authority over the victim and used this
authority to coerce the victim to submit.
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(c)

Sexual contact occurs under circumstances invOlving the

(d)

The actor is

commission of any other felony.
aid~.

or abetted by 1 or more other persons and

either of the following circumstances exists:
(i)

The actor knows or bas reason to know that the victim is mentally defective, mentally

incapacitated~

or physically helpless.
(11)

The actor uses force or coercion to aco011.plish the
sexual contact.

Force or coercion includes but is

not limited to any of the circUIDstances listed in
sections 520b (l)(f)(i} to (v).

(e)

The actor is armed with a weapon or any othe"r article used
or fashioned in a manner to lead a person to reasonably
believe it to be a

(f)

~apon.

The actor causes personal injury to the victim and force or
coercion is used to accomplish the sexual contact.

Force or

coercion includes but is not limited to any of the circumstances listed in section 520b ( l) (f) (i) to (v).
(g)

The actor causes personal injury to the victim and the actor knows or has reason to know that the victim is mentally
defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless.

(2)

Criminal sexual conduct in the second degree is a felony

punishable by imprisonment for not raore than 15 years.
Sec. 520d.

(1)

A person is gulity of criminal sexual conduct in

the third degree i f the person engages in sexual penetration with another person and if any of the following circumstances exists:
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(a}

That other person is at least 13 years of _age and under 16
years of age.

(h)

Force or coercion is. used to accomplish the sexual penetrat~on.

Force or coercion includes but is not limited to any

of the circumstances listed in s·ection 5200 (l) (f) (i) to
(v).

(c)

The actor knows or has reason to know that the victim is

mentally defective, mentally- incapacitated, or physically
helpless.

(2}

Criminal sexual conduct in the third degree is a felony

punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years.

Sex. 520e.

(1)

A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct

in the fourth degree if he. or she engages in sexual contact with an-·
other person and if either of the following circumstances exists:
(a)

Force or coercion is used to accomplish the sexual contact.
Force or coercion includes but is not limited to an;· of the
circumstances listed in section 520b (1) (g) (i) to (iv),

(b)

The actor knows or has reason to know that the victim is
mentally incapacitated or physically helpless.

(2)

Criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree is a misde-

meanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 2 years, or by a
fine or not more than $500.00, or both.
Sec. 520f,

(1)

If a person is convicted of a second or sub-

sequent offense under section 520b, 520c, or 520d, the sentence
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imposed under those sections for the second or subsequent offense
shall provide for a mandatory minimum sentence of at least 5 years,
(2)

For purposes of this section, an offense is considered a

second or subsequent offense if, prior to conviction of the second or

subsequent offense, the actor has at any time been convicted under
section 520b, 520c, or 520d or under any similar statute of the United
States or any state for a criminal sexual offense including rape, carnal knowledge, indecent liberties, gross indecency, or an attempt to
commit such an offense.

Sec. 520g.

(1)

Assault with intent to commit criminal sexual

conduct involving sexual penetration shall be a felony punishable by

imprisonment for not more than 10 years.
(2)

Assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct in

the second degree is a fe'lony punishable by imprisonment for not more
than 5 years,
Sec. 520h.

The testimony of a victim need not be co:n:oborated in

prosecutions under sections 520b to 520g.
Sec. 520i.

A victim need not resist the actor in prosecution

under sections 520b to 520g.
Sec. 520j.

(1)

Evidence of specific instances of the victim's

sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the victim's sexual conduct, and
reputation evidence of the victim's sexual conduct s;,dll not be admitted under sections 520b to 520g unless and only to the extent that
the judge finds that the following proposed evidence is material to a
fact at issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial
nature does not outweigh its probative value:
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(a)

Evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct with the actor.

(b)

Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing

(2)

If the defendant proposes to offer evidence described in

the source or origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease.

subsection (l)(a) or (b), the defendant

~.dthin

10 days after the ar-

raignment on the information shall file a written motion and offer of
proof.

The court may order an in camera hearing to determine whether

the proposed evidence is admissible under subsection {_l),

I f new

information is discovered cluring the course of the trial that may make
the evidence described in subsection (l)(a) or (b) admissible, the

judge may order an in camera hearing to determine whether the

pro~

posed evidence is admissible under subsection (1).
Sec. 520k.

Upon the request of the counsel or the victim or ac-

tor in a prosecution

und~r sections SlOb to 520g the masistrate

before whom any person is brought on a charge of having committed an
offense under sections 520b to 520g shall order that the names of the
victim and actor and details of the alleged offense be suppressed until such time as the actor is arraigned on the information, the charge
is dismissed, or the case is otherwise concluded,

~michever

occurs

first.
Sec. 5201.

A persou does not commit sexual assault under this

act if the victim is his or her legal spouse, unless the couples are
living apart and one of them has filed for separate maintenance or
divorce.
Section 2.

All proceedings pending and all rights and liabil-

ities existing, acquired, or incurred at the time this amendatory act
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takes effect are saved and may be consummated according to the law in
force when they are commenced.

This amendatory act shall not be con-

strued to affect any prosecution pending or begun before the effective date of this amendatory act.

Section 3.

Sections 85, 333, 336, 339, 340, 341, 342, and 520

of Act No. 328 of the Public Acts of 1931, being sections 750.85,
750.333, 750.336, 750.339, 750.340, 750.341, 750.342, and 750.520 of

the Compiled Laws of 1970, and section 82 of chapter 7 of Act No. 175
of the Public Acts of 1927, being section 767.82 of the Compiled Laws
of 1970, are repealed.
Section 4.

This amendatory act shall take effect November 1,

1974.
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Sec. 750.8la
Sec. Sla.

Assault; infliction of serious injury.
Any person who shall assault another without any

weapon and inflict serious or aggravated injury upon the person of
another without intending to commit the crime of murder, and without
intending to inflict great bodily harm less than the crime of murder,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by i_mprlsonment in the
county jail or the state prison for a period of not more than 1 year,

or fine of $500.00, or both.
Sec. 750.82

Felonious assault.

Sec. 82.

Felonious assault--Any person who shall assault an-

other with a gun, revolver, pistol, knife, iron bar, club, brass
knuckles or

ot~er

dangerous weapon, but without intending to commit

the crime of murder, and without intending to inflict great bodily
harm less than the crime
Sec. 750.83
Sec. 83.

'of

murder, shall be guilty of a .felony.

Assault with intent to commit murder.
Assault with intent to commit murder-Any person who

shall assault another with intent to commit the crime of murder,
shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison for life or any number of years.
Sec. 750.84

Assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than
murder.

Sec. 84.

Assault with intent to do sreat bodily harm less than

murder--Any person who shall assault another with intent to do great
bodily harm, less than the crime of murder, shall be guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than 10
years, or by fine of not more. than 5,000 dollars.
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Sec. 750.86

sault

Assault with irttent to maim.

Sec. 86.

Assault with intent to maim--Any person who shall as-

a~other

with intent to maim or disfigure his person by cutting

out or maiming the tongue, putting out ·or destroying an eye, cutting

or tearing off an ear, cutting or slitting or mutilating the nose or
lips or cutting off or disabling a liiDb, organ or member, shall be
guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison

not more than 10 years or by fine of not more than 5,000 dollars.
Sec. 750.87

Assault with intent to commit felony not otherwise

punished.
Sec. 87.

Assaulr with intent to commit felony, not othendse

punished--A."1y person who shall assault another, with intent to commit
any burglary, or any other felony, the punishment of which assault is
not otherwise in this act prescribed, shall be guilty of a felony,
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than 10 years,
or by fine of not more than 5,000 dollars.
Sec. 750.88
Sec. 88.

Assault with intent to rob and steal; unarmed.
Assault with intent to rob and steal being unarmed--

Any person, not being armed with a dangerous weapon, who shall assault

another with force and violence, and with intent to rob and steal,
shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison not more than 15 years.
Sec. 750.89
Sec. 89.

Assault with intent to rob and steal; armed.
Assault with intent to rob and steal being armed--Any

person, being armed with a dangerous weapon, or any article used or
fashioned in a manner to lead a person so assaulted reasonably to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

J.79

believe i t to be a dangerous

~eapon,

who shall assault another with

intent to rob and steal shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by

imprisonment in the state prison for life, or for any term of years.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allison vs. U.S., 409F.
Althusser, L.

zq 445 (D.C. Cir.) (1969).

Politics and history.

London:

.Amir, M. Patterns in forcible rane.
Press, 1971.

NLB, 1977 .

Chicago:

University of Chicago

Atkins, B. & Pogrebin, M. (Eds.). The. invisible justice system:
Discretion and the ·law. Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing
Company, 1978.
Babbie, E.
1983.

The praetice of social research.

Belmont, CA:

Wadsworth,

Balbus, I. D. Commodity form and legal form: 1ln essay on the relative autonomy of the law. Law and Society Revie~.;r, 1977, Q,
571-588.
Balkan, S., Berger, R. J., & Schmidt, J. Crime and deviance in
America: A critical approach. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1980.
Becker, H. S. Outsiders: Studies in the sociology of deviance.
New York: The Free Press, 1963.
Beeker, H. S. Labeling theory reconsidered. In H. S. 'Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the sociology of deviance. New York: The
Free Press, 1973 (second edition).
BenDer, J. Justice after rape: Legal reform in Hichigan. In M. L.
Wacker & S. L. Brodsky (Eds.), Sexual assault. Lexington, MA:
D. C. Heath and Company, 1976.
Bierne, P. Empiricism and the critique of Marxism on law and crime.
Social Problems, 1979, ~(4), 373-385.
Bierne, P., & Quinney, R.
Wiley & Sons, 1982.

Harxism and the law,

Blackburn, R. (Ed.). Ideology in social science:
cal social theorv, London: Fontana, 1972.
Blumberg, A. S. Criminal justice:
New Viewpoints, 1979.

New York:

John

Readings in criti-

issues and ironies.

New York:

Bohmer, C. & Blumberg. A. Twice traumatized: The rape victim and
the court. Judicature, 1975, .2§_ (March), 381-399.

180

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

181
Braithwaite, J, ·rneguality, ·crime, and public policy.
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979.

Lcndon:

Brown vs. State, 127 Wis. 193, 201, 106 N.W. 539 (1906).
Brownmiller, S. Against our will:
Simon and Schuster, 1975a.

Brownmiller, S.
196-198.

Men, women, and

~·

New York:

Heroic rapist. 'Mademoiselle, 1975b, 81, 128-129,

Bullock, H. A. Significance of the raci~l factor in the length of
prison sentences. Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and
Police Science, 1961, .2_, 411-417.
Caringella-MacDonald, S. Sexual assault prosecution: An examination
of model rape legislation in Michigan. Journal of Women and
Politics, 1984, i(3), forthcoming.

Car sen, W. G.
laws.
trol.

The sociology of crime and the emergence of criminal

In P, Rock & M. Mcintosh (Eds.), Deviance and social conLondon: Tavistock Publications, 1979.

Chambliss, W. J. Crime and the legal- process.
Hill Book Co. • 1969.

New York:

McGraw

Chambliss, W. J. The state, the law, and the definitions of behavior
as criminal or delinquent. In D. Glaser (Ed.), Handbook of
criminology. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1974.
---Chambliss, W. J. Contradictions and conflicts in law creation.
S, Spitzer (Ed.), Research in law and sociology (Vol. 2),
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1979.
Chambliss, W, J. Functional and conflict theories
heritage of Emile Durkheim and Karl Marx. In
& M. Mankoff (Eds.), Whose law? What order?
proach to criminology. New York: John Wiley

In

of crime: The
W. J. Chambliss
A '!Onflict ap& Sons, 1976.

Chambliss, W, J., & Seidman, .R. B. Law, order, and por.ver,
MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1971.

Reading,

Chambliss, W. J., & Mankoff, :H. (Eds.). \-.'hose law? What order? A
conflict approach to criminology. New York: John Wiley & Sons,

1976.
Chappell, D., Geis, R., & Geis, G. (Eds.). Forcible rape: The crime,
the victim, and the offender. Ne~;~ York: Columbia Pniversity
Press, 1977.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

182
Cbiricos, T. G., & Waldo, G. P. SociDe.conomic status and criminal
sentencing: An empirical assessment of a conflict proposition.
American Sociological Re:V"iew, 1975, iQ_, 753~772.

Clelland, D., & Carter, T. J. The new- myth of class and crime.•
Criminology, 1980, .!§_, 319-336.
Cobb, K. A., & Sdi.auer, N. R. Michigan's criminal sexual assault law.
In D. Chappell, R. Geis, & G. Geis (Eds.); -Forcible ·rape: The
crime, the victim, and the offender. New York: Columbia Uni~
versity Press, 1977.
Cole, G. F. The American system of criminal justice-.
MA: Duxbury Press, 1975.
Cole, G. F. Criminal justice:
MA: Duxbury Press, 1976.

Law and pOlitics.

North Scituate,

North Scituate,

Connell, N., & Wilson, C. (Eds.}. Rape: The first sourcebook for
~New· York: New American Library, 1974.
Currie, E. P. Crimes without criminals: Witchcraft and its control
in renaissance Europe. LaW and Society Review, 1968, ]_ (August),
7-32.
Curtis, L. A. Present and future measures of victimization in forcible rape. In M. J. Walker & S. L. Brodsky (Eds.), ·sexual
assault. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company·, 19~
Davis, R. J., & Stiv€rs, R. (Eds.). The collective definition of
deviance. New York: The Free Press, 1975.
Davis, K. C. Discretionary justice in Europe and America.
University of Illinois Press, 1976.

Chicago:

Davis, N. J. Sociological constructions of deviance: Perspectives
and issues in the field. Dubuque, IA: William C. Brown Com
pany, 1975.
Dean, C. W,, & deBruyn-Kops, M. The crime and consequences of rape.
Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1982.
Delury, G. E. (Ed.). World almanac and book of facts - 1979.
York: Newspaper Enterprise Association, 1979.

New

Dick<;:on, D. T. Bureaucracy and morality: An organizational perspective on a moral crusade. Social Problems, 1968, ..!.§._, 143-156.
Downes, D., & Rock, P. (Eds. ).. De:viant interpretations..
Barnes & Noble Books, 1979.

New York:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

183
Drapkin, I., & Viano, E. (Eds.).
(Vol. III). Lexington, MA:

Victimology: A new focus
D. C. Heath and Company, 1975.

Durkheim, E. The division of labor in socieey.
Press, 1893/1964.
Duster. T.
1970.

The legislation of morality.

New York:

New York:

The Free

The Free Press,

Eisenberg, R. L. Abolishing cautionary instructions in sex offense
cases: People vs. Rincon-Pineda. Criminal Law Bulletin. 1976,
ll_(l). 58-72.
Eisenstein, J., & Jacob, H. Felony justice: An·organizational analysis of criminal courts. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1977.
Ennis, P. H. Criminal victimization in the United States: A report
of a national survey. National Opini.on Research Center (NORC),
University of Chicago. Washington, DC: u.s. Government Prin:ting
Office, 1966.
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Uniform .crime reports: Crime in
the United States. Washington, DC:· U.S. l"',.overnment Printing
Office, 1973.
Federal Bureau of Investigation.

the United StS.tes.
Office, 1975.

Uniform crime reports: Crime in
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

Federal Bureau of Investigation. Uniform s;rime reports: Crime in
the United States. Washington, DC: U.S. GQvernment Printing
Office, 1980.
Field, H. s:, & Bienen, L. B. Jurors and rape: A study in psychology and law. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1980.
Gager, N., & Schurr, C. Sexual assault: Confronting rape in .America.
New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1976.
Glaser, D.

Handbook of criminology.

Chicago:

Rand McNally, 1974.

Grau, C. W. Whatever happened to politics? A critique of structuralist Marxist accounts of state and law. In P. Bierne & R.
Quinney (Eds), Marxism and the law. New York: John Wiley &
Sons, 1982.
Greenberg, D. Crime and capitalism.
lishing Company, 1981.
Griffin, s. Rape:
ber, 26-35.

Pa;Lo Alto, CA:

The all-American crime.

Mayfield Pub-

Ramparts, 1971; Septem-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

184
Grosman,· B. The prosecutor: An inquiry into the exercise of discretion. Toronto: University of Toronto Press·' 1969,
Gusfield, J. R. Moral passage: The symbolic process in the public
designations of deviance. Social Problems, 1967, .l2._, 175-188.
Gusfield, J, R. Symbolic crusade.
Press, 1963.

Urbana:

University of Illinois

Hagan, J. Extra-legal attributes and criminal sentencing: An assessment of a sociological viewpoint. Law and Society Review, 1974,
~.

357-383.

Haines, W. Quoted in Wittles, What can we do about sex crimes?
Saturday Evening Post, 1948, 221 {Dec. 11), 30-31.
Hale, Sir M. The history of the pleas of the crmm.
Rider, Little, Brown, 1800.

Hall, J. Theft, law, and society.
1952.

Indianapolis:

London:

E.

Babbs-Harrill,

Harring, S. L. Policing class society: The expansion of the urban
police in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
In Greenberg, D. Crime and capitalism. Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield
Publishing Co., 1981.
Harris, L. R. Towards a consent standard in the law of rape.
versity of Chicago Law Review, 1976, ~(3), 613-645.

Uni-

Hepburn, J. Social control and the legal order: Legitimated repression in a capitalist state, Contemporary Crisis, 1977, _!., 77-90.
Hepburn, J. R. Race and the decision to arrest: An analysis of
warrants issued. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency,
1978, _!2_, 54-73.
Herzog, A.

As cited in Yale Law Journal Note, 1972,

~.

at 1373.

Hibey, R. A. ·The trial of a rape case: An advocate's analysis of
corroboration, consent, and character. American Criminal Law
Review, Q, 309-334.
Holmstrom, L. L., & Burgess, A. W. Rape: The victim goes on trial.
In I. Drapkin & E. Viano (Eds.), Victimology: A new focus
(Vol. III). Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company, 1975.
Humphries, D., & Greenberg, D. The dialectics of crime control. In
Greenberg, D. (Ed.), Crime and capitalism. Palo Alto: Manfield
Publishing Co., 1981.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

185
Hunt, A. Dichotomy and contradiction in the sociology of law. In
P. Bierne & R. Quinney (Eds.), Marxism and the law. New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1982.

Jacoby, J, E. The prosecutor's- charging decision: A policy perspective. Washington, DC: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1977.
Jones, J. Prosecutors and public defenders: Cooperative relationships and non-negotiable cases. In B. Atkins & M. Pogrebin
(Eds.), The invisible justice system: Discretion and the law.
Cincinatti: Andersen Publishing Co., 1978.
Kalven, H., & Zeisel, R.
& Company, 1966.

The American jury.

Kanin, J, Sex aggression by college men.
Sexuality, 1970, _i, at 25, 29.

Boston:

Little, Brown

:Hedical Aspects of Human

Kaplan, J. The prosecutor's discretion: A coniment. In B. Atkins &
M. Pogrebin (Eds.), The invisible justice system: Discretion
~·
Cincinatti: Andersen Publishing Co., 1978.
Karlen, D., & Schultz, J, 1. Justice in the accusation. In S. Nagel
(Ed,), The rights of the accused: In law and action. Beverly
Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1972.
Klare, K. Judicial deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the origin
of modern legal consciousness. Minnesota Law Review, 1977, 62,
265-278.
Klemmack, S. H., & Klemmack, D. L. The social definition of rape,
In M. J. Walker & S. L. Brodsky (Eds.), Sexual assault. ·
Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company, 1976.
Kolka, G. The triumph of conservatism.
1963.

New York:

Kolka, G. Railroads and regulations: 1877-1916.
Princeton University Press, 1965.
Landau, S. Rape:
19-22.

The victim as defendant.

The Free Press,

Princeton, NJ:

Trial, 1974, 10 (July),
--

LeGrand, C. E. Rape and rape laws: Sexism in society and the law.
California Law Review, 1973, ..§JJ3), 919-941.
Lear, M. W, Q. If you rape a woman an4 steal her T.V., what can
they get you for in New York? A. Stealing her T.V. New York
Times Magazine, 1972, (Jan. 30), 11, 55, 60-63.
---

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

186
Lemert, E. M.
1951.

Social pathology.

Lindesmith, A. R.

New York:

The addict and the law.

McGraw-Hill Book Company,
New York":

Vintage Books,

1965.

Littrell, B.

w.

barSainins.

Bureaucratic justice: ·Police. prosecutors, and plea
Beverly Rills, CA:

Sage Publications, 1979.

Lizotte, A. J, Extra-legal factors in Chicago's criminal courts:
Testing the conflict model in criminal justice. Social Problems
1978, ll· 564-580.
Ludwig, M. The case for repeal of the sex corroboration ref:!uirement
in New York. Brooklyn Law Review, 1970, 2!• 378-386.
\

Luginbill, D. Repeal of the corroboration requirement: Bow will it
tip the scales of -jusdce? Drake Law Review, 1975, 24(.3), 669-

-

~.

McCaghy, C. H. Crime in American society.
lishing Company, Inc., 1980.

New York:

MacMilJ,an Pub-

McCahill, T. W., Meyer, L. C., & Fishman, A. M. The aftermath of
.E!E!• Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1979.
McCormick, A. E. Dominant class interests and the emergence of antitrust legislation. Contemporary Crisis, 1979, 1· 339-418.
McCormick, C. As cited in D. Luginbill, Repeal of the corroboration
requirement: How will it tip the scales of justice? Drake Law
Review, 1972, ~(3), at 674.
---

MacDonald, J. M, Rape: Offenders and their victims.
TI.: Charles C. Thomas, 1975.

Springfield,

Mares vs. Territory, 10 N.M. 770, 776 (1901), citing People vs. Hulse,
1 Hill 309.
Marsh, J, C., Geist, A., & Caplan, N. Rape and the limits of law
!!!2!:!!.· Boston: Auburn Publishing House, 1982.

Marx, K. The German ideOlogy,
1845-46/1970.

New Yorkr

Marx, K. The communist manifesto.
Crofts, 1848/1955.

Internadonal Publishers,

New York:

Appleton-Century-

Haher, L. A. Some determinants of the method of case disposition:
defenders in Los Angeles • .In G. F. Cole, Criminal justice: Law
and politics. North -~-~ituate, MA: Duxbury Press, 1976.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

187

Messinger, s. L. (Ed.). The Adline crime and justice annual.
cago: Adl!ne Publishing Company, 1974.

Chi-

Michalowski, R., & Bohlander, E. Repression and criminal justice in
capitalist America. Sociological inquiry, 1976, ~(2), 95-106.
Michigan Women's Task Force on Rape. Background material for a proposal for criminal code reform to respond to Michigan's rape
~· -~um~o> lS7!,,

MH:i.band, R. Reply to Nicos Poulantzas. In R. Blackburn (Ed.), Ideology_J.n social science: Readings in critical social theorY':"
London: Fontana, 1972.
Uiller, F. W. Prosecution: The decision to charge a suspect with a
crime. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969.
Myers, M, A., & Hagan, J. Private and public trouble: prosecutors
and the allocation of court resom:ces. Social Problems, 1979,
~. 439-451.
Nagel~

S. The rights of the accused: In law and action.
Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1972.

Beverly

National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal..Justice, Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration. Forcible rape: A
literature review and annotated bibliography. -Hashington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office, .1978.
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration, Fordble:rape: An analysis of legal issues. Washington, DC: U.S.'Government Printing
Office, 1978.
Neubauer, D. W. Criminal justice in middle America.
General Learning Press, 1974.

Morristown, NJ:

Newfield, J. Crime in the. suites: t-J'ill Congress go easy on corporate crooks? In D. E. J. MacNamara (Ed.), Criminal jUstice
80/81. Sluice Dock, Guilford, CT: The Dudkin Publishing Group,
InC., 1980.
Newman, D. J. Conviction: The determination of guilt or innocence
without triaL Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966.
Note, The rape corroboration requirement:
~. 1972, §J_, 1365-1391.

Repeal not reform.

Yale

Note, Police discretion and the judgement that a crime has been committed -- rape in Philadelphia. University of Pennsylvania Law
Review, 1968, .!!I.• 277-322.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

!SR
Note., Corroborating charges of rape..
1137-1148.

Columbia Law- Review, 1967; -67,
~-

0 1 Connor, J. The fiscal crisis of the state.
Press, 1973.

Perkins, R. M.

Criminal law.

New York:

New York:

St. Martins

Foundation Press, 1969.

Peterson, D. M., & Friday, P. c. Early release from incarceration:
Race as a factor in the use of "shock probation." Journal of
Cri:nim:.l Lmv·«ncl C't·lmino1ogv, 1975, .§.§._. 79-87.
----

Picciotto, s. The theory of the state, class struggle, and the rule
of law. In P. Bierne & R. Quinney (Eds.), Marxism and the law.
New York: John Wiley and Sons:, 1982.
Pitler, R. M. Existentialism and the corroboration of sex offenses
in New York: A new attempt to limit "if someone didn't see it,
it didn't happen." Syracuse Law- Review, 1973, ~. 1-37.

Ploscowe, D. Sex offenses: The- American legal context.
Contemporary ProDlems, .1960, Q, 217-223,

Law and
---

Plummer, K. Misunderstanding labeling perspectives. In D. Downes &
P. Rock (Eds.), Deviant interpretations. Ne-v York: Barnes and
Noble Books, 1979.
Pope, C. S. Postarrest release decisions: An empirical examination
of social and legal. criteria. Journal of Research in Crime and
Delinquency., 1978, .!l> 35-53.
Poulantz.as, N. Law. In P. Bierne & R. Quinney (Eds.), Marxism and
the law •. New York: John Wile-y and Sons, 1982.
Quinney, R. Crime and justice in society.
and Company, 1969.
Quinney, R. The social reality of crime.
and Company, 1970.

Boston:
Boston:

Little, Brown
Little, Brown

Quinney, R. Class, state, and crime: On the theory and practice of
criminal justice. New York: David HcKay, 1977.
Quinney, R.

Class, state, and crime.

New York:

Reiman, J. H. The rich get richer and the
John Wiley and Sons, 1979.

Longman, 1980.

poo~ ~~.t

nrison.

New York:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

189
Reiman,_ J. ,. & _Headle~, _S. Marxism and criminal justice policy.
Crime and Delinquency, 1981, n._, 24-47.
Ritzer, G. Contemporary sociological theory.
Knopf, 1983.

New York:

Alfred A.

Robin, G. D. Forcible rape: Institutionalized sexism in the criminal justice system. Crime and Delinquency, .1977, Q, 136-153.
Rock, ?. , & Mcintosh, M. (Eds. )_. Deviance and social control.
don: Tavistock Publications, 1979.

Lon-

Rosett, A., & Cressey, D. R. Justice by consent: Plea bargains in
the American courthouse. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1976.
Saggs, H. W. F. Greatness that was Babylon.
Library, 1962.

New York:

New American

Sasko, H., & Sesek., D. Rape reform legislation: Is i t the solution?
Cleveland State Law Review, 1975, ~(3), 463-503.
Schur, E. M. The politics of deviance: Stigma contests and the uses
of power. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1980.
Schur, E. M. Interpreting devi.ance:
New York: Harper & Row, 1979.

A sociological introduction.

Schwartz, M. D.J & Clear, T. R. Toward a new law on rape.
Delinquency, 1980, 1§_(2), 129..:151.

Crime and
---

Schwendinger, J. R., & Schwe.Jldin.ger, R. Rape and inegualitv.
- ly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1983.

B~ver

Schwendinger, H., & Schwendinger~ J .• R. Rape myths: In legal, theoretical, and everyday practice. Crime and Social Justice, 1974,
_l, 18-26.
Sebba, L. The requirement of corroboration in sex offenses. In I.
Drapkin & E. Viano (Eds.), Victimology: A new focus (Vol. III).
Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company, 1975.
Shapo, H. s. Recent statutory developments in the definition of forcible rape. Virginia Law Review, 1975, 2.!_(7), 1500-1543.
Southern California Law Review. Prosecutorial discretion and the
initiation of criminal complaints. In B. Atkins & M. Pogrebin
(Eds.), The invisible justice system: Discretion and the law.
Cincinatti: Anderson Publishing Company, 1978.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

190

Social Problems,

Spitzer, S. Toward a Har.xian theory of deviance.
1975, _ll., 638-651.

Spitzer, S. (Ed.}, Research_ in law: and sociology (.Vol. 2),
wich, CT: JAI Press, 1979.

Green-

Stapleman vs. State, 150 Neg. 460, 464, 34 N.W. 2d 907 (1948).
Starr vs. State, 205 Wis. 310, 311, 237 N.W. 96, 97 (1931)
Sudnow, D. Normal crimes: Sociological features of the penal code
in a public defender's office.. In W, J. Chambliss, Crime and
the legal proces·s. New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1969.
Sutherland, E., & Cressey·, D. R.
Lippincott Company, 1974.

Criminology.

Philadelphla:

J, B.

Taylor, I., Walton, P., & Young, J. The new criminology: For a social theory of deviance. New York: Harper and Row, 1973.
Tbio, A. Class bias in the sociology of deviance.
Sociologist, 1973, ~. 1-12.

The Punerican

Thompson, E. P. The rule of law. In P. Bie.rne & R. Quinney (Eds.),
Marxism and the law. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1982.
Thornberry, T. Race, socioeconomic status, and sentending in the
juvenile justice system. In S, L. Messinger (Ed.), The Adline
· crime and justice annual. Chicago: Adline Publishing Company,
1974.
Traab, S. K., &. Little, C. B. (Eds.}. Theories of deviance.
IL: F. E. Peacock Publishers, 1975.
Turk, A. Conflict and criminality.
!966, ]1, 338-351.

Itasia,

American Soeiological RevieW',

Turk, A. Criminality and the legal order.
1969.

Chicago:

Turk, A. Class, conflict, and criminalization.
1977' .!Q.. 209-220.

Rand XcNally,

Sociological Focus,

U. S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Criminal
victimization in the United States. Washington, DC: U-.-S-.Government Printing Office, 1979.
Walker, M. J., & Brodsky, S. L. Sexual assault.
D. C. Heath and Company, 1976~

Lexington, MA:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

191
Warner, C. G. Rape and sexual assault: Management and intervention.
Germantown, MD: Aspen Publicatio_ns, 1980.
Washburn, B. Rape law: The need for reform.
1975, 2 (May), 279-309.
Weber, M. Economy and society.
1968.

Totowa, NJ:

New Mexico Law Review,
B.edminster Press, 1921/

Weis, K., & Borges, S. S. Victimology of rape: The case of the legitimate victim. Issues in Criminology, 1973, .§_, 71-115.
Wigmore, J. H. A treatise. on the Anglo-American system of eVidence
in trials at common law, ·including the statutes and judicial
decisions of all jurisdictions: of the United States and Canada,
Chadbourne, J, W. (Ed.}. (3rd ed.). Boston: Little; Brown
and Company, 1940.
Williams.

As cited in Yale Law Journal Note, 1972,

~.

at 1373.

Wolfgang, :{. E., & Reidel, M. Race, judicial discretion and the
death penalty. Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, 1973, !QZ.., 119-133.
Wood, P. L. The victim in a forcible. rape case: A feminist view.
The American Criminal Law Re.view, 1973, .!.!..(2), 335-354.
Younger, J. The requirement of corroboration in prosecutions for sex
offenses in New York. Fordham Law Review, 1971, !!:2_, 263-272.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

